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Near East & South Asia

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Bank Report Predicts Normalization of Gulf Economies

44040417 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL
in Arabic 25 Apr 89 p 39

[Article: "Gulf Adjusts to Post-Oil Stage: Fact That Budgets in Gulf States Are Not Being Cut Is One of Positive Indicators in Those States Where Adjustments Are Being Completed in Economic Sectors"]

[Text] Positive indicators in the Gulf area continue to manifest themselves, and economic sectors continue to complete their adjustment to the post-oil stage. A report from the International Bank of the Gulf in Bahrain states that by the end of 1988 a number of positive developments had taken place in the area. These positive developments manifested themselves in an end to the Iraq-Iran war and an agreement reached by members of OPEC to set the ceiling for oil production until the first half of 1989 at 18.5 million barrels a day. In addition, the rapprochement between the two superpowers is growing, and that could lead to political detente which could manifest itself in the world's economy with the rate of exchange for the dollar becoming stable in world markets. That would have a positive effect on Gulf currencies which are tied to the dollar.

The report adds that the fact that the 1989 Saudi budget was not reduced and the fact that this year's expansion budgets for Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar were also not reduced created an atmosphere of optimism in the area.

Although no one expects an economic boom in 1989, it is expected that local demand will continue to improve and that normal levels of economic activities will be restored.

The report finds that the oil sectors are making effective contributions to the GNP [gross national product] of the various GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries. The oil sector contributes 20 percent of the GNP in Bahrain; 28 percent of the GNP in Saudi Arabia; and over 35 percent of the GNP in the other countries of the region.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had raised their average oil production rates to make up for the roll-back in oil prices. Except for Saudi Arabia, official figures are not yet available on the 1988 average growth rates in the GNP for the countries of the region. In Saudi Arabia, there was an improvement in growth rates for 1988, compared with last year.

The report states that the non-petroleum sectors of the economy continued to grow in 1988. Average local demand rose significantly during the last quarter of the aforementioned year. One of the most prominent indicators of this growth is the noticeable improvement in

trade activities and in retail sales operations. Profits of commercial banks rose; there was a gradual revival of the construction and housing sectors; and rents as well as real estate prices rose.

In the United Arab Emirates, for example, land prices rose by approximately 20 percent during the past year. The highest rate of increase was in Dubai where the increase amounted to 25 percent. Other Gulf states were not exempted from this increase, even though the increase there was not as high as it was in the United Arab Emirates.

Another indicator of the improvement in local economic activities is the general increase in the price of shares sold in the region. In Saudi Arabia share prices continued to rise last year. The Financial Advisory Center's index rose 11.1 percent after scoring an 80.2 percent increase in 1987.

It has been noticed that this increase does not fully reflect the sharp increase in the value of some Saudi shares. Compared to last year, for example, the value of shares in the Saudi Company for Basic Industries (SABIC) rose by 167 percent. The volume of trading in the four issues which were put on the market last year exceeded the value of the shares significantly.

Shares performed well in the United Arab Emirates too. The value of some shares rose more than 50 percent. In one year the price of a share in the Abu Dhabi National Bank rose 32 percent, and the price of one share in the Abu Dhabi Cooperative Society rose 50 percent. In Bahrain there was a similar increase in share prices. Shares in the National Bank of Bahrain, which is one of the main indicators of share activity, rose more than 50 percent. In Kuwait, however, the situation was different. At the end of the year the al-Shal index closed at 41.21 points, and that is a 1.4 percent decline compared with last year.

The announcement of a cease fire between Iraq and Iran caused a 17 percent increase in the prices of Kuwaiti shares. Most of that increase dwindled, however, after interest rates on deposits in Kuwaiti dinars rose.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Hamas Leader Ahmad Yasin Interviewed
44040436b Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI
in Arabic May 89 pp 16-19

[Interview with Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, leader of Hamas, by unnamed interviewer: "Proposed Solutions a Mirage"; date and place not given]

[Text] This is an interview with militant Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the most prominent leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Palestine. At the end of the first year of the intifadah [uprising], he dealt with various aspects of the Palestinian political situation.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] The independence declaration of 15 November 1988 regarded Resolution 181 of 1948 as still providing conditions for international legitimacy. What is your opinion about this?

[Yasin] I tell you that international legitimacy in my opinion is on the side of the strong man. The strong man has legitimacy; the weak man does not have legitimacy. I'll give you an example. Namibia—the Security Council and the world gave it independence long ago, but South Africa, because it is powerful, agreed to give Namibia independence only when war, problems, and foreign interventions took place. Afterwards, they finally agreed under pressure. International legitimacy belongs to the powerful; the weak have no rights as far as legitimacy is concerned.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] Are you for or against the Palestinian state, and why?

[Yasin] We are for a liberated Palestinian state. However, we are of the view that the proclamation of it was premature, since we have not liberated any part of our homeland. We will establish the state on any part of our homeland that we liberate. While we are still under occupation and without its having withdrawn from us yet, where shall we establish the state? In what place? In Amman, or Cairo, or Algiers? We must have land where we can stand freely and establish our state without preconditions and without offering concessions.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] Some newspapers have published a statement by you, saying that you reject the National Council resolutions, but respect the opinion of the majority. What do you mean by saying that you respect the opinion of the majority? Does that mean that you abide by it? Is a National Council majority legitimacy for you? Does it represent the majority of the Palestinian people?

[Yasin] I said that I respect the opinion of the majority and still say so. The meaning of "respect" is different from the legitimacy in which I believe and of which I approve. Respect is one thing; approval is another. I do not impose Islam on people by force; I summon people to Islam, so that they may accept it out of conviction and faith. I call on the Palestinian people and National Council to embrace Islam and establish an Islamic state in Palestine.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] If the nations of the world recognize this state and call for direct negotiations, what is your view of the future?

[Yasin] I want to tell you that all this talk will come to nothing, because the other party (Israel) is a party that absolutely does not want to arrive at giving anything to the Palestinians and will not concede a single point. I don't think the international conference will accomplish

anything. Even if the international conference takes place and is held, our view that we announce to the public remains—namely, that this way is unsound, wrong, and premature.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] In brief, what should we say to the Muslims of the world about your position?

[Yasin] Tell them that we agree on a state, but we stress not abandoning our full rights. We want it to be a state that returns us all our land and all our people.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] How have the National Council's resolutions affected the intifadah of the Palestinian people?

[Yasin] Naturally, some people have rejoiced, since they feel spiritually that they have a state. But the problem is what is the reality of the state. Where is this state, and what tangible benefit has it realized for the Palestinian people in the occupied territory? It has not solved their vital problems, and thus has been considered invisible and unrecognized.

In fact, the Palestinian people here say that if the issue is one of land—for example, my getting the Gaza strip—I already am present in Gaza. So the problem is not one of getting the Gaza strip or something else. That would not solve the problem. So while I do not reject the state, just as the Palestinian people do not reject it, we are not satisfied with the path that has been taken, the path of acknowledging resolutions that abrogate our rights. Resolution 242, for example, considers the Palestinian people refugees and their problem a refugee problem. This is what the people here do not accept.

At the stage of no return, men, women, and children are really not prepared to retreat, because there is nothing left for them to fear. Therefore, everyone is on a path against the occupation, in order to realize his existence and dignity. I think the Palestinian people are becoming more resolute with the events. There are no deserters or spectators in their ranks, because suffering has entered every house. There is no house whose occupants have not been subjected to beating, imprisonment, expulsion, murder, or various kinds of punishment. The people here believe that they should continue on their path and in their uprising. Nothing can stand in the way of the intifadah. The proposed solutions are a mirage, and a mirage will achieve nothing for this people.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] At the end of the intifadah's first year, what are the most important achievements it has realized?

[Yasin] There is much to be said about the achievements of the intifadah. As just one example, the image of the Palestinian people in the world was that of a criminal—a murderer and airline hijacker. Then the intifadah came to show the world the real image of the Palestinian: a human being wronged, deprived of his rights, sometimes

pursued and expelled, and sometimes killed, only because he demands his usurped rights. This clear image has brought with it the world's sympathy. It has provided the opportunity for the Palestinian to announce his desire to establish his Palestinian state. The Palestinian people now feel that they are expressing themselves and rejecting their present state in a variety of ways, even by stones, these being the possibilities available to them. They now feel an emotional unity and solidarity with each other. They feel that despair has gone, fear has gone, and that psychological strength exists—and all this for the purpose of attaining their rights. These can be considered the most important achievements. In addition, the Palestinian people were suffering from a stage of indecision, being lulled to sleep, and loss of morale. The intifadah has removed many of these factors and has acquainted the world with this issue and its course.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] How do you see the future of the intifadah?

[Yasin] The future is in the hand of God, but our present feeling is that the intifadah will continue. Knowledge belongs to God. None knows the Unseen except God. But again I say that according to our feeling and knowledge it will continue. I want to say that it is moving like a wave of the sea: sometimes turbulent, sometimes calm, sometimes high, and at other times low.

[AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI] A final word?

[Yasin] Before the recent meeting of the National Council I had a telephone interview. I was asked whether I wanted to address a message to the National Council. I said that I wanted to say three things to them: that they should embrace Islam, that they should continue in their struggle, and that they should be patient, because patience is the way to success. Patience and time are half of success for our cause. I say to every Palestinian youth and man that what is now needed is a return to God and to religion; victory will come after that. Our Lord has said in the Holy Koran [28:5], "And We desire to be gracious to those who were abased in the land, and to make them leaders, and to make them the inheritors." If we are patient, return to God, and make Islam a way and path for action, I believe that our problem is on the way to solution. Despair finds no way to the believer, nor does he know it. The believer is patient, until God judges; and God is the best of judges. I add that the Islamic spirit and Islamic consciousness think that the entire nation has sunk into the sea and that nothing remains to save it but the Book of God. This is clear now. All of them, by thus clinging to God and holding to their right, are on the way to victory for Islam.

West Bank Cottage Industries Aim for Economic Independence

44040443 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 27 May 89 pp 48-51

[Article by Mawal Al-Ghul: "Political Independence Is a Feminist Experiment that Means the Difference

Between Death and Possible Life! Does Anybody Care?"]

[Text] The past year's upheavals of the destiny of the Palestinian woman were not the result of the continuing disruptions in the occupied territory. Like other historical stances, they were the result of difficult uncontrollable circumstances that have imposed on the Palestinian woman different reactive patterns indicative of the Palestinian's ability to adapt to different conditions.

As in the case of any other development, difficult economic conditions that beset all Palestinian households have been their own convincing argument for a fundamental change in their economic dimension in order to mobilize every available talent and raw material that has been, until now, of day to day significance.

The ability to utilize these resources in one form or another is indicative of human success in adapting and surviving.

The cottage industry concept has been, and still is, debated by several local economic entities. The concept did not come out of nowhere but was born out of a pressing necessity to find alternatives to the foreign product as a first serious step towards economic independence and self-sufficiency.

But is it really possible to achieve economic independence by tapping the economic potential and organizing the activities of various Palestinian towns and villages?

The concepts of cottage industries and self-sufficiency have become an overriding issue for every small family in every Palestinian household. Nay, they have become daily rituals practiced in every kitchen and at every table. They are among economic priorities for families that have preserved these practices, mostly within the framework of returning to the land for one's primary consumption needs.

But they soon took a larger and more mature form, especially in certain Palestinian villages that, thanks to the diligent among their member, were able through "cooperatives" to extend this effort to all families.

Worthy of particular mention are the two villages of Bethel, in the township of Ramallah, and of Sa'irah, in the township of al-Khalil, which were particularly successful in establishing two economic cooperatives supervised and operated by area women. The cooperatives produce and distribute various local farm and other products and have achieved a satisfactory degree of success.

But despite considerable success in the two aforementioned villages, the experiment was only partially successful, and partially a failure, in the town of Beit Sahur, where the concept was implemented and though not stillborn, was very weak and living in a glass incubator hanging between life and death.

Like other villages, Bayt Sahur, township of Bethlehem, returned to the land for self-sufficiency and replaced decorative trees and plants with fruit trees and consumable plants. However, the experiment there fell short of total success. Several of its markets and stores have replaced almost all "foreign" goods with the domestic output of local factories that blossomed during that period and generally succeeded in meeting most consumer needs for citizens of the West Bank and Gaza.

But the innate desire to keep Bayt Sahur's consumption confined to the limits of its production led many of its women to consider forming cooperatives similar to those in Bethel and Sa'irah, but on a more elementary level by operating out of their homes (in order to achieve something like profitable foodstuffs). One of the women, for instance, would specialize in the making of candies of all types, another in baked goods, while a third would specialize in producing spices, etc. This specialized division of production [labor] continued for a while but stopped at the doors to partial success.

For an in-depth search for the reasons why the Bayt Sahur economic project attained only partial success, teacher Jahad Khuri (Umm 'Ala'), an active woman with sustained participation in the project, invites us to examine the dimensions of this feminist economic experiment.

Although a number of town women created a local productive quasi-cooperative operated out of their various homes, she and a neighbor were, in the final analysis, the only ones to endure in the face of failure.

Before delving into the reasons for that failure, teacher Khuri insists that we have no call to dub that women's experiment a failure merely because it did not sufficiently expand to include the whole town. She says: "It is an experiment, and a somewhat successful one in my opinion". She says she was able to bring the town's women together and involve them in serious productive work that is likely to develop Bayt Sahur. Umm 'Ala' insists that we begin our search on the day when the town's productive experiment was conceived and undertaken, and not when it began to falter.

She says: Current conditions, the closure of schools, and the need for home economics had a great deal to do with prompting the steps we took. We were induced by our involuntary spare time to seek a project within the simple means available to us. There was also the question of Jordan's legal and administrative ties to the West Bank and the resultant "halving" of teacher salaries. Income was needed money to cover my daughter's expenses in Greece where she went for her education. Add to that the recurring waves of inflation and the devaluation of the dinar and shekel. All that, as far as I was concerned, was reasons to hit a hundred birds with one stone.

Jahad's home economics efforts were not too far removed from her specialty as a home economics teacher at the Bayt Sahur girls' school. Being highly cultured and widely read, she decided to use her skills to serve the town's economy by dividing production chores among the townswomen in order to create some sort of autonomy for the town.

Al-Khuri says: Yes, we actually began operations. I specialized in making Arab and various other kinds of sweets. Another specialized in such baked goods as Kibbeh and Safiha. One lady was given charge of coffee—to roast, grind, and package. Another was assigned to grind and package species, and so on.

We proceeded with the project. My job was to make the sweets—prepare the dough and the filling and bake the goods. Then, with the help of my 15-year-old son 'Ala', package the product and distribute it to a number of shops in the area. Demand for the product was strong for a considerable period and we thought of expanding our sales to three or four grocery stores where the product was sold at a little above cost. Other women were also doing their part.

Despite the project's initial success, several difficulties were apt to show their ugly face. Because demand frequently surpassed supply, Umm 'Ala' and others narrowed distribution to only one grocery store. That is, limitations of time and resources put a damper not on the willingness to continue with the project, but on the ability to sustain expansion in production and innovation.

Teacher Khuri says: Demand for my sweets was reason enough for me and my neighbor Hiyam Khuri to maintain this effort till the present time. We would have doubled our efforts and expanded our operations and other aspects of this local project were it not for the obstacles we faced.

Obstacles to continuity included the lack of equipment to automate such chores as dough-making, mixing, and freezing as well as coffee grinding and roasting. We used our own equipment in the beginning, she said pointing to a small mixer and a medium-size oven, but they proved too small to handle increased market demand. Accordingly, we had to reduce our activity in line with our modest equipment. I still would have been unable to meet demand were I to work 12 hours using these simple tools. Now I limit my efforts, with the help of my neighbor Hiyam and a woman relative, by supplying only one store in addition to specific requests.

She emphasized: The home, by its nature, impeded expansion because it is not large enough to accommodate all participating women. Its size alone limits their freedom of movement. Besides, the prospect of imminent school reopening caused us to reduce activity rather than plunge in at our own expense to buy the necessary equipment. The absence of a responsible authority to

support our efforts to their conclusion was also a limiting factor. We are trying whoever possible to overcome these and many other obstacles. Sometimes we succeed and sometimes we don't.

When Jihad Khuri and the women of Sahur spun their economic tale with persistence and insistence on continuing no matter what the obstacles, news of their success spread and demand increased from that town, perhaps because of curiosity as people sought to discover the elements of innovation, persistence, and courage that resulted in success without need for plants, automatic equipment, workers, and qualified full-time technicians. The aura of joyful success that usually accompanies new ventures gave way to practical considerations, instilling in all citizens confidence and strong wish for local steps towards self-sufficiency by devising substitutes for the products of other economies.

Yes, that was a period of success, so much so that many consumers decided to go directly to the "factory"—Jihad Khuri and her friends at their homes—bypassing the stores which encouraged the effort by displaying and selling the product. Demand increased and surpassed their capacity for continual work, causing them to abandon "production on recommendation" to producing according to need, thus reducing pressure. Jihad says: We followed that course because of the obstacles I enumerated and the absence of equipment and a suitable place to work, and in order to reduce work pressures. We succeeded somewhat.

The women's effort, as any other success story, had to send out roots to reach those able to adopt such projects which split rocks and grow within it plants that are leafy green, albeit weak. The point of weakness, despite all the other elements of success such as persistence, will, and diligence, was that all parties that supported the initial steps suddenly abandoned the effort in midstream, stagnating the others.

Jihad Khuri comments: Our early steps were successful and attracted people to our simple products. They also attracted certain authorities which wanted to examine what we were doing and discuss the feasibility of sponsoring and supporting the effort. Indeed, the Arab Development Fund in Jerusalem studied the project and commended its leaders and their efforts to adapt circumstances for the benefit of the project.

The Arab Development Fund set about to develop this feminist project, visiting the participants tens of times and offering to circulate samples of their output beyond Bayt Sahur and even outside the region. Khuri says that fund officials undertook to export samples of our products even to Poland and other nations.

She adds: Even after our efforts received support and commendation, Fund officials deemed it necessary to maintain follow-up and support. They asked that we double the effort to increase production, which we did,

being beholden to those who supported us financially or even with a kind word. Unfortunately, we found out in the middle of "the battle of production," they withdrew their support after they said they would distribute and market all our products. This threw us into a quandary on how to dispose of all the excess inventory—do we let it go to waste? Do we offer it for sale at the few available grocery stores? All solutions that presented themselves to us were illogical.

She pauses, then adds: In truth, such a setback should have discouraged us and destroyed our willingness to continue.

Umm 'Ala' says the authorities had also promised to help expand the project to include the preparation and packaging of spices and coffee as well as the making of baked goods. These solemn promises were suddenly withdrawn for reasons unknown to us.

Of course, financial or material difficulty were not cause for reneging on promises to support the project initiated by Al-Khuri and the other women. The Fund had previously, and perhaps even during the same period, subsidized a number of other projects such as the al-Ra'at bakery, supported before the outbreak, and a project for a plant nursery.

[The issue of] support for the latter project raises numerous questions on the reasons for subsidizing such a feminist project initiated by Jihad Khuri and other women in Sahur. Initial readings of their collective effort were until very recently indicative of a new period of good economic potential for one of the villages of the West Bank, even for all feminist cooperative movements which are all diligent in the quest for economic independence, regardless of how young the experiment or of the mistakes made. Why, why was support for the project withdrawn?

Even though this economic road of a hundred thousand miles is fraught with problems and replete with bumps and potholes, the group of women in Sahur persisted in the belief that when a door closes, fate will cause a wider one to open. That wider door may be insignificant in view of the effort entailed, but suffices that it offers encouragement and is a reminder that their efforts do not go unappreciated.

A woman's bazaar was being planned which would feature all types of women's handicrafts and other local products. Khuri recalls that she and her colleagues were invited to take part in that bazaar which was sponsored by the Committee for Farm Relief. The Committee helped defray part of the Sahur women's expenses for raw materials, flour, and fillings. All the women had to do was make the effort and supply the skills that have always been the mark and pride of the women of Sahur.

Khuri recalls with joy: Our goods were greatly admired at the bazaar. Contributions by women of al-Jil—the neighborhood where she lives—were considerable and effective and impressed the name of Bayt Sahur on all those who saw our product or tasted it. It was personally satisfying that we made the majority of the region's women grow so accustomed to collective work through this feminist cooperative effort that they wanted to continue this activity even after the bazaar was over. This desire, however, was frustrated by distribution and marketing difficulties. The products we made for the bazaar were consumed by those attending it. Were it not for the bazaar, we would not have had such a high volume of production and would have had difficulty marketing consumables while still fresh.

The Committee for Farm Relief bazaar's acceptance of the feminist product of Bayt Sahur may have been the first step, or even the turning point, at which the [women of Sahur] realized that their efforts were noted and their persistence appreciated. Success begets success, and the women now supply other bazaars whose tables never lack the popular products of Bayt Sahur.

On that day of 8 March, as Palestinian women recorded their stances and memories in history books, they [the women of Sahur] were given an opportunity to expand their project. In the name of their town and encouraged by their bazaar experience, the women of Bayt Sahur joined the women's conference at the National hotel in Jerusalem to exhibit their achievements for three or four days. On the occasion of 8 March, International Day of Women, the Federation of Women's Committees asked us to supply the baked goods, such as safihah and sambusik. We prepared the dough and fillings at home but preferred to do the baking at the Al-Ra'ah bakery because it is spacious and easy to maneuver in.

She recalls with a smile: We put some 12 large trays in the oven and they were ready inside of two hours. It was smooth sailing from then on!

Al-Khuri emphasizes that the effort was not in vain this time. In view of their product's popularity at the conference, the women's federation expressed willingness to market Bayt Sahur sweets and has actually done so even though the return has been somewhat marginal. Al-Khuri recalls that a woman at the bazaar expressed admiration for the wonderful product, as she put it, by exclaiming that the idea was even better than the product itself!

Al-Khuri comments: This really makes us aware of the kind of effort we made. It gives value to the preliminary steps we have taken towards economic self-sufficiency. Al-Khuri then stops talking, leaving the morning's sun to penetrate all the words and awaken our joy from its long winter hibernation, or its still-birth.

Jahad Khuri, Sahuri teacher at the Bayt Sahur school for girls, was not content to just convey the townswomen's attempts to reach economic self-sufficiency, the obstacles they faced, their dreams, and their indirect invitations for concerned officials to observe first hand their magnificent, albeit preliminary, accomplishments.

Not content to recount only that, she touched on various other issues of no less importance. She discussed the concept of returning to the land and talked about the considerable maturity and consciousness gained by the Palestinian woman in a very short period of time. She discussed certain flawed economic practices and the role of family in nutritional education. She also discoursed on the Palestinian woman's efforts in all aspects of life under the prevailing conditions and her attempts to coordinate home, economics, need, and even the desire to enter new and developed stages of dealing with all matters. She has emerged from all that a humane woman capable of understanding and adapting to the most difficult and vicious of conditions. She had to discuss that with us, being one of the women of persistence who attempted, and still does, to develop viable substitutes to current economic and social conditions.

But we must emphasize here that it is of the utmost importance that sponsors be found to shield this and other experiments with their funding ability until this small Palestinian Arab boat reaches a safe harbour. All efforts currently being exerted in Bayt Sahur or other locations are expended in the interests of every town, village, and camp and is of no less importance than what has taken place in Bethel and Sa'ir and their two separate cooperatives, or which will take place in Janin, Nablus, Gaza, or Jericho. All of them will take us, in the final analysis, on the road to some sort of self-sufficiency. Will we really reach that goal?

ALGERIA

Labor Minister Interviewed on Strikes, Employment Problems

45190080a Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 28-29, 30 Apr 89

[Interview with Labor and Social Affairs Minister Mohamed Nabi by Ali Bahmane and Ammar Belhimeur; date and place not given. First paragraph in each installment is publisher's introduction.]

[28-29 Apr 89 pp 2, 3]

[Text] Some 200 work stoppages have been counted in the last 3 months. This unprecedented wave of strikes has its causes and, of course, its consequences. In a long discussion on the subject, the minister of labor, employment and social affairs underscores the importance of the future law governing the right to strike, now in the drafting stage. The consensus-based text will authorize recourse to this constitutional right under normal conditions. Mr Mohamed Nabi also raises the plight of those

who are not fortunate enough to have jobs and the steps that could and should be taken to help them. The unemployment problem, he reveals, is already—and will continue to be over the coming years—one of the greatest challenges we have to face.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Several days ago, you were a guest on Channel 3. The studio's switchboard was deluged with calls from listeners, indicating that there is an information gap regarding all aspects of the work world.

[Nabi] Frankly, that is an understatement. For more than 4 hours, Channel 3 received calls from several dozens of listeners. Clearly, there is an information gap. Workers do not always know where to take their complaints and grievances.

I would have personally liked to answer them directly then and there, but that was physically impossible. I can, however, reassure those who called on the night of the broadcast that we will work with Channel 3 to respond to each of their calls. Still, the best solution is to arrange for information to be disseminated on a permanent and regular basis to workers and their dependents. The services of the ministry are available to the press for the publication of special columns. This was done last year by HORIZONS and EL MOUDJAHID with conclusive results. I will use this opportunity to propose that these columns be started up again or initiated by all members of the press wishing to do so.

[EL MOUDJAHID] For the past 6 months, the country has been experiencing a wave of strikes without precedent in its history. What do you attribute them to? Are they related solely to salary issues?

[Nabi] "A wave without precedent?" Yes—at least, much larger, four or five times much larger, than the strikes we had in those months in previous years. The causes are not limited to salaries, although the problem of remuneration and the broader problem of purchasing power in general are central. It seems to me that there are four reasons for the strikes.

First, there is the reason you have just mentioned, salaries—remuneration in all its forms—and other reasons that could be grouped under the heading "general working conditions" (health, safety, labor organization and relations, cafeterias, cooperatives...).

Second, there are reasons that do not always involve the company alone, but that compel the attention of the nation as a whole, such as housing, transportation, etc. Demands related to housing were by far foremost in the 200 some work stoppages observed in the public administration sector from the beginning of the year to the 15th of March. Housing was cited 95 times, whereas salaries and income were cited only 44 times.

The problem is felt as acutely by the workers as it is by a large share of the population and it is not, once again, up to the company or management alone to take action.

The third type of reason is related to new demands that, in a certain number of cases, involve criticism of the supervisory structure, whether it be managers or workers' representatives.

The fourth type of reason, which seems to be a particularly sensitive one since last February, is related to questions or doubts being raised generally throughout society today and that obviously extend into the company or workplace.

It is evident that the problems raised by the work world can be addressed only if we implement appropriate solutions and responses to their diverse causes. Consequently, action by the government and public authorities is being initiated simultaneously on several distinct levels that I can discuss with you.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Behind the demands on salaries lies the central question of purchasing power. What measures does the government intend to institute in this area?

[Nabi] The government has responded with two series of measures, one involving salaries and the various types of bonuses and allowances, and another involving the purchasing power of those sources of income.

At the beginning of the year, the government decided (as you know) to raise salaries at the lower end of the pay scale. The lowest salary (1,100 dinars) was increased to 1,500 dinars. The increase essentially affects the first 10 brackets of the present wage scale. Concurrently, out of a desire to decentralize decisionmaking powers, the bonus and allowance section of the SGT [workers statutes] is henceforth the domain of the company—meaning managers and workers' representatives—and will depend upon the company's means and resources.

At the same time, to guarantee the full effect of its decision to raise salaries, the government is striving to ensure that essential goods are available at prices stabilized at their 1988 levels.

Similarly, it is working to improve and reorganize the distribution system on the one hand, and to strengthen price controls and anti-speculation efforts on the other.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Housing and transportation are a concern to workers, yet there is no sign of a definitive and lasting solution on the immediate horizon.

[Nabi] It is clear that an effective solution to these problems cannot lie solely with companies or employers, although the company can obviously contribute if its means of intervention could be formulated more precisely. That is one concern now before the appropriate

departments. But the solution is, of course, to increase the country's capacity to build new housing. In particular, we must expand the availability of construction materials considerably by using our production capacities more judiciously, by investing more in the manufacture of construction materials and, in the meantime, by increasing imports to the extent our foreign exchange reserves allow. As an example, a 10-percent reduction in our food import bill, which stands at 14 billion dinars for the current year, would enable us to fully meet our needs in construction materials and thereby raise our construction capacities from 90,000 to 100,000 housing units a year.

It goes without saying that the reduction in the food import bill entails an increase in national food production, not a reduction in consumption.

Still on the subject of housing, it is true that we must build more, but it is also true that we must ensure that completed units are equitably distributed. A series of measures have been adopted toward this end to make housing available in an open and public manner to those who have the most legitimate right to it.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Presumably, there are limits to how far the public sector can go without "breaking." While it may indeed offer the best conditions for labor and even political expression, it is nonetheless "young" and fragile....

[Nabi] That is a pertinent question that brings us to the public sector's capacity to respond immediately to every demand its workers raise and that determines its preservation and future development. Very obviously, the first of its limits lies in the financial feasibility of satisfying all of the demands, and some of them incidentally do not fall directly within its responsibility even though the public sector offers a favorable forum for expressing them. It is the will of the public authorities and of companies to take charge of everything that can be placed in their charge, with available resources the sole limitation.

The most lasting response to the expectations of workers lies nonetheless in improving the public sector's performance to a level enabling it to generate new resources and progressively satisfy the legitimate demands of workers while ensuring its own development, which is essential to the country's development.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In some places, there have been complaints against managers and "elected" union officials for "incompetence" or "lack of representativity." The strikers seem to have no forum for their complaints in these cases. The ministry of labor has the prerogatives and the authority to recognize the legality or the legitimacy of a labor demand and can take steps to satisfy a demand. But can it handle such cases as these?

[Nabi] Measures that should facilitate a solution to this type of problem, which lies at the root of a certain number of disputes, have already been adopted and put into place. Where the representation of workers is involved, we have adopted mechanisms and procedures under the office of CNGSE [expansion unknown] designed to handle this type of situation very quickly and in a fully democratic fashion. The measures provide for new elections, open to all candidates, to be organized in as short a period of time as possible to elect a body that reflects the views of the great majority of the workers at the company or institution concerned.

Where managers and directors are challenged, the measures adopted should ensure that this type of problem is handled with respect for the rights and obligations of managers who are workers themselves, first of all, and without losing sight of the need to maintain and strengthen the indispensable solidarity among workers and managers who work to develop the public sector. However opinions may differ, the public sector is the backbone of the country's social and economic development.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In certain rare cases, the dispute seems driven by political escalation or even by "manipulation."

[Nabi] As I have just said, the work world is clearly not shielded from the questions and worries felt by all of society today. This may sometimes lead to an escalation, which is not conducive to solving problems.

The solution to this type of problem lies in our continuing effort to give greater scope and depth to the democratic process. At a very recent meeting of the Central Committee of the FLN [National Liberation Front], the president of the republic firmly reiterated this goal and the inevitability and wisdom of it.

[EL MOUDJAHID] But we have seen that the public sector is the sole target of strikes. Why?

[Nabi] The sole target? No, although it is the target of most, certainly. The economic public sector was the first to be targeted, then as of March, the strikes spread into the administrative public sector (teaching, health, postal service, community services, etc.). Why the public sector? First, because it is by far the largest employer where the largest concentrations of workers are to be found. It is also the best forum for raising and debating problems, for expressing them in an organized manner. Perhaps the dividing wall is weakest in the public sector between what is happening in society—its questioning and worries—and what is happening in the work world.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Another question about the concentration of strikes in the public sector: Can it be linked to the fact that the public sector offers the most guarantees for exercising and expressing certain rights and freedoms?

[Nabi] That is essentially what I have just said, it seems to me.

[EL MOUDJAHID] There seems to be a problem when it comes to taking action, as many of the strikes are "recurrent," if that is the term. Is it because promises have not always been kept?

[Nabi] Unkept promises? Probably in a few cases, but it is certainly not true of the great majority of disputes we have seen. On the whole, the agreements reached between managers and workers' representatives, sometimes with difficulty and delay, are being applied with a desire to restore healthy labor relations and to return to work in the best of conditions.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In most cases, the strikes resulted in salary increases (various bonuses and allowances were awarded) that were legally due in keeping with the workers statutes. These financial "improvements" nonetheless have an impact on the company as well as on government resources for carrying out policy. How great an impact is it?

[Nabi] The impact of the pay raise at the lower end of the wage scale, which the government approved at the beginning of the year, is approximately 7 billion dinars. The raise brings with it other increases that involve the bonus and allowances schedule for the most part. In addition, there are increases related to job reclassification and various corrections called for by the regulations in force. The impact of all these measures stands at a year-end figure of at least 11 billion dinars, which is considerable since it represents nearly 10 percent of the wage bill.

The first question that comes to mind is whether production and productivity have increased commensurately and put an equivalent value of goods and services on the market, so that the pay raises do not result in price increases. That is to say that the salary measures will preserve and improve purchasing power as expected only if there is a corresponding increase in production and productivity.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Where will the government and companies find the money to pay for these new costs?

[Nabi] There is only one answer to that question. The company, with the managers and workers it is made up of, and the national economy in general should be able to derive new resources from an equivalent, if not greater, rise in production and productivity. Failing that, these costs will end up fueling inflation. Although controllable, it would require constant attention.

[EL MOUDJAHID] It is true, however, that increased production and productivity do not depend on the workers alone, or even on the way companies are managed, but to a large degree on supplies, given the dependence and outward orientation of the nation's economy.

[Nabi] They depend on all those factors. They depend as much on improvement in the way work and management are structured as on the reliable and sufficient supply of spare parts, raw materials and semifinished products to the production system. Naturally, this last factor is directly linked to our foreign exchange resources and to the importance of this last element to our development.

As to government action in this field, I refer you to statements made by the head of government on this important facet of the action taken by public authorities, in particular to defend the price of oil, to lighten the debt burden that is far from affecting Algeria alone, and to increase our nonoil exports.

[EL MOUDJAHID] But there is now an immediate goal, which is to create the jobs called for in the government's program. Given the current financial constraints, how is this to be done? Can the government keep its promises on jobs?

[Nabi] Clearly, that is not likely to make the task any easier, especially since the general economic environment was not the most favorable to begin with. But the task does not have to be easy in order to be achievable. I remain absolutely convinced that the job creation program to which the government is committed will, with the help of all, be carried out successfully.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Strikes concern those who have a job, but there are all those who are at risk of losing their jobs, who have already lost their jobs and who are not yet fortunate enough to have a job.

[Nabi] Yes, all the "others," as you call them. And you know what the figures are, in particular, how the situation can evolve over the next few years given an average yearly increase of 200,000 in the demand for employment.

But your question relates more globally to our job creation policy. Let me therefore briefly recall some of our present concerns. One of the government's major objectives aims at preserving the tools of work, utilizing production capacities fully in liaison with the community of workers, and ensuring regular supplies to companies.

In this vein, I would like to underscore the fact that our imports for 1989 are growing by nearly 50 percent over our 1988 imports. Even if food imports take up a large share of our import bill with a 3-billion-dinar increase, priority has been given to efforts directed at supplying the production system at a corresponding level, which should enable us to preserve jobs and improve incomes by rewarding stimulation and results.

But beyond the program for the current year, the employment problem is already—and will continue to be in years to come—one of the greatest challenges we have to face.

It relates to our entire development policy and to the central problem of our economic performance figures.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In addition, a minimum of [capital] accumulation is necessary to replace old equipment. Therefore, companies must not only be kept from foundering, but enabled to clear enough revenue to expand and thereby create jobs.

[Nabi] Your question takes us back to the answer I have just given and, of course, relates to the economy as a whole. We must do what is necessary to raise our economy as rapidly as possible to a level of efficiency that would provide not only better pay for workers and a higher standard of living for the population, but also the necessary [capital] accumulation to expand investments to a level at which some 200,000 jobs can be created each year.

This situation requires greater effort, discipline, output, and sacrifice from all of us equally. Only through austerity and work in an environment of social justice and national solidarity can we guarantee every one of our children a job.

Without going back over the government's employment program in any detail, for the immediate future it should be pointed out that dozens of concrete measures have emerged and we are convinced that they will make it possible to improve the situation over the next 2 to 3 years by tapping the available but under-used "well-springs of employment" as they are called.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In general, women are the first victims of unemployment and job losses....

[Nabi] It is evident that when pressures arise over jobs, there is a tendency in that direction. It is true of all societies. Up to now, there has been nothing to confirm your fears in the job losses we have experienced. Indeed, 80 percent of the job losses occurred in the building and public works sector where the number of women employed is still insignificant.

There is nothing in our Constitution, laws, religious and moral values or our Revolution that authorizes discrimination of any kind. Where employment is concerned, the only battle worth fighting at this time is the battle to bring about the conditions that would enable the national economy to create enough jobs so that every Algerian man and woman seeking employment can find a job in Algeria that will guarantee them a decent living. A great deal remains to be done and it will take a great deal of time. With more efficiency on the job from everyone, we must create the conditions that will enable all citizens to help build the country.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The conditions for exercising the right to strike are in the process of being codified. Could you give us an outline of the legal text being prepared?

[Nabi] After the new Constitution was adopted with the right to strike guaranteed in Article 54, it was announced that a bill would be submitted to the APN [National People's Assembly] during the current session. We are striving to meet this goal. We have worked on a preliminary draft formulating the use of this right, which is usually a last resort when all other paths have been exhausted—settlements reached through dialogue and consultation within an organized framework to problems concerning the workers and the company as they arise, conciliation, mediation and arbitration....

In cases where the workers decide to resort to a strike after all other means have been exhausted, there again the law should formulate a certain number of mechanisms to preserve the tools of work, to arrange for prior notification, etc.

Moreover, labor and management are not the only parties concerned by a strike. There is the entire economic and social environment. For this reason, appropriate formulas must be found for special cases vital to the population or to the preservation of the country's strategic economic interests so a minimum of service is ensured during work stoppages.

It is evident that the text to be submitted to the National People's Assembly must be strictly in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the Constitution and that the mechanism proposed must allow for this constitutional right to be exercised in normal conditions.

Before submitting the preliminary draft to the government, we have opened up a dialogue with all the parties concerned, starting with the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers]. The head of government would like this dialogue to be as broad and as in-depth as possible. I am convinced that we will quickly arrive at a text that will compel approval and support from all parties concerned so as to permit full use of this constitutional right within an organized framework.

[30 Apr 89 p 2]

[Text] Mr Mohamed Nabi spoke at length yesterday about the labor disputes that are rocking the work world and answered questions on the preservation of jobs and the strengthening of purchasing power. Here he answers our journalists questions on how the SGT [workers statutes] will be modified and on the celebration of 1 May [Labor Day]. He contends that the "theme of the workers' Labor Day rally reflects the serious economic and social concerns troubling the world we live in and the difficult economic times our country is experiencing." (See EL MOUDJAHID of 28-29 April 1989.)

[EL MOUDJAHID] Our country is pursuing economic reform. The reform effort coincides with the 11th anniversary of the adoption of the SGT. Can you comment on the implications of this in terms of social progress, if there has been any progress?

[Nabi] The economic reform, as you know, is aimed at bringing about greater efficiency in the nation's production system by firmly requiring companies to assume their economic and social responsibilities effectively. The expected improvement in company performance should generate the resources needed to safeguard economic and social development and to preserve, consolidate and increase the general level of employment.

As you have already mentioned, the reform follows the adoption of labor legislation enforcing the application of the workers statutes over the last decade. The current reform helps to enhance and reinforce the labor laws that were enhanced last year with the enactment of the important law on health, safety and medical care in the workplace for a more effective prevention of occupational hazards and greater protection of the worker in the workplace.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Yes, but what about the SGT? Much has been said about it over time. For a while now, there has been talk of modifying it. Where does it stand? What can you tell us about it?

[Nabi] The SGT is like any system or mechanism that seeks to organize a domain as complex and as sensitive as company operations and management and all aspects of labor relations within the company.

As you pointed out, the SGT law has been in force for nearly 11 years now and there comes a time when a mechanism of any kind reaches certain limitations and shows signs of rigidity that turn into obstacles, when the new context forged by the very system in question requires that modifications be made to meet new needs. It is part of the natural order of things and I believe that everyone feels that the modification is necessary. With the general outline already worked out, the preparatory work is being completed.

It is important that the bill soon to be presented to the government and then to the APN [National People's Assembly] be discussed in depth by all the parties concerned, particularly by the labor confederation, of course. We will set about it very soon, with the shared concern of making it a major objective of the modification to rehabilitate the company as an important decisionmaking entity with regard to management tools and, particularly, salaries.

That will reinforce the role and responsibilities of managers, workers' representatives and workers alike by giving a much more concrete form to the necessary dialogue and consultation between labor and management as they shape their own future, which is inseparable from the company's future.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Workers are getting ready to celebrate 1 May 1989 with the central theme of "preserving purchasing power." Do you have a message for them?

[Nabi] Let's say I have a few brief thoughts. Every year the first of May is a reminder to society of the work world's aspirations and of the social victories that have shaped general progress.

The theme of the workers' rally reflects the serious economic and social concerns troubling the world in which we live and the difficult economic times the country is experiencing.

It openly and firmly conveys the deep aspirations of the workers with respect to improved living conditions for the population, the preservation of jobs, the fight against unemployment, and the renewal of the country's economic and social development.

All will agree that those are the basic challenges the country is facing, complex challenges that go beyond the specific question of purchasing power, although that should be a constant concern to us all. These inter-related challenges require a real mobilization of collective efforts on a daily basis, the indispensable virtues of austerity and discipline over the long term, and the fundamental and parallel needs for social justice and national solidarity.

In this respect, we must consolidate the framework in which the actions and efforts of all converge to preserve and consolidate the public sector and enable it to continue to fulfill its vocation as support and motor for the economic and social development all workers will have helped to build and by which all workers will benefit.

The government's action speaks for its desire to address the legitimate concerns of the workers. The only limits its action can have are those imposed by the resources the national economy can generate or those dictated by collective interests and the preservation of the future.

As the country's labor official, I hardly need to add that this is also a welcome opportunity to extend to all workers and to all those whose daily labor contributes to the progress of our country my most fraternal wishes for progress and prosperity.

Population Growth Strains Services in Blida
45190080b Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 28-29 Apr 89 p 4

[Article by Rachid Semmad]

[Text] As he toured the wilaya of Blida on a visit of inspection and official business Thursday, Mr Yacine Fergani, minister of posts and telecommunications, had as his primary focus the goal of bringing the services

offered by the postal administration closer to users by providing the material and human resources necessary to make it a true "public service."

Visiting construction sites and inspecting post and telecommunications facilities at Birtouta, Boufarik, Larbaa, Bougara, Ouled Yaich and Blida, administration officials were able to judge how far this alluring wilaya falls short of satisfying the needs of a population that has doubled in a decade. An important crossroads for the country's various regions, the wilaya of Blida is feeling the shock of the flood of immigration and all the demands it has brought with it. The shortfall is most acutely felt in the postal sector that has only 55 offices here—1 for every 13,202 inhabitants, while the national average stands at 1 for every 10,800.

The capital of the wilaya is the most striking example of this imbalance. The city of Blida is growing disproportionately (131,615 inhabitants) and has 5 offices, 1 for every 26,000 inhabitants. Mr Fergani gauged the situation when he visited Blida's main post office, at its cash withdrawal window in particular, where 505 to 600 checks are normally handled although the figure is 800 at the end of the month. This center is more than saturated, as the minister pointed out at a working session held at the wilaya's governmental offices with local authorities and sector officials. Hence the need to equip *daira* post offices with terminals to lighten the load at the central office and thereby improve the distribution of services.

Ten post office construction projects are to be incorporated into town development plans, in addition to the three post offices that will become operational by the end of the year. The official opening of a class-3 post office in Ouled Yaich by the minister will be of great service to the residents of this heavily populated area who have had to travel to the capital for their postal needs.

It should be noted that the wilaya is willing to create offices in new housing complexes in order to reinforce the post office network in residential areas as well as on the campus of the University of Soumaa, which has 7,000 residents. In telecommunications, with regard to telephone service, which is considered a social need in our times, the wilaya is currently equipped with four telephone exchanges with a capacity of 19,000 units and a central telegraph office of 300 units, or 16,297,000 telephone lines with a saturation level of 85 percent and a density of 2.25 users for every 100. There again fast action was required given the impact of the situation, particularly in Blida, on the quality of service.

In fact, the purpose of the posts and telecommunications minister's visit was primarily to inspect digital projects, a new telecommunications and heavy industry technology that the wilaya will be the second area to receive after the capital. The sophisticated network is made up of two exchanges having 10,000 lines each in Blida and Larbaa. Mr Fergani inspected the work, now well advanced, which will considerably improve telephone

service coverage and satisfy a large portion of the 25,490 requests for service until the construction project of new 30,000-line telephone exchanges in Blida can be finalized. In this context, it should be pointed out that 3,000 new lines will be hooked up between now and the end of the year to meet priority needs.

Concurrently, the technical department is proceeding with the renovation of the network of cables that represents 56 km of cable ducts, 306 km of alveoles [cavities?] and 729 chambers of all types. There is one sour note in all of this: Although not required to do so under current regulations, real estate developers failed to equip the wilaya's 93 housing complexes with telephone cable ducts. In this regard, the Wali pledged to involve the OPGI [expansion unknown] in the laying of cable ducts in existing complexes and to generalize this practice to future residential areas. It should be noted that the minister also visited the Boufarik maritime radio center, a superstructure that enables ships at sea to communicate with their home ports to ensure their safety at sea.

The reinforcement of the telecommunications network to raise national coverage from 3 to 10 percent by the year 2000 is a fundamental goal for the posts and telecommunications administration. That average is small as, without implying a comparison, some countries have achieved 80 percent.

The minister did not fail to speak with sector officials about managerial and socioprofessional problems and the imperative need to foster greater dialogue and consultation with workers and their representatives in order to preserve social [labor] stability, which is a factor in progress and human advancement.

EGYPT

U.S. Allegedly Prevents Islamic Law Implementation

45040365 Cairo *AL-ITISAM* in Arabic
May 89 pp 36-38

[Article by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahhab Fayid: "America Behind Shelving of Islamic Shari'ah Laws"]

[Text] We resume the discussion of reforms in certain areas closely connected with the public. In the last issue of *AL-ITISAM*, we spoke about cooperation between rulers and preachers. We said that this is what gives impetus to the Islamic call and how the path of this call is surrounded by calamities and dangers. We spoke about the need for preaching and the importance of religious awareness. We said that neglect of religion had harmed production everywhere. We spoke of the mistake in the leadership and how it was behind all the disasters that have befallen us, the last of these being the disaster of \$1.2 billion smuggled away by lucky people with connections—people whom the authorities have been unable to trace as of the writing of these lines.

America Behind Shelving of Shari'ah Laws

I write this, knowing that America and other parties are warning against the application of Shari'ah laws. The late Professor Jalal-al-Din al-Hamamsi expressed his rejection and loathing of this in AL-AKHBAR, 14 May 1985, saying:

"They are not our leaders, and they have no right to intervene in our affairs."

He was joined the next day by Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Nimr. It seems to me that we have been influenced by America's advice out of a desire to obtain American aid and blessing. As a result, God has deprived us of His aid and blessing, so that life's necessities have become scarce for us and the daily crowding and struggle in line for food have become worse. The word of God has proved true for us: "But whosoever turns away from My remembrance, his shall be a life of hardship, and on Resurrection Day We shall raise him blind" [Qur'an 20:124]. Whoever does not agree to humble himself to the commands of God, God humbles him to the commands of His servants. Thus we have come to receive orders from America, the World Bank, and the IMF in degradation and dejection, having rejoiced in the aid and loans they offered us. In the end, these things have turned into a choking collar around the neck of this and succeeding generations. Now we seek mercy and self-esteem, things that in reality do not exist with peoples and countries, but only with the Merciful and Compassionate One, the Almighty and Powerful. Mercy and self-esteem are obtained by applying God's law. God's law is not limited to enforcing punishments; it is a complete and comprehensive system that provides for man's welfare in all his stages and in all his situations, whether he be leader or subordinate, ruler or ruled. It provides for the welfare of the state, giving it and those who live in it the means to obtain self-esteem and strength, well-being and happiness, prosperity, security, and stability. It does this not only for Muslims, but both for them and those who differ from us in religion, who live in peace, whether Jews or Christians. What is to our advantage is to theirs, and what is to our detriment is to theirs.

Islam the Solution

If preachers and the media show concern for religious education and deepening religious awareness, this will solve all our problems. It will root out vices and strengthen the pillars of virtue. It will eliminate addiction and the crimes of rape, robbery, embezzlement, bribery, injustice, and corruption. It will link the community in the bond of love and brotherhood and in cooperation in righteousness and piety, not in sin and enmity. It will prevent the spread of poverty, sickness, and ignorance. It will raise the level of the state, preserve its being, raise its stature, and make it distinguished among the nations, so that it will have its true independence, free will, and distinct character.

Concern for Land Reclamation and Farming

I hope that land reclamation—and we have land in abundance—will be at the forefront of our concerns, so that we reach self-sufficiency, and so that our decisions come from our heads, with no one interfering in our affairs. This is not hard for us. Saudi Arabia, with help from God and by the alertness of its rulers, has been able to transform itself from a valley where nothing grows into a cultivated valley, using modern means of agriculture and huge plants to sweeten and desalinize the waters of the Red Sea, so that they have become suitable for drinking and agriculture. Saudi Arabia has thus been able to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat. It has bestowed its wheat liberally on the Gulf states and has not lost the opportunity to do good and be charitable to us, hastening to ease our economic crises. Mr President, we are not inferior to Saudi Arabia. We have millions of feddans that can be reclaimed. We have the water of Red Sea and the Mediterranean, that we can desalinize. We have ground water and Nile water, and we have outstanding men in the agricultural sciences. We have tremendous idle manpower, estimated officially at nearly 3 million people with diplomas. These people can be put to work for this purpose, instead of our complaining about their idleness and about how unemployment leads to crime and vice.

I advise you again, Mr President, to pay great attention to searching out these smugglers and saboteurs, punishing them and clipping their claws. The country cannot be built up when people like them are in it. Long ago someone said: "How can the building ever reach its completion, if you build it while someone else is tearing it down?"

Such people are a bad example. They work to spread corruption, embezzlement, and theft and to weaken the religious spirit. We should not be surprised to read news of thieves who stole a drilling rig as big as a multistoried building and made off with it without a trace. Nor should we be surprised about those who stole the electrical generating plant of the suburbs of Nasr City (it weighed 8 tons). Nor should we be surprised about those who cheated individuals and banks, got their hands on millions, and fled. We have no right to be surprised. These crimes have become normal. Old and young commit them, and resolutions are achieved in proportion to the people's resolve. God have mercy on al-Mutanabbi, who said: "Egypt's watchmen have fallen asleep, oblivious to the foxes; the latter have gorged themselves, and the clusters of grapes have not been exhausted."

Charges Against Religious Groups Exaggerated

It remains to speak about the extremism imputed to religious groups, most recently to the 'Ayn Shams group and Adam Mosque. In my opinion—and only God knows fully—what is published by some government

newspapers is exaggerated. This is confirmed by the innocent verdicts that the courts have passed on many of them. The following also confirms this.

On Saturday, 24 December 1988, AKHBAR AL-YAWM published a provocative article on pages 4 and 5 under the headline, "Tragedy and Victims." It said, "Religious extremism wears a white garment, but carries a knife and whip. The extremists have set up inspection committees and have prevented citizens from entering mosques. They have manufactured explosives to fire at policemen." Before any indictment was issued by the public prosecutor or a judicial body, the Great Imam [Shaykh of al-Azhar], influenced by what had been written, hastened to issue a strongly worded statement, before seeking confirmation of the report, as the Qur'an commands us. A week later, a statement appeared by Shaykh al-Sha'rawi, Shaykh al-Ghazali, Shaykh al-Tayyib al-Najjar, and others whom we respect and whose activity in the service of Islam we appreciate. We commented on the two statements in the Jamada II 1409 [January 1989] issue of AL-I'TISAM. Significantly, AL-AHRAM, a national newspaper very close to the government, published a journalistic investigation following a field visit to the area. The report gave the impression that this Islamic group in 'Ayn Shams was innocent of all that had been attributed to it. According to the testimony of residents of the area, it was performing social and health services and distributing aid to the needy, while the National Democratic and other parties were not active in improving these neighborhoods.

AL-AHRAM, After Investigating, Proves Their Innocence

To convince the reader of the truth of what I say, I will quote for him a few paragraphs that were published on page 3 of AL-AHRAM on Monday, 30 January 1989. AL-AHRAM's investigating reporter said:

"We expected to find dozens of worshipers in the mosque. Instead, even at the conclusion of worship, we counted only nine. As soon as we finished praying, I went up to one of the worshipers and said, 'Tell us, shaykh, what happened between you and the religious groups.' (His name was Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Raziq, the owner of Adam Bookstore, across from the mosque.) He said, 'The truth is that some of these groups were committed to "calling to the way of their Lord with good admonition." ' Going back in his memories to tell the story from the beginning, the shaykh said: 'One Friday last August, we were surprised after the night prayer by forces from state security surrounding the mosque. The members of these groups fled through the windows of the mosque. The security forces continued to surround the mosque for 2 days; then they left, and we saw no security presence in the neighborhood.'"

The newspaper said, "Continuing, the shaykh said, 'After the security forces left, the groups began to increase in numbers. They used the mosque as a center

for Qur'anic reading, sometimes calling for fairness at other times to keep away from the reprehensible. And so they continued, until security forces again invaded the mosque early last December.'"

The newspaper investigator asked, "Does calling for fairness justify the use of force and violence to impose it."

Shaykh Ibrahim Najib said, "We saw them use violence only in the last incident, when they beat someone named Muhyi because they believed he was the one who had denounced them and guided the security forces to them. This Muhyi (God only knows) works as a civilian employee in the explosives department of the Interior Ministry."

The newspaper said, "Another worshiper interrupted Shaykh Ibrahim. 'But Shaykh Ibrahim,' he said, 'they used to hit people with chains and pocket-knives.' Shaykh Ibrahim asked him, 'Did you see it with your own eyes?' The man (he refused to give his name) said, 'No, I heard it.'"

The newspaper reporters said: "We asked him, 'Who told you?' He said, 'I heard it from a certain Christian called Iskandar. He works as a mechanic. He was calling for his assistant, with abusive language and insults that reached the point of insulting Islam; so a member of these groups intervened and hit him.'"

Shaykh Ibrahim: "Isn't insulting Islam a sin that deserves punishment?" The man replied, "But that is no part of their jurisdiction. There are rulers who are responsible."

Newspaper investigator: "We left Adam Mosque. In an area nearby, we met Engineer Zaki Muhammad Mitwalli in a clothing store. We asked him about the protection fees he paid to the leaders of these groups. He said, 'I haven't paid them anything and haven't heard that anyone has paid them any protection fees.'"

The newspaper investigator said, "But they said that some members of these groups were levying such protection fees on store owners, merchants, and sometimes even vendors in the market place!"

Answer: "This, too, is something we have not seen. We did, however, notice during our tour of the market before it was closed that they were selling at prices lower than the merchants and were able to break the monopoly on chicken prices, which some merchants were selling at 3.60 pounds a kilo, while they were selling chickens at 2.80 pounds a kilo."

AL-AHRAM: "Another person interrupted the conversation, saying, 'Not just chickens, but also fish and other things. Even grapes—they were selling them at 50 piasters, while the merchants were selling them at 90.'"

AL-AHRAM said, "Salah Yunis, an accountant with the [Ministry of] Manpower said, 'Why should we pay for treatment in al-Matariyah Teaching Hospital, which is supposed to be a free hospital, and pay dearly for it, while in Adam Mosque and other mosques there are medical dispensaries and clinics that treat the needy for 1 pound?'"

The newspaper investigator said, "We asked about some of the families that these Islamic groups had helped. The answer came to us in a ramshackle house from the wife of Sulayman 'Abd-al-Radi, who used to work as a carpenter, and who, through no fault of his, was injured in an accident and rendered unable to work. The wife said, 'My husband was injured for no reason while he was crossing the street at the time of the events. He supports four children. The religious groups were the first to offer us aid; the government didn't pay us a thing.'"

AL-AHRAM'S investigator asked, "Did they distribute regular aid to the poor of the neighborhood, other than the injured?"

Answer: "Yes, they used to distribute monthly aid to the poor and give them blankets and cloth. The proof is that there are still blankets inside the mosque."

The investigator met a housewife carrying some vegetables—it was after the government destroyed the market. He asked her, "Where do you buy your vegetables." She said, "From the street vendors, at very high prices. They took away the market and left us no alternative. As a result, the price of a kilo of sour oranges has gone to over a pound." The woman spoke with bitterness and went her way.

Here the AL-AHRAM report ends—and AL-AHRAM is no opposition newspaper. It gives unbiased readers, reasonable leaders, and religious scholars a picture of these groups. However no matter how we twist these facts, nothing calls for government terrorism, destruction of useful public facilities, arrest of men and women, invasion of mosques, and random shooting.

The Awakening Is God's Work, Must be Guided and Protected

Let everyone know that this Islamic awakening, which has encompassed the countries of the world and not been limited to Egypt or the Islamic states, is not the work of man or the work of al-Azhar scholars. It is the work of God. No one will be able to end it; but by the will of God it will remain, to be a fire consuming the enemies of God, and a light guiding His friends. "They want to extinguish with their mouths the light of God; but God will perfect His light, though the unbelievers be averse" [Qur'an 61:8].

Now that the light of Islam burns brightly in all government departments and has become dominant in universities, trade unions, associations, and political parties,

the duty of leaders and Islamic scholars is to guide and deepen this awakening, so that it does not fall into errors that are hard to correct. Our duty is to preserve it. We must take care to develop and strengthen it, so that it bears its fruit of amending souls, bringing hearts together, and strengthening the ties between people and their Creator. Thus they will be able to build up the earth and live a secure and stable life. Our duty is to be truthful with God. We must make our intentions sincere and walk according to our strength with continuous and uninterrupted steps toward the application of God's law. We must substitute Shari'ah laws for man-made laws, that we may enjoy the law of God, win his favor, and obtain security, prosperity, and stability. The people will be in harmony with the government and will cooperate with it in what brings benefit and happiness to the country and to all citizens, both rulers and ruled.

Economic Relations With USSR Regularized

45040384B London AL-TADAMUN
in Arabic 12 Jun 89 p 31

[Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Shahib: "New Trade Protocol Between the Countries, Regularization of Egyptian-Soviet Economic Relations"]

[Text] Only 4 months after its formation, the joint committee for economic cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet Union has held its first round of meetings in Cairo. A large 18-member Soviet delegation, headed by Konstantin Katushev, the USSR's minister of foreign economic relations, participated in this round. Dr Yusri Mustafa, the Egyptian minister of economy, headed the Egyptian side.

With these meetings, which lasted nearly a week, which the Soviet delegation spent in Cairo, Egyptian-Soviet economic relations, which had been held up at various points, were regularized. The meetings were preceded by a number of measures and resolutions exchanged between the two sides. These contributed to the regularization of economic relations between them over the past 2 years.

As early as 2 years ago, an agreement was signed allowing Egypt to reschedule its outstanding military debts to the Soviet Union—debts amounting to 2 billion pounds sterling—without interest and over a period of 25 years. The exchange rate of the accounting pound sterling in which commercial dealings between the two countries are valued was reviewed several times, until it jumped from 125 Egyptian piasters to about 3 Egyptian pounds at present. The last increase was made only a few weeks before the Soviet economic delegation's arrival in the Egyptian capital.

As a result, it was possible to conclude a new commercial protocol between the two countries. This replaces the old protocol, which ended 10 years ago. The new protocol, which is for a period of 3 years, ending in the following

year, aims at increasing the volume of trade between the countries to 1 billion pounds sterling. This represents double the volume of trade between them before the conclusion of this protocol.

At the same time, the two sides agreed to conclude reciprocal trade deals between them, in addition to the trade protocol, to further increase the volume of trade. This year's most recent reciprocal trade agreement was worth 200 million accounting pounds sterling. This is in addition to the value of the protocol this year, which is 600 million accounting pounds sterling. Thus, the volume of trade between the countries this year is projected to reach 800 accounting pounds sterling.

This was not all. Early this year, a new economic cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed in Moscow to replace the agreement signed between the two countries in the sixties. This agreement aims at strengthening all areas of economic relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. It does not concentrate only on trade relations, but allows Egypt a restoration of the technical and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union that ceased during the seventies because of the cooling of diplomatic relations between the countries. It also allows Egypt the possibility of concluding new loan deals with the Soviet government and institutions to finance a number of Egyptian investment projects included in the economic development plan.

Thus, the appropriate economic climate has once again been prepared for regularizing Egyptian-Soviet economic relations—relations that in past years have sometimes been disturbed and damaged.

When the Egyptian-Soviet joint economic committee met for its first round after its formation, circumstances were favorable for the advancement of economic relations between the two countries and for maintaining the regularization of these relations.

A number of important subjects were raised for discussion at the meetings. These will guarantee the regularization and further development of economic relations between the two countries.

Among the most important of these subjects was discussion of the Soviet Union's contributing to the renovation of several Egyptian projects that it constructed or to whose funding it contributed in Egypt during the sixties—e.g., iron and steel projects, granite production, glass and thermal materials factories, as well as the Hulwan coke factory. In fact, contracts worth 200 million accounting pounds were signed for the modernization and renovation of these Egyptian projects.

These subjects also included a Soviet offer to arrange a new \$120-million loan to Egypt in cooperation with a consortium of Western European countries at a low interest rate of 3 to 4 percent. The loan would be

earmarked for the construction of an electrical project in the 'Uyun Musa area of Sinai. The project would provide Egypt with 600 megawatts of power a year. However, the negotiations ended with the conversion of this loan completely into a Soviet government loan.

Also discussed at the meetings were various proposals to increase the volume and value of Egyptian exports to Soviet markets either through the reciprocal trade deal between the two countries or through the trade protocol. The Soviet side expressed its readiness to import more nontraditional Egyptian exports, especially ready-made clothing, knits, carpets, and certain consumer goods. It also expressed its readiness to resolve the problem of the surplus in the balance of trade between the two countries in favor of Egypt.

The idea of establishing certain joint projects between the two countries was also discussed. It was agreed in principle to establish a joint project between a cooperative Soviet enterprise and an Egyptian company to produce perfumes and cosmetics.

Thus, the first round of meetings of the joint Egyptian-Soviet economic committee passed without serious difficulties and will in turn contribute to the regularization of economic relations between the two countries.

However, there are forecasts of a thrust that will permit increased speed in the process, when President Mubarak's visit to Moscow takes place—a visit that he has recently announced his willingness to undertake.

Dilemma Faces People's Assembly in Implementing Court Order

45040364 London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 2 Jun 89 pp 36-37

[Article by Usamah 'Ajjaj: "Constitutional 'Row' Raging Between People's Assembly and Opposition"]

[Text] Cairo—At a meeting Egyptian President Husni Mubarak had with the judiciary, he welcomed them saying: "Welcome to Egypt's real rulers." What President Mubarak said was no exaggeration and not for propaganda purposes. He was actually underlining a tangible reality confirmed by the recent years' developments. The proofs to this are numerous:

When Lawyer Kamal Khalid contested the constitutionality of Law No 114 of 1984 governing the Egyptian People's Assembly elections—a law which confined the right of candidacy to the assembly to parties only and which totally denied independents any opportunity—the Supreme Constitutional Court accepted the appeal and the assembly was declared illegal. Consequently, President Husni Mubarak issued a decree dissolving the assembly and amending the law, making it Law No 188 of 1986.

Judiciary orders were also behind dissolving the Consultative Council in nearly the same manner when Lawyer 'Abd-al-Halim Ramadan contested the constitutionality of Consultative Council Law No 120 of 1980 and the council elections which were conducted on the basis of the absolute list, meaning that a party getting 51 percent of a district's vote is entitled to all the district's seats. The remaining 49 percent of the votes going to other parties were thus totally squandered. "Dissolving the council" was the only way out of the crisis. Earlier, the Consultative Council law was amended and the individual election system—the system to which Egypt had been accustomed throughout its parliamentary experience—was restored.

The judiciary has, according to the opposition, also been behind the dilemma Egypt is experiencing currently, especially since the "political struggle" has this time mixed with the "partisan disputes" as a result of the different legal and constitutional interpretations.

The story may be old but it is serious. In the latest People's Assembly elections, held in April 1987, a number of candidates running for assembly membership contested the decision of Major General Zaki Badr, the minister of interior, declaring the results. They did in fact get on 21 April 1987 an Administrative Court ruling entitling them to declare themselves, not other assembly members, the winners. The beneficiaries of the ruling issued by Counselor Muhammad 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy State Council chairman, did actually get a copy of the text of the ruling and asked the minister of interior to enforce it. The minister of interior referred them to the Ministry of Interior legal advisers who received a copy of the ruling. But the Ministry of Interior did not enforce the ruling. Dr Ibrahim al-Dasuqi Abazah, a beneficiary of the ruling, has told AL-HAWADITH: On the day following the issuance of the ruling, we went to the People's Assembly and asked to meet its secretary general in his capacity as the official responsible for enforcing the order. But the assembly guard denied us entry.

The council sessions continued to convene and a group from al-Wafd and Labor Parties carried on with their lawsuit before the Higher Administrative Court.

In not enforcing the order, the People's Assembly relied on a similar precedent concerning the validity of Hamid al-Azhari's and Ibrahim 'Awwarah's membership in the previous assembly. When the matter was presented to the previous assembly's Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, it said in a report it submitted to the assembly on 15 June 1986: "The orders issued by the Administrative Judiciary Court to stop implementing the decision of the committee preparing the elections outcome, and the decision of the minister of interior declaring this outcome, make a determination on the validity of assembly membership; whereas this power is confined to the assembly exclusively in accordance with

Article 93 of the Constitution which states that the assembly shall have the jurisdiction to determine the validity of its members' membership."

Dr Mahmud al-Saqqa, a beneficiary of the latest order by the Administrative Court, has noted that President Husni Mubarak did not intervene in any of the issue's procedures except in the comment in the speech he gave on last year's Mayday when he emphasized that he would enforce the order in the event it becomes final. When the order became final at the end of April, President Mubarak made no comment on it in his Mayday speech but was content to say in a press statement: "The People's Assembly is the master of its own decision."

Before reviewing the dimensions of the "current constitutional dilemma," one should pause a little before the Higher Administrative Court order. Lawyer Muhammad Rashad Nabih, who litigated all phases of the case, has told AL-HAWADITH that enforcing the order means the introduction of 17 new members from the al-Wafd and Labor Parties. This means the ouster of a similar number from the National Party—representing groups—so that 10 members from al-Wafd and 7 members from the Labor Party may be included. In a related development, the status of 21 members from the two parties representing workers and peasants will be shifted to the status of representatives of groups. Consequently, a similar number (21) of National Party members representing groups will have to be ousted and an equal number of National Party members representing workers and peasants will have to be included. In other words, enforcing the inclusion of 21 members from the al-Wafd and Labor Parties means the ouster of 42 members—21 members from al-Wafd and Labor representing workers and peasants and 21 members from the National Party representing groups—and including 21 members from al-Wafd and Labor to represent groups and 21 National Party members, who were not declared winners the day the results were announced, to represent workers and peasants.

The issue does actually seem to be complicated. The reason for its complexity is that the disagreement between the court on the one hand and the committee supervising the elections on the other centers on two points:

- There is disagreement on the distribution of the People's Assembly seats. As a result of this disagreement, the committee gave the National Party 17 seats to which al-Wafd and Labor Parties were entitled.
- There is a clear provision which states that one-half the People's Assembly members must be workers and peasants. The disagreement begins on how to fully meet this percentage. The court ruling finds that this percentage was fully met at the expense of the al-Wafd and Labor Parties, that the Ministry of Interior did not declare the top vote-getters in the two parties' lists—candidates who ran to represent the groups—as the winners and that it replaced these winners by

members representing the workers and the peasants; whereas what the committee should have done was to complete the quota representing workers and peasants from the National Party lists, not from the two opposition parties.

In any case, the fact is that the situation represents a constitutional dilemma, considering that there is a Higher Administrative Court order requiring immediate enforcement. The two disputing sides rely on provisions of the Constitution and the law to defend their positions.

In not enforcing the order, the People's Assembly relies on Article 93 of the Constitution which states that a membership may not be declared null and may not be dropped by an order from any source whatsoever and that the assembly exclusively may determine the validity of its members' membership. The Constitution also empowers the People's Assembly to refer the appeals concerning membership validity to the Appeals Court to examine them and to take sole charge of such appeals. According to Dr 'Adil Sharif, an assistant adviser at the State Council, the assembly relies in this regard on the concept of parliamentary action. In accordance with the principle of the separation of powers, this concept calls for the independence of the People's Assembly from the executive authority. After the minister of interior declares the election results, the subsequent procedures are within the assembly's jurisdiction. The assembly alone determines the validity of its members' membership. All other judiciary and executive agencies are banned from exercising this power.

Added to this is the concept of the assembly's judiciary jurisdiction, which means that the assembly's power to determine the validity of its members' membership is a judiciary power. When it exercises this power, the assembly is considered a judiciary authority making judiciary rulings. This means that this right must be confined to the assembly and denied all other authorities, including the judiciary courts. Should these courts issue rulings concerning this affair, such rulings have no standing and no justification because they are issued by an authority which has no jurisdiction in the area in which it has issued them.

Responding to the aforementioned opinion, Lawyer Muhammad Rashad Nabih denies that he filed the lawsuit on the question of the validity of his clients' membership or the invalidity or revocation of the membership of members declared to be winners. He has told AL-HAWADITH: "The question of membership validity or invalidity is beyond the State Council's jurisdiction. The case concerns rescinding the decision issued by the committee preparing the election results and the decision issued by the minister of interior which failed to declare the al-Wafd and Labor Parties as winners in the People's Assembly elections in a number of districts. The case also concerns the impermissibility of meeting the workers and peasants quota from the al-Wafd and Labor

Parties." Explaining the nature of the task of the 3-member committee [preparing election results], Lawyer Muhammad Rashad Nabih said that this committee counts the number of votes won by each party throughout the Republic and determines the parties that are entitled to be represented in the People's Assembly, namely the parties that get more than 8 percent the total vote. The committee then prepares the draft general outcome of the elections and presents this draft to the minister of interior to approve it and issue his decision on the final outcome. This activity has nothing to do with the election process. It is an administrative task and the decisions issued in this regard are administrative decisions.

Kamal Khalid has cited to AL-HAWADITH a number of articles that put the People's Assembly under the judiciary authority, saying: "Article 64 states that supremacy of the law is the basis of government in the state. The law cannot be supreme unless observed by all. Moreover, Article 65 puts the government under the law. This is an extremely explicit article which shows that the People's Assembly is subject to the judiciary's decisions. Moreover, Article 86 of the Constitution defines the People's Assembly tasks as those of watchdog over the executive authority. These tasks can under no circumstances extend to the judiciary authority. Furthermore, Article 166 of the Constitution states that judges are independent and are subject in their decisions to no authority other than the law. Supreme Constitutional court Law No 48 of 1979 gives this court the power of judiciary control over the constitutionality of laws and regulations. This is a clear and explicit provision showing that the People's Assembly is not the country's supreme legislative power and that there is a higher control power to watch for any violation."

Counselor Samir Sadiq, a former chairman of the State Council, objects to subjugating the People's Assembly to the judiciary authority and notes that Article 93 makes the assembly the sole authority empowered to determine the validity of its members' membership. Moreover, only the Appeals Court has the exclusive power to examine membership's validity.

But Counselor Sadiq offers a new concept when he points out that the administrative judiciary is empowered to examine whatever may corrupt the decision of the minister of interior or of the committee supervising the elections only until the People's Assembly convenes and the Legislative and Constitutional Committee begins its task of examining membership's validity.

The conflict and the dilemma have moved to another level. While the People's Assembly sources assert that the Judiciary Administrative Court's latest decisions do not in any way influence the validity of the assembly's convocation and of its forthcoming sessions—an assertion reflected in the assembly's eagerness to reveal extensive details of its activity in the coming period and the dimensions of the queries and questions it is scheduled

to debate with the government—the opposition asserts, according to Dr Ibrahim Dasuqi Abazah, that convocation of the assembly without enforcing the order will nullify all the assembly's activities and all the laws it issues despite the serious nature of the bills which will be presented to it in the coming period, including the drug and (drug possession) law, the unified investment law, and the budget, in addition to approvals required for numerous agreements and loans.

AL-HAWADITH has learned that the steps that have to be taken in the coming period are summed up in the following:

- Upon receiving the text of the order officially, Maj Gen Zaki Badr, the minister of interior, has to deliver it to the People's Assembly speaker.
- Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub [assembly speaker] has to read it to the People's Assembly members and then refer it to the assembly's Legislative and Constitutional Affairs Committee to draft a report on this issue and present it to the assembly for debate.
- Or the report [order] has to be presented to the Assembly for a vote, considering that dropping a member's membership requires specific procedures, including the consent of two-thirds of the members. Or the entire issue has to be referred to the Appeals Court, whose sole role is to submit a report after examining the validity of the members' membership. The assembly will have the final decision.

It seems that this disagreement in interpreting the law has assumed political dimensions, especially since it has become easy to persist with the conflict that has been going on for a long time between the al-Wafd Party, on the one hand, and Assembly Speaker Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub and Interior Minister Maj Gen Zaki Badr, on the other. One of the beneficiaries of the latest order and Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din have stated that Maj Gen Zaki Badr's failure to enforce the court order exposes him to imprisonment now that he has lost parliamentary immunity with the dissolving of the Consultative Assembly of which he was a member. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din has also announced that al-Wafd will wage the People's Assembly elections shortly and said that these elections will be fierce and that his party will prepare for them with utter strength as of now. Thus, al-Wafd has begun to wager on dissolving the People's Assembly even though numerous circles find this unlikely, at least at present or in the current year and especially since the government has not yet completed the Consultative Council elections which are scheduled to take place in the middle of this month of June.

But Lawyer Kamal Khalid has stressed to AL-HAWADITH that it is possible that the People's Assembly will be dissolved, especially since there is a tendency to return to the individual election system. Moreover, the litigation in the appeal made to contest the constitutionality of the new People's Assembly law—Law No 188 of 1986—was concluded and the case was reserved, with

the provision that the Constitutional Court's Commissioners Committee submit its report on the issue. The committee did actually present its report but it has been referred to another committee. Upon the submission of this report [to the Constitutional Court], a session has to be scheduled within 15 days to make a decision on the appeal. It is reported, says Kamal Khalid, that the Commissioners Committee has actually completed the report but that there is an inclination not to rush its submission so that dissolving the People's Assembly may not coincide with dissolving the Consultative Assembly and with the burdens of two election battles that are chronologically close to each other.

Kamal Khalid stresses that he is confident that his appeal will be accepted. This appeal is, according to Khalid, distinguished from the previous appeal which was behind dissolving the previous assembly in that, first, the Administrative Court accepted the appeal and, second, in that this court referred it to the Higher Administrative Court. The appeal emphasizes that even though amended, Law No 188 of 1986 permits independents to run for membership, it has made it impossible for them to win if they are actually independent and not supported by a party. Thus, the independent candidate is denied the principle of equal opportunities and of equal rights and duties for all citizens—principles guaranteed by Articles 8 and 48 of the Constitution.

Thus, if the People's Assembly emerges from the Higher Administrative Court's ruling safely, it will not emerge as safely from the Supreme Constitutional Court's decision.

Transport Minister Discusses Maritime Transport Contribution to Payment Balance
45040544 Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic
10 May 89 p 29

[Article: "Maritime Transport Companies Contribute 645 Million Pounds to Balance of Payments"]

[Text] Companies of the maritime transport sector contributed 645 million pounds to the state's balance of payments this year. Comprehensive development throughout the sector resulted in time gains at all Egyptian ports estimated last year at \$8 million, according to Minister of Transport Engineer Sulayman Mitwalli.

Engineer Sulayman Mitwalli discussed the Ministry of Maritime Transport's major accomplishments in providing suitable ports for Egypt's foreign trade, in providing port services needed by vessels and cargo, and in developing a national fleet. He also discussed new projects such as the construction of three new ports at Damietta, al-Dukhaylah, and Nuwaybi; the completion of certain stages of the Gulf of Suez navigation project; the construction of three tanker stations; implementation of two projects for the automatic unloading of grain; deepening

of navigational channels; state-of-the-art modernization of shipping and unloading equipment to world standards; and warehouse development.

He also addressed the issue of allowing both private and public sectors to own vessels on equal footing and the establishment of national maritime companies capitalized by public sector firms, banks, insurance companies, and private sector individuals, in order to secure the transport of Egypt's foreign trade.

He also discussed the Arab Bridge Company.

He began by saying that maritime transport is, without doubt, the main shipping vehicle for international trade because it is the cheapest.

Being responsible for securing the transport of the state's foreign trade, the Ministry of Maritime Transport has focused its goals and plans on providing suitable ports to accommodate Egypt's foreign trade.

Three new ports were created with that objective in mind—the Damietta port on the Mediterranean, the Al-Dukhaylah port on the Mediterranean, and Nuwaybi' port in Sinai on the Gulf of 'Aqabah.

The ports of Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, al-Adabiyah, and Safaja were expanded by the addition of piers and by deepening to allow access to modern ships and those with larger draft.

Egyptian ports, at the end of 1987, had 109 piers with a nominal capacity of more than 40 million tons.

Navigational channels to the ports were also deepened and supplied with various navigational aids and wireless guidance systems. Competent pilots were also provided to secure navigation in the ports.

The first and second stages of the project to organize navigation at the Gulf of Suez have been completed. The project will utilize up to-date systems to secure international navigation in that gulf.

On port services needed for ships and cargo, the minister engineer Sulayman Metwalli said:

The ports had to be supplied with state-of-the-art equipment in order to efficiently and expediently load and unload cargo therefore reduce the cost to the maritime carrier by expediting vessel departure. It was also necessary to increase port handling capacity and to protect shipments against damage while at the port. Systems for shipping, unloading, and warehousing have been modernized at all ports. The following has been completed:

- Three container stations equipped with world-class giant cranes, overland transport systems, and warehouses. The transport of goods in containers has become the prevailing trend in international shipping.

- Already completed are a station at the port of Alexandria with an annual capacity of 120,000 containers, a station at Port Said capable of handling 140,000 containers annually with an eventual capacity of 200,000 containers, and a station at the port of Damietta with an annual capacity of 215,000 containers.
- Two facilities for the automatic unloading of grain have been completed, one at al-Adabiyah and the other at Port Said. Each has a daily capacity of 5,000 tons.
- Loading and unloading equipment have been modernized to the latest world standards and are now suitable for all kinds of ships and cargoes at all Egyptian ports.
- Warehouses at the Port of Alexandria have been developed to suit the volume and type of goods warehoused at the port. Cold storage is now provided for frozen and chilled goods.

Modern warehouses were built at Port Said, a modern warehouse at Port Suez and one port Nuwaybi'. All those warehouses were built to suit the volume and type and goods that transit the ports.

He also discussed the development of a national fleet, saying:

"The objective is to provide the kind of maritime transport that would secure shipments of the state's foreign trade while contributing to the balance of payments by conserving a large portion of fees formerly paid in hard currency." The following has already been accomplished towards that objective:

- Both private and public sectors are now allowed to own vessels of all types and sizes
- The creation of national maritime companies capitalized by public sector firms, banks, insurance companies, and private sector individuals. Such maritime companies include:
- Misr Company for Maritime Transport, with a estimated capital of 90 million.
- The National Maritime Company, capitalized at 50 million.
- Modernizing and expanding the fleet capacity of the Egyptian Company for Maritime Transport. The fleet was enlarged by the addition of nine vessels including two for dry pouring, four for down rolling, and three multipurpose ships. Four more vessels are under construction at the Alexandria shipyard.
- The national fleet is composed of 143 vessels with a capacity of 1.45 million tons and 3,080 passengers compared with 70 vessels with a capacity of 520,000 tons in 1980.

As a result, the following has been accomplished:

- Port capacity increased beyond the foreign trade needs of the state
- Time gained at all Egyptian ports—exceeded \$7.7 million in 1987/88, compared with previous chronic delays. The result is less of a burden on the state's balance of payments
- The percentage of Egyptian foreign trade carried by Egyptian ships has increased, resulting in great savings for the balance of payments. Egyptian vessels carried 41 percent of the state's (dry) foreign trade compared to 6 percent previously
- Firms of the sector contributed 645 million pounds to the state's balance of payments
- Modern large-capacity vessels were attracted to Egyptian ports
- Egyptian shipyards were engaged in building 11 vessels of all types over the past six years. This activated the shipyards and bolstered the national economy
- The maritime industry was provided with trained cadres and the needed experts through on-the-job training by companies and institutions and at the Arab Merchant Marine Academy
- Various new job opportunities were created for the Egyptian labor force.

Engineer Sulayman Metwalli concluded by saying: "I should not neglect to point out that the Arab Maritime Bridge Company, capitalized at \$6 million, has been created in partnership with the Iraqi government and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. A vanguard of cooperation among members of the Arab Cooperation Council, this company operates the 'Aqabah/Nuwaybi' maritime line connecting the Arab east with the Arab west. It has also been decided to include overland operations in the company's activities in order to facilitate the movement of trade among the three states, therefore bolstering their economies and attaining their objectives. Both cargo and passenger traffic have increased on the 'Aqabah/Nuwaybi' line, prompting a decision to add a new pier at the port of Nuwaybi' in order to expand its capacity to meet service demands."

Agriculture Minister Praises Local Experiments, Crop Ratio

45050320a Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 10 Apr 89 pp 46-47

[Article by Nahal Shukri in "Behind the Political Scenes Column]

[Text] Aerial photography and charts of diverse land areas have shown that cultivated acreage in Egypt is up to 7.2 million feddans. Here the pressing question arises on the degree to which it will be possible to increase the areas planted to wheat, and whether the state will be able to add it to this area to achieve the goal of self sufficiency in the form of long term plans in addition to short term plans. In order to clarify these points, "Behind the

Scenes" held an interview with Dr Yusuf Wali, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, in which he responded to various questions on the future of farm land in Egypt.

Increasing Wheat Acreages

The interview began with the pressing question which is often echoed in Egypt: namely, the degree to which it will be possible to increase the acreages planted to wheat. The deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture said: "The rate of crop intensification is up to 200 percent, and with that we have about 14 million cultivated feddans."

Responding to what is said about increasing strawberry acreages at the expense of other crops, Dr Wali said: "The strawberries that are grown now throughout the republic are on only 3700 feddans. To aid the process of increasing acreages planted to wheat, the state has laid down several policies to give the farmer an incentive to grow it, whereby the state has decided to increase the price of wheat, which was up to 100 pounds per ardab, which caused the farmers to hoard wheat. The current aim of the state's policy is also to add 50,000 feddans to wheat this year, such that the area now planted to it is up to 1,550,000 feddans.

By way of example, this year for the first time 8,000 feddans were planted to wheat in Marsa Matruh, using the variety Giza 155 and smaller amounts of water. The state also intends to increase the acreages of wheat throughout the northern coast, and we have already given seed free of charge to farmers, besides helping them with harvest operations.

The ministry also intends to grow 50 percent of the wheat that we in Egypt need, on condition that the millet that is needed, and which is used in bread making, is grown. Thus maize will not be permitted to be grown in Egypt, so that large areas can be used for growing millet.

On the age requirement for granting property to young people, Dr Wali said: "There is no exception to the age requirement for granting land to young people, and there is no exception to the draft requirement. Lands have already been taken from citizens who were not serious about reclaiming them and turned over to young people."

A Drop in Cotton Yield Caused by the Farmer

About the cause of the drop in cotton yields during the past year, Dr Wali responded: "There has in fact been a fall in cotton yields over the past 5 years, and the reason for that is attributable to several economic issues. The farmer grows the crop which brings him a profit, and he sees cotton as a government crop, and therefore the state has increased the price of cotton by 60 pounds a qintar in

order that a profitable return in this crop may be realized. The variety Giza 77 has become a promising crop in the northern region of the republic."

Expansion in Oils and Granting Ownership

About the plan aimed at increasing the production of oils, Dr Wali said: "The Ministry of Health has already approved rapeseed oil, and therefore we aim to expand its cultivation, since we are now growing only 3,000 feddans to it. It is a winter oil crop, but the rest of the oil crops are summer crops, and we will achieve self sufficiency by increasing it."

He mentioned that the granting of ownership of agricultural land to young people throughout the republic will be expanded, and universities in the governorates will be asked to help in raising productivity.

Granting youth governorate land in their governorate will be controlled. For example, natives of Tatruf will have priority in owning land of the north coast, and the youth of al-Wadi al-Jadid will have priority with respect to its lands. Dr Wali affirmed the role of the Agricultural Credit Bank in financing poultry and livestock production projects belonging to graduating youth, as well as small projects.

The Southeastern Desert and the Future

About the hope in the future of the land in the southeastern desert Dr Wali said: "We have great hope that new land equal to the area now cultivated may be added. In the past we used to depend on basin irrigation until the High Dam, which gave Egypt much peace of mind, was built. There is a new method of irrigating which has added new hope for reclamation, and with the use of traditional engineering methods, more land will be reclaimed in Egypt in the new lands.

Bread Experiment in Al-Sharqiyah

On improving a loaf of bread and the fact that there different prices of 2 and 5 piasters without a difference in quality, Dr Wali explained: "When Pres Mubarak visited the Center for Agricultural Research he saw the experiment to produce bread in a way that eliminates excess dough in the center [between the two layers of pocket bread]. The result is that flour is saved, since 100 more loaves are produced from the same amount, and the experiment has met with success in the governorates of al-Sharqiyah and al-Jizah."

He added: "What bothers the citizens is that there is no difference in quality between the 2-piaster and the 5-piaster loaf. However, the situation varies from one governorate to the next, for whereas there was no difference between the two loaves in Sawhaj, in Alexandria the 5-piaster loaf was better."

Moreover, the production of French bread takes 2 kg of sugar per sack, and because of the rise in the price of sugar molasses has come to be used instead of sugar in the leaven.

All of the above caused the decree to be issued dissociating production from distribution. This has been successful in the governorates of al-Qalyubiyah and al-Minufiyah, where a sack of flour is given to the baker in exchange for 920 loaves, with attention paid to quality.

Aswan and the Problem of Drainage

About adding new areas to the lands in Aswan, Dr Wali said: "The problem of reclaiming land in Aswan has to do with the cost of lifting the water. At the same time if a part of the lakes were to be dried we would need stations for drainage, not lifting. The basic factor in reclamation now is lifting the water by machines that need energy, and therefore having lifting stations in Aswan is an important goal if the new lands are to be cultivated there, and talks are going on now with some countries on obtaining lifting stations.

"We have high hopes, and with the efforts of youth we will plant and build, and we will be guided by the wisdom of our leaders, and we will paint the picture of the future."

Defense Report Requests Lower Interest on Military Debts

45000167 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 1

[Report by 'Abd-al-Sattar Abu-Husayn]

[Text] AL-SHA'B has learned from informed political and military sources that the issue of "Egyptian military debts" [quotation marks as published] to the United States will take priority in the Egyptian defense minister's talks with the American Administration during the visit for which he is now preparing.

The sources said that the competent technical offices have prepared a report for the political and military leadership. This report calls for lowering the interest rate on military debts to America and achieving the greatest possible flexibility in using the American military aid to Egypt, which amounts to more than \$2 billion.

The sources added that Abu-Talib's talks will deal with the Egyptian request for coproduction of the most modern American fighter and the arrangement of joint military exercises between the two countries.

Also, reports coming into Cairo have warned of recent intensified Zionist lobby efforts to block the recommendation that the American Administration sent to Congress regarding its determination to sell military equipment worth \$850 million to Saudi Arabia.

The reports called for coordinating Arab efforts to pass the Saudi deal and thwart the Zionist lobby's plans.

Islamists Find Solution in Production, Not Family Planning

45040351 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 24 May 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ibrahim Nasr and Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "Birth Control Is Not a Solution"]

[Text] Implementing government policy, the national information media recently intensified their birth control campaign. They have focused in this campaign on limiting reproduction as the basic solution to the cycle of economic problems from which we suffer. In the past, this campaign took veiled form, calling for birth control, described as "family planning," without explicit government involvement. Now, however, the national newspapers, radio, and television openly call for the government to make a positive decision to force families to practice birth control.

Many of the nation's religious scholars, Islamic preachers, and economic experts have therefore expressed their disapproval of this audacious development in the concept of birth control propaganda. They have stated that this campaign, which conflicts with the His Eminence the Mufti's fatwa disallowing government involvement in birth control, will never be a solution to our economic problems, not to mention its clash with the correct Islamic conception of the problem of provision, economic development, and increasing production.

First of all, Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk, the well-known Islamic preacher, states that the solution to the economic problem in Islam is not by family planning or birth control. The real solution to the problem includes many aspects, especially the cultivation of virgin land. A tradition reports that the Prophet said, "If anyone brings virgin land into cultivation, it belongs to him." Why doesn't the nation go to land that amounts to 96 percent of our territory—land that shouts and cries out every morning, "Ye servants of God, come and people me, in accordance with what He has said: 'It is He who produced you from the earth and has given you to live therein' [Qur'an 11:61]"—meaning that He has asked you to people it?

Shaykh Kishk asks, "When have Muslims ever complained of scanty provision because of a large number of children and an increase of progeny, while the Holy Qur'an affirms that provision and life span are guaranteed by God's providence? God has said, 'No creature is there crawling on the earth, but its provision rests on God; He knows its lodging-place and its repository. All is in a manifest Book [Qur'an 11:6]. Have we forgotten that the desert extending from Alexandria to the Libyan border was once all green and gardens of delight?' Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid says, "I am amazed that Saudi Arabia has started exporting wheat to Russia and China—Arabia, a land of which God said, speaking

through Abraham, peace be upon him, 'Our Lord, I have made some of my seed to dwell in a valley where is no sown land [Qur'an 14:37]. How is it that this valley, thus described, exports wheat, while the Nile Valley imports it? This is indeed an astonishing thing. I call upon the sleepers and idlers to wake up and cultivate the land. If you do not make the effort, it will become wasteland. How unlike your forefathers you are, who immortalized this soil! The godly will have a reward with God and men. Remember a day of gray hair, on which you will make young people cry."

Shaykh Kishk adds, "Don't waste your efforts calling for birth control, because it is useless. Bring knowledge and money, reassure those who have funds, and give them a guarantee of safety, so that they may invest in this land. As the noble Messenger has said, 'Seek provision from what is hidden in the earth.' Have we delved into the depths of the earth? If we did so, the word of the Almighty would become true for us: 'Yet had the people of the cities believed and been God-fearing, We would have opened upon them blessings from heaven and earth [Qur'an 7:96].'"

Shaykh Mahmud Fayid, a scholar from the Islamic Law Association, says that the problem does not lie in increased population. The real problem lies in increased rates of misappropriation and thefts, or the lack of deterrent laws to eliminate the phenomena of corruption and immorality.

He pointed out that efforts exerted in an attempt to limit the population increase have failed and that any efforts in this field will fail, because the Egyptian people are a religious Muslim people who reject these calls.

He stated that work must be done to spread the Islamic spirit and Islamic education both for officials and the people. Plans must be made to go out into the empty desert and populate it.

Dr Mahmud Mazru'ah, dean of the theology faculty at al-Minufiyah, states that the claim that the cause of the economic crisis is population increase is a false claim and an unacceptable proposition. It is aimed at diverting attention from the real causes of the crisis.

Dr Mazru'ah calls for studying the main reasons for the economic collapse, apart from the peg of population increase. He says that there are numerous factors behind this collapse. Among them is this deformed and distorted child called the public sector. It swallows up hundreds of millions and wastes them every year; yet the government insists on preserving it, on the pretext of maintaining worn-out socialist slogans.

Dr Muhammad al-Ahmadi Abu-al-Nur, former minister of awqaf and professor of Prophetic traditions in the Women's College of al-Azhar University, thinks that the call for birth control or family planning under the pretext of the economic problem is a worthless call that is

doomed to failure. It has had no effect, especially among the working and peasant class. He affirmed that all the expenditures on the media campaign for birth control or planning—and these are enormous—are being wasted.

Dr Abu-al-Nur explained that the question of family planning is completely clear in the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace. He said that if mothers nursed their children 2 full years beyond the period of pregnancy, which is 6 months at minimum, there would be at least 30 months between each child. Even before that, the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, made material ability (designated by the word "ba'ah") basically a condition for undertaking marriage. The Prophetic tradition, "He who is able of you to marry, let him marry," means that whoever is not able should abstain, because it is to his credit and appropriate.

Dr 'Abd-al-Hayy al-Farmawi, professor in the theology faculty and member of the People's Assembly (Alliance), states that the economic crisis has many reasons, but that the population increase is not one of them. Egypt has many resources. If they were used well, it would be possible to solve the economic crisis. In addition, it is important to use manpower in a definite program to build up the desert, which represents a huge area of our country.

Economic experts, too, have affirmed that the population increase is not the real cause behind the economic crisis. Lack of planning and confused economic policies and laws are the fundamental cause of the crisis we are currently experiencing.

Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Ghazali, professor of economics in the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, said that regarding population increase as a cause of pressure on economic resources cannot be considered important from the development point of view. Population increase can be seen from two perspectives: from the perspective of consumption, or from another perspective as a productive force. Dr al-Ghazali asked, "Why do we regard it as a force for consumption, while neglecting it as a force for production?"

He stated that this is the essence of our economic crisis. The crisis we are now suffering is happening because we neglect the productive side. The only way out of the current crisis is by increasing production. Stopping population growth will not lead to a solution of the economic crisis. The solution is to formulate an ambitious plan that takes into account the employment of tremendous human resources to build new housing, industrial, and agricultural communities.

Dr al-Ghazali indicated that imbalances in the Egyptian economy are the cause of the current crisis. These include the large gap between consumption and production. This comes from the weakness of production in the commodity sectors.

Dr al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Muttalib, chairman of the Department of Statistics in the Business Faculty of al-Azhar University, states that the population increase has its positive side, inasmuch as these tremendous human forces can be used and exploited in increased production. If these energies were well exploited and trained, if they were well directed toward many projects such as conquering the desert, they would become a productive force, not a consuming force dependent upon the state.

He added that there are many projects that can be established using human resources—for example, projects to reclaim land and turn it into settled communities. He stated that there are fundamental factors behind the current economic crisis. Foremost among them are the bad management and terrible bureaucracy from which we suffer, as well as the unrestrained spread of the phenomena of corruption and immorality.

Dr Isma'il al-Daftar, professor of Prophetic tradition at al-Azhar University, explained that the fundamental solution to our economic problems lies in completely eschewing usury and in implementing the Islamic economic system in all banking transactions. He stressed that population increase is not a cause of the economic problem. Limiting reproduction certainly does not represent a solution to the problem.

Parties Condemn Actions of Youth Festival Committee

*NC0107194289 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1510 GMT 1 Jul 89*

[Excerpts] Dr 'Abd-al-Ahad Jamal-al-Din, secretary general of the National Democratic Party's Cairo branch, and representatives of all the Egyptian parties—the Labor Party, the National Progressive Unionist Grouping, the Liberal party, and the Ummah party—today stressed their rejection of the actions of the international preparatory committee for the youth festival in Pyongyang, North Korea. These actions, they said, violated accepted norms in international representation.

At a press conference today, which was attended by representatives of the Egyptian political parties, Dr Jamal-al-Din denied that any representative of any of the Egyptian parties or political forces had gone to attend this festival. He also denied that any of the persons scheduled to participate in the festival had been arrested, as claimed today in Pyongyang by the international preparatory committee. He stressed that the parties' refusal to participate in the festival stems from a united national and patriotic stand. [passage omitted]

Dr Salah 'Abdallah, Labor Party representative and People's Assembly deputy, said that the international committee had not respected Egypt's legitimate and national stance. It wanted two delegations to represent Egypt—one of which has no legal position—with the aim of creating distortion and divisions, he declared. [passage omitted]

It is recalled that the world youth festival of socialist and democratic countries began today with the participation of 138 countries and 750 organizations. It is held once every 4 years and Egypt takes part in it annually [as received]. However, the festival's preparatory committee, which met in Pyongyang in April, went against the Egyptian delegation's recommendations and sent invitations to other political forces that are not present in Egypt.

Article Contrasts Regional Groups With Arab League

45050320b Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 10 Apr 89 pp 52-53

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Ati Muhammad]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Apprehensive reactions should not be looked upon with doubt and disapproval, nor belittled; rather they should be viewed with a certain amount of objectivity that the general desire for unity of Arab action calls for. That is because any new development must necessarily establish its legitimacy by meeting with satisfaction and approval at the intellectual level and in practice. Such apprehensive reactions express a specific sector of Arab public opinion that must be taken into consideration. Or at least they reflect a general psychological feeling even among those who defend the concept of the regional groupings, that we are ending an era that essentially knew joint Arab endeavor only through the Arab League, and moving on to a new age whose characteristics have not yet been clearly defined, whose basis is mutual regional action. Decisive stages of movement in the life of a people usually create a climate of anxiety even in relation to new directions.

What causes the doubts. How is the solution to be found in a basic relationship such as the presence of the Arab League and the three regional Arab groups: the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], the Arab League, and the Arab Maghreb Union?

Some stir up fears of the regional concept, as opposed to the national one, saying that the establishment of these groups means fragmentation and establishes regionalism, which previously had only been an inclination among Arab groups. They say that the Arab League arose on a national basis or on the basis of a national system, while the regional groups have a regional basis (a geographical basis or at least a subregional geographic basis), and they fear that the national Arab bond will weaken and perhaps completely disappear with time. The arguments proved to be true of some trends that appeared at the end of the seventies to end the concept of Arabism, the concept upon which the Arab League was based as a founding expression of the growth of the national concept since the mid-forties. Regardless of the political trappings that blended with the establishment of the league itself, they aroused criticism from the nationalists themselves. These people believe that the

regional groups will draw in upon themselves or work according to their own interests, even if they are against the Arab interest as a whole.

The response to this criticism is that all the charters upon which the three existing groups are based are intent on affirming their Arab orientation and commitment to the national Arab bond. They all have promised practical action in the Arab interest as a whole. Over time the GCC has acted in a way that confirms its national commitment over the nearly 9 years that have passed since it was established. As for the states of the Arab Cooperation Council, it would be difficult if not impossible to doubt their pan-Arab positions before they entered the new council, which is not more than 2 months old. The same rule holds true to one degree or another about the positions of the states of the Arab Maghreb Union, namely that the action of the Arab states through the groups does not do away with their national commitment. Their view of national action was already developing, but not the philosophy of national action itself. We are not in a position to repeat the many criticisms which in past years have been directed against joint Arab action through the Arab League by all tendencies and *** all groups and levels.

That has been proven by scientific field studies, the results of which need not be repeated. In fact, these studies have shown that there is a growing feeling in Arab public opinion that leans towards accepting the concept of regional groups as a necessary outlet for joint Arab action.

Then, is not the essence of the activity of the Arab League the same as that of the regional groups? Is not the league a regional international organization that has the purpose and task of bringing about economic integration and political coordination among its states? But then the league's performance over almost 50 years showed that it was totally incapable of doing its job, so the Arab states had to look for an alternative to achieve their goals, and to lateral branch organizations for this purpose.

The problem that arises here is that the Arab League as an establishment and as an alliance does not bear the responsibility for the failure to achieve the greater Arab goals for which it was founded. Rather, the fault is in the failure of Arab administrations to agree on implementing the decisions of the League, and in the mistakes of the executive bodies in the league itself, foremost of which is the general secretariat. The Arab League has already suffered because the Arab states have inflated the issue of their sovereignty as opposed to submitting to the league as a general umbrella or organization that determines the course for everybody. Then it has also suffered from the mistakes made in its administrative and specialized agencies, etc. Herein lies an important point that the supporters and opponents of the concept of regional groups vis-a-vis their relationship with the league must agree upon, inasmuch as problems abound which have obstructed the work of the league. How will

the establishment of the regional groups become a means by which the league's situation can be corrected, and what will cause these groups to be a power that will force the league to continue in a new direction, devoid of the negative aspects of the past?

For example, it has been said that the condition that league decisions be unanimous was one of the main reasons why its endeavors failed, but some have responded that the blame lies not in the condition of unanimity nor in the charter, but rather in the fact that Arab states lacked determination and were not serious about implementing the decisions taken by league's council or the various committees. In fact, this condition was brought up in specific cases according to specific Arab circumstances and moods, and did not affect other completely similar cases.

Thus when these Arab groups arose, starting with the GCC, they tried to avoid the condition of unanimity as much as possible on the one hand, but pushed for another idea equivalent to it, namely consent and agreement among their members. For, as long as this consent or agreement existed, the issue of a lack of unanimity in making decisions would not have the political significance that could obstruct work within these groups. In spite of the problem of these groups in making decisions, the problem is not considered intrinsic, because there is a small number of members, which makes it easy for them to make agreements by the consent of all, contrary to the Arab League which has a large number with diverse positions. These groups kept apart from this problem, and thus if the league is to continue, it must begin the first reform steps toward changing its charter so that decisions are made by majority and not by unanimous agreement, profiting from the experience of the regional groups, particularly that of the GCC, because its experience can be looked to for guidance in view of its long period of continuing success.

Another issue that can be agreed upon is that the Arab League should pay more attention to its role of bringing about economic integration between all the Arab countries through the ideas, proposals, and decisions which it puts forth and which it works to implement on the entire Arab scene in order to revive issues of agricultural and industrial development and solve the problems therein among all the Arab states.

Since the orientation of the regional groups centers basically on economic cooperation, the economic interest will seem logical to everybody because it has a single scientific language that brooks no argument, and all the Arab states will welcome it. Even though the Arab League in reality has made prominent efforts in such areas, present circumstances would give it a greater opportunity for achievement if the charter were amended to make decisions binding by majority, and if the league were rid of the climate of political tension or pressures which have prevailed in it because of past circumstances. This is possible because with the regional groups around

it, the league will not become an arena for political wrangling, because that role which some have imposed on it for this purpose will end, of course.

With respect to the political aspect, and in particular the power of the league vis-a-vis the regional groups, several endeavors are being made. Perhaps the most important of these is that expressed by Prof Jamil Matar, an expert on Arab and international affairs, in his analysis of the future of the relationship of the league with the regional groups. He suggests that the Arab summit be developed into an establishment that would perform its leadership role at the level of the Arab system as a whole, coordinating the goals and interests of the Arab regional groups. If the charter were changed, the Arab summit could turn into an autonomous league establishment, and it would have the right to set up the apparatuses that it believes are necessary for carrying out its role as the supreme Arab power. In this case the charter could define the relationship of the summit to the league and to the regional groupings. Another proposal is that mentioned by amir al-Hasan ibn-Talal, head of the Arab Thought Forum. He suggests that the Arab League become a league for the Arab regions by creating a political link that would bring coordination and uniformity among the various regional groups. A third proposal is that a supreme Arab council be created that would include the heads of the regional Arab groups and the secretary general of the Arab League. This council would meet periodically to coordinate for the common Arab welfare.

This period of Arab ascent, the signs of which we are now seeing, is causing optimism. Thus, those who have fears and doubts ought to give heed to the positive side to them, namely that they are being raised out of desire to bring about the success of new experiences, not in order to cause doubt or spread a spirit of despair. Moreover, this period itself has created a quiet and reasonable climate on the Arab scene that interacts with events extremely positively. In the relationship between the league and the regional groups there are many endeavors which must be given greater attention in the foreseeable future. In summation, it can be concluded that there is increasing Arab concurrence on a number of facts, namely:

- The Arab League must be strengthened.
- The regional groups add to the league and strengthen it, and they are not the last word in joint Arab action. Perhaps if the Arab summit were to resume its role as a broader and stronger political establishment these groups would find themselves in a position where they would voluntarily dissolve themselves before a single Arab framework.
- Realism, gradual progress, and political accord are new values on the Arab scene, which all must deal with at all levels.

Al-Hudaybi Views SLP Split, MB Role
45040331a Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 17 Apr 89 pp 46-48

[Interview with MB People's Assembly Deputy by 'Abd-al-'Azim Darwish; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI introduction]

[Text] Because the Socialist Labor Party [SLP] crisis continues to impose itself on party activity in one way or another, and because the file on the crisis contains a bill of indictment against the Muslim Brotherhood [MB]—one of the parties of a three-party alliance—which indicates that the “policies of this ally,” and its behavior, ultimately led to the eruption of this crisis, the “Papers from the Opposition” column interviewed the Honorable al-Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, a prominent MB deputy in the People's Assembly, regarding the facts pertaining to the MB role in the SLP crisis.

“Papers from the Opposition” is also publishing the text of the interview verbatim.

Al-Hudaybi stated the following in his interview:

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] The 5th General Convention of the SLP has come to represent a turning point in the history of the party, arousing widespread debate. To what extent did the results of this convention succeed in changing the nature of the party as a socialist party?

[Al-Hudaybi] I believe that when the SLP began to grow, it was composed of dissimilar groups. It comprises various orientations and trends with clear, ideological differences, including groups with Islamic, leftist-communist, and Nasserist orientations. Complete homogeneity has not existed among different members of the party, and there have been genuine lasting disagreements between these different groups.

We mention here that the former authorized representative of the party, the Honorable al-Damardash Zaki al-'Uqqali, who left the party before the previous People's Assembly elections were held, submitting his resignation, in which he criticized the policies of the party. At the time, al-Damardash believed in certain policies and approaches, and advocated changing party ideology into those approaches in which he believed. When the principle of appointment to the Consultative Council was approved, he submitted his resignation from the party, even though he was its authorized representative at the time. This indicates that ideological differences had existed for a long time. Also, before the establishment of the alliance, 'Adil Husayn, the editor-in-chief of the AL-SHA'B newspaper, had Islamic orientations, whereas others had Nasserist, and leftist or socialist orientations. We know that “socialism” comprises various schools. So far, none of the groups fighting over the party has specified which “socialism” it is pursuing. If each group had to define the “socialism” in which it believed, we would find them differing. What happened in relation to

the SLP is that certain parties have been exploiting the internal conflict which has existed in the SLP since the alliance first began to be established in the 1987 elections. Personal differences helped to fuel disagreements, the most important of which is the insistence of some people on occupying the leading position on “the alliance's list,” which provoked a big split, such as that of Mamduh Qinawi, the assistant secretary-general of the party at the time, leading ultimately to his indignation, because he could not realize his desire, and to his subsequent statement that the alliance represents a deviation from the nature of the party, even though he had earlier agreed to it.

Hence, I maintain that what happened after that is that certain parties—government or official parties, or of the Interior Ministry—exploited this internal disagreement in the party. These parties had a large role in contacting persons who were in the party in order to deepen differences and to depict the alliance as having led to the control of the MB over the party, and to the strengthening of the party's Islamic wing.

Change in the Nature of the Party

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] What I mean here is, what did the results of the elections of the special convention produce in the way of a change in the nature of the party?

[Al-Hudaybi] The truth is that I have not carefully studied this matter extensively, because I did not feel that I had to intervene in these events. However, personally, I do not understand the essence of the disagreement which Ahmad Mujahid states is between him and 'Adil Husayn and Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, inasmuch as Ahmad Mujahid, in discussing socialism, states that he believes in Islamic socialism, while Ibrahim Shukri advocated nothing more than calls for reform in the Islamic outlook, and did not invalidate “Mujahid's socialism.” So what is the disagreement between the two? Only that Ahmad Mujahid did not win in elections for the executive committee. I cannot understand [it being] more than that.

Homogeneity in the Ideology of the Party

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] Permit me to say that the elections are held, and figures of the religious current win 28 of the 30 executive committee seats. How can we not judge that as a clear change in the identity and nature of the party? How can this issue not raise questions?

[Al-Hudaybi] Why do you not say that the results led to homogeneity in party ideology? We recognized at the beginning that the party has different orientations. There is no defined orientation from which we can say that there is a deviation, because there have been many differences since the outset. Even those calling for socialism do not define the socialism they advocate. If one calls for Islamic socialism, has he deviated from the

principle of the party? How can that be, when it was present originally? Therefore, an orientation present from the beginning predominates. It determines the concept of socialism. It did not deviate from the principles of the party, nor did it change the identity of the party. Rather, it is a current which was originally present in the party. It advocates a specific concept of socialism, namely, "Islamic socialism." It has obtained the majority. Even I could not say that the party has changed its principles as a result of that. How can we say that, when this current was actually present in the party? I repeat here the example of the Honorable al-Damardash al-'Uqqali. A Muslim Brother at one time, he advocated the socialism of 'Abd-al-Nasir, affirming that it is Islamic socialism, and writing much about this topic. Therefore, the presence of the socialist, Islamic current is not alien to the party. Indeed, it was present before, and the fact that this current has been able to win a majority, and receive the greatest attention is not strange.

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] Is it possible to define the MB's current position on the SLP, after that transformation which occurred in the party, and the SLP's transformation into a rival Islamic party?

[Al-Hudaybi] First of all, I refuse to say that the SLP has become an Islamic party rivaling the MB just because the Islamic orientation currently predominates in the party. There are still people in the party who believe in other concepts, which differ from the "Islamic concept." There is no competition between us and anyone else who makes the call to Islam, unless he is the type of whom God, may He be praised and exalted, says, "Let the competitors compete." This competition is good. It leads to love, as we compete together in the SLP to impart the call of God, and to establish Islamic rule. As such, we welcome all sources of endeavor in this area. We are pleased, and happy, and we thank God when we encounter any person who takes upon himself this noble call.

So Far We Have Our Independent Personality

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] In this context, are there Muslim Brothers in the SLP in its current form, in sufficient numbers to work through it, or are you still insistent on your strategy to establish your own party?

[Al-Hudaybi] So far, we continue to have our special entity. We will not relinquish this special entity, and, God willing, we will never merge with, or become dissolved into, other entities. As for our relationship with the SLP, we work through any possibility through which it is possible to work. In any case, we have an alliance with the SLP and the Liberals. The articles of the alliance are published and well-known. We all embraced elections on the basis of "a joint program." We will continue to be allied with whomever adheres to this program. This is the basis which governs our activity. At least, we have no other basis at present.

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] Meaning that no one is currently thinking about establishing an MB political party?

[Al-Hudaybi] On the contrary. The hope of forming a political party for the MB has existed for a long time. However, implementing this would be difficult, because such a party would be established in the face of a great number of objections. We all know of the existence of what is called the Parties Committee, and the conditions stipulated by the Parties Law, all of which are impediments. We would never expect Interior Minister Zaki Badr to approve the establishment of a party for us, because he is a prominent member of the Parties Committee, and all members of the committee are members of the ruling NDP. Experience has shown that, since the start of party plurality and the establishment of political parties under the rule of Anwar al-Sadat, the Parties Committee has not approved the establishment of any new party. All of these factors do not bode well for the establishment of a new party. On the contrary, any such effort would meet with failure.

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] Would you say that the Muslim Brothers have an independent personality, and that they would not dissolve into any party, especially the SLP, which binds you to an alliance? Can you provide us with the points of disagreement between the Muslim Brothers and the SLP in its current form following its 5th General Convention?

[Al-Hudaybi] I do not wish to enter into this area. Also, the SLP has an existing program. If there is presently a current which views socialism in terms of Islamic socialism, or views the reform of the state from an Islamic outlook, it currently has the upper hand. This is an issue which we must study carefully. However, we refuse to enter into a comparison between us and others.

We Will Not Interfere in the Organizational Matters of the Party

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] How do you respond to the accusation leveled at the Muslim Brothers, which asserts that they had a strong hand in what happened recently in the SLP?

[Al-Hudaybi] I do not at all believe in the validity of this accusation. I do not believe that anyone would dare to prove that. What is happening now is that some who are "slandering" us in numerous newspapers, are the ones who are claiming that. Very regrettably, the honor of speech means little to them. All party members are fully aware that the Muslim Brothers have no relationship to organizational and administrative matters in the party. Jamal As'ad 'Abd-al-Mallak himself confirmed that. True, we clearly intervened in the SLP's parliamentary organization in view of the fact that we are members in it, and that there must be coordination between us and some people. This is accepted. Briefly stated, we can say that the power of the general Islamic current in the state,

and in the entire Islamic east, is reflected in this group within the SLP, which has called for reform from an Islamic perspective. This is conceivable, and it is very conceivable that this group will have been influenced by the Islamic awakening. I repeat that I challenge anyone to prove that we were behind organizational or regulatory matters in the SLP.

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] Permit me to cite another criticism, namely, that the MB's alliance with the SLP has a negative effect politically on the SLP itself, and that the MB aimed to use the SLP to their own advantage.

[Al-Hudaybi] This accusation is being repeated by enemies of the Islamic currents. Any rational person would affirm that the Interior Ministry has an influence on the repetition of this accusation. The current interior ministry describes us in the lowest of terms. Accordingly, he is exerting all of his efforts to destroy [what is] between us and any power possibly connected to us. This is being done not only by the interior minister, but also by very many official agencies and parties who are not satisfied with this alliance, including foreign parties. We are cognizant of them. However, we also declare that we will not impose on others what they would not brook. We undergo arrest, expulsion, even murder, which, by God's grace, we consider a badge of honor. The prophet, God bless Him and grant Him salvation, says: "Do not to desire to meet the enemy; however, if you meet him, maintain your ground.... God purchased the believers' wealth and souls, in exchange for which they obtained paradise.... They fight in the service of God, killing and being killed."

I maintain that we did not force anyone to enter an alliance with us. We knocked on doors officially. I recall that I turned to the SLP, which, at the time, entertained no notion of entering into an alliance with us after the failure of the coalition plan between all of the opposition parties under the banner of the Wafd Party. Efforts in pursuit of this plan on the part of Eng Ibrahim Shukri ended when the Wafd Party rejected it.

Subsequently, I went to Eng Ibrahim Shukri. It so happened that I telephoned him, and was told at the time that he was busy in a meeting of the supreme committee of the party. I went to him, and proposed the idea of an alliance at the committee meeting, which was attended by Ahmad Mujahid, Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad, and Shawqi Khalid. I then left them to discuss the matter.

Therefore, I affirm that we did not jump on anyone to usurp a right that was not ours. Rather, it is the official agencies of the SLP and the Liberals, which discussed and agreed to the alliance. It is odd that Ahmad Mujahid, who currently rejects the idea of the alliance, previously nominated himself according to the slogan of the alliance, "Islam is the solution." Likewise, Jamal As'ad

'Abd-al-Malak, the Coptic deputy, also was nominated under the same slogan, as well as Ahmad al-Faqi.... What has happened today? What has changed?

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] What I mean is that the alliance has opened the door for the MB to control the SLP!

[AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI] The MB does not control the SLP. I challenge anyone to make such a statement.

Next week, Ibrahim Shukri will finish setting a series of fires.

ISRAEL

Israel, Greece Create Commercial Office
44230086a Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 24 Apr 89 p 15

[Article by Avy Gan'or]

[Text] The umbrella organization of the Binational Chambers of Commerce last week announced the establishment of an Israel-Greece Chamber of Commerce. In the first meeting of the chamber's administration, it was decided to elect lawyer Miko Menahem as chairman, lawyer Lily Ayas as secretary general, and Avigdor Ben-Ze'ev (from Bank Le'umi) as treasurer.

The decision to establish the Chamber comes in the light of growth in the volume of trade between Israel and Greece, which totalled \$180 million in 1988. Lawyer Miko Menahem stated that Israeli exports to Greece, which are double the volume of imports, comprise mainly chemicals, textiles and electronic and mechanical equipment.

The new chamber has already turned to 50 Israeli factories and companies involved in commerce with Greece in an attempt to facilitate, on their behalf, the expansion of contacts between the two countries. The chamber also appealed to banks and the press to add the exchange rate of the drachma to their publications.

The establishment of a binational chamber of commerce with Greece has received the encouragement and support of Ilyas Griboinis [as published], the trade attache at the embassy of Greece in Israel, and the Bureau for Israel-Greece friendship.

Peres Business Contacts Discussed
44230108 Tel Aviv HADASHOT Weekend Supp.
in Hebrew 30 May p 2

[Article by Naomi Lewitzky: "Peres's Generals"]

[Text] Just as Menahem Begin admired generals and felt insignificant in their presence, so does Shim'on Peres feel toward millionaires and businessmen. Rafa'el Eytan was Begin's Bar-Kohba. People like Charles Bronfman,

Rafa'el Recanati, Ye'quti'el Federman, and Ely Horowitz are Peres's Einsteins. The logic of it is rather superficial and simple: if they know how to manage their personal business, there is no doubt that they also know what is good for the country. Perhaps it is his modest background that causes a man like Peres to be so awed by handlers of big money. It is said that whenever he finds himself in the presence of some financial power, even a minor one, his heart simply beats faster. Their word is worth gold to him.

Charles Bronfman, for example, is not merely a friend. He is also a bank. State comptroller Miriam Ben-Porat will soon issue a list of big contributors to the various parties. Bronfman is slated to be well at the top of the list of Labor Party contributors, and his contribution is not even made public in its entirety. Some of it is disguised as private business, such as the survey firm Decima. Decima is financed by Bronfman and works for the Labor Party. Each party has its own methods of disguising contributions. Peres's candidates in internal party elections also profited from Bronfman's generosity. And of course, we must not forget Bronfman's Battle Fund, whose turnover is about \$20 million. Peres is said to have a say in the affairs of the fund. And who is in charge of the fund's public relations, if not Moshe Te'umim, Peres's image adviser? Te'umim's contribution to the image of the finance minister is not quite clear, but what is very clear is the fund's contribution to Te'umim.

And then there is his relationship with Rafa'el Recanati. Recanati, Peres's good friend for over 20 years, was one of his strongest supporters. Rumor has it that he expected, for example, that Peres would help preempt the appointment of the Beisky Commission. Peres did not manage to do so. Then he expected Peres to prevent his removal from the directorship of Bank Discount, despite the commission's findings. Once again, Peres failed, and a black shadow passed between the two. They began talking again only in the past few months.

The long friendship with millionaires Steve and Lillian Shalom is helpful, too. If not directly to Peres himself, then to his close associates, like Nimrod Novick. Ye'quti'el Federman, owner of the Dan hotels chain, financed the "economists for Peres" campaign.

And what do the millionaires get in exchange? An open door and a listening ear. And when those belong to the finance minister, they can be worth a lot of money. Even if Peres does not deliver immediately, like Ari'el Sharon, the very fact of the closeness helps.

It was money that prompted Peres to invite David Balas to his house. To this day, kibbutzniks heatedly argue that it was Balas's closeness to Peres that convinced them to trust him and to entrust him with over \$100 million. Bruce Rappaport, too, made a killing. In the previous elections he contributed \$300,000 to the Labor Party. Peres did not give him a thing in exchange, except for a short note. So what, since when is it forbidden to give a

letter to a friend? Neither did businessman David 'Amar, brother-in-law to Rafi 'Edri, request anything in exchange for his large contribution. It must have been a coincidence that 'Edri was appointed cabinet minister. During Peres's visit to Paris, he kept one evening free especially to attend a festive dinner party at 'Amar's house. It does not hurt Peres, and it helps 'Amar.

Sources close to Peres say that he cannot resist even wealthy people who are not his particular friends. The Ary Genger affairs, for example, caused great excitement at the treasury. Within 5 minutes, Peres gave Genger what even Sharon would not have dared to give. The huge Intel Company also won his favor. Intel has a plant in Jerusalem. For years the company fought with the treasury about, among other things, the size of the grant that it was to receive. Intel demanded 30 percent of its investment, while the treasury insisted on only 27 percent. Those paltry 3 percent were worth, after all, many millions. Moshe Nissim, former director general of the treasury, withstood the pressure, Victor Medina said, "Over my dead body," but Peres granted their demand. Intel sent to Israel one of their American stars, and Peres could not resist. He received him for a talk, and the battle that had been waged for years was settled on the spot. Intel will now receive the grant it requested.

All that prompts veritable pilgrimage to Peres. Local leaders, farmers, businessmen, everyone comes for private talks on their personal affairs. Even the director general of the Kenes congress association, Gid'on Rivlin, managed to get an interview with the finance minister. Genuine occupational therapy. Treasury professionals are tearing their hair out. That could never have happened under Nissim, they say. Now when a millionaire shows up, Peres not only admires him, he also does his bidding.

However, in the eyes of treasury professionals the big damage is caused by the fact that businessmen and other people with vested interests serve as advisers to Peres. Ely Horowitz, Dov Lautman, Moshe Zanbar, and Tzadik Bino sit in on his working meetings together with the head of the budget department and his aides, and the governor of the Bank of Israel. That professionals hear businessmen talk is not so bad, but the trouble is that businessmen listen to professionals at the prime source. One must be an angel or a monk not to make use of such valuable information.

Most upset are treasury people about the involvement of Professor Hayim Ben-Shahar in ministry decisions. Ben-Shahar, it is said, is no longer just a professor. He is now a full-fledged businessman and adviser to various firms, and his affairs are blooming. On the one hand, he is an adviser to the finance minister; on the other hand, he advises commercial firms, such as, for example, Armand Hammer's representation. It is difficult, really difficult, not to mix the two. Ethics, complain treasury people, is not strongly represented in all this.

And last but not least, there is Deputy Finance Minister Yossi Beylin. Beylin, Peres's big gun, has become a national distributor to kibbutzim, Koor, the Sick Fund, etc. And if the decision to allot NIS 90 (New Israeli Sheqels) million to the Sick Fund passed, now they are already talking about NIS 250 million. And if one needs to throw something to the competition to keep it quiet, then the settlements have no problem getting money, even though that runs counter to Beylin's ideology. And if one wants to pacify the Herut, one transfers NIS 4 million to the Betar Youth Organization. So far, to put things in perspective, the entire budget of all the youth organizations together was no more than NIS 4 million.

But Beylin's most clever work concerns the religious parties. He had long ago decided that one cannot fight for peace and against the religious at the same time. And if you can't fight them, bribe them. Beylin kept back a small fund out of the money allotted by the Funds Commission for the religious, which allows him room to maneuver. No sooner did he do it that Hassidim and rabbis started coming to him on pilgrimage. The reason is that some of the orthodox are organized in "courts," but some are not, and there was no one to take care of the latter. Now there is, praise be to the Lord. At the treasury they now belong to "Beylin's Court."

The treasury is simply going crazy. Beylin, they say, is the first deputy finance minister who distributes money. "Distributes is not enough said," David Bo'az, head of the Budget Department recently said, "he shovels it out."

New Regulations for Confiscating PLO Money in Israel

*44230115c Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 16 May 89 p 3*

[Article by 'Uriel Ben-'Ami, "A New Law Would Allow the Confiscation of Monies that the PLO Transfers to Israeli Arabs"]

[Excerpt] According to the change in the ordinance for preventing terror that is being prepared by the Ministry of Justice, administrative detentions would be allowed within the Green Line without a hearing before the chief justice of a district court and associations that act on behalf of the terrorist organizations would be outlawed.

Money and property transferred by the PLO to Israeli Arabs would be confiscated according to an amendment to a law, associations acting on behalf of the terrorist organizations would be outlawed, and administrative detentions would be allowed also within the Green Line, according to Assistant Minister of Justice Dan Meridor, who spoke yesterday at a meeting in Jerusalem with reporters on the territories.

"We will modify the instructions in order to adapt them to reality. Prime Minister Begin had ordered an end to administrative detentions and that those arrested be

brought before a judge, but when the intifadah (uprising) intensified and the number of those arrested administratively grew, this order was suspended," the assistant minister said, adding that his ministry is now considering a revision of the ordinance for preventing terror within Israel.

Meridor said that lately there has been an increase in the amount of funds transferred on behalf of the terrorist organizations to the Arabs of Jerusalem, the Galilee, and the Triangle. According to him, the PLO is interested in making the Israeli Arabs dependent upon it by transferring the monies.

The minister emphasized that organizations and associations that today serve the terrorist organizations or engage in terrorist activities will be disbanded or their establishment will be prevented by the revisions in the new law.

He noted that, until now, it was necessary to have administrative detention cases within the Green Line heard before the chief justice of a district court, while according to the revision in the law, administrative detentions within the Green Line will henceforth be heard before any of the district judges. [passage omitted]

Foreign Currency Surplus Analyzed

44230119c Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 May 89 p 5

[Text] Some 10 days ago we were triumphantly informed that our foreign currency reserves had reached the new record figure of \$5.4 billion. In its announcement, Bank of Israel also noted with satisfaction that such a record had not been attained in a long time.

According to the report, during the past 4 months the reserves increased by \$2 billion as a consequence of the latest shekel devaluation. Before the devaluation the public hastened to cash in dollar certificates of deposit, thus decreasing the currency reserves; after the devaluation, the public endeavored to make a profit from its outcome.

However, together with declared satisfaction with the growth of foreign currency reserves, lately the Bank of Israel, as well as the Ministry of the Treasury and senior economists have begun to wonder what in fact is the level of surplus that Israel should maintain as national reserves.

In view of the unprecedented record, some people suggested considering alternative uses for some of the foreign currency, such as bringing forward the maturity date on state loans, increasing the rate of allocations for faster economic growth, and so forth. Israel Bank summoned its experts to devise a policy, whereby the key question was the optimal level of foreign currency

surplus and alternative uses for some of the current reserves. The conclusion of the meeting was that the reserves should not be touched and that their present level was satisfactory.

Concerning the fundamental question of the desirable level of foreign currency surplus in Israel, it turns out that to this day the questions was never decided in principle. In point of fact, the surplus level is predicated more by economic-political reality than by "hard assets," as Israel Banks prefers to refer to it.

The best illustration for that was the latest event we witnessed, namely the more than NIS 2 billion (New Israeli Sheqels) drop recorded in reserves in the last quarter of 1988. Clearly, if the optimal level of foreign currency reserves in Israel should have been NIS 5 billion, it was reasonable to expect that a steep and rapid drop of over \$2 billion in that surplus should have caused Israel Bank to "raise Cain," rather than be content to whisper faintly and without conviction that something should be done about the reserves, since, moreover, there is no doubt that had those in charge of the subject realized that \$5 billion foreign currency surplus was more than is necessary, in the recent past they would have had several occasions to suggest alternative uses for the reserves, something that never happened.

The Bank of Israel will say that when a government maintains a fixed rate of exchange, it must also maintain a relatively high level of foreign currency reserves to ensure appropriate room to maneuver without destabilizing the economy. About this point there is no dispute. Israel Bank also points out that the custom in Israel is to hold foreign currency reserves equal to 3 months worth of imports; this point is not disputed either.

An additional argument in favor of maintaining a high foreign currency surplus is the structure of the government debt and the fact that Israel needs considerable loans from foreign banks. There is no denying that the existence of foreign currency reserves palpably improves the country's bargaining position when it comes to borrow from the international money market; it also necessarily reduces the marginal interest rates on those loans.

The question is why and what for does Israel hold reserves totaling precisely 3 months worth of imports, rather than 5,6,7 or, alternately, 0,1, or 2 months? That is the key question.

It must be understood that, like everything else, one is forced to pay an economic price for holding reserves that are too high. There are all sorts of alternative uses for that money, and each alternative use has its own cost and gain.

Wise management of national resources does not begin and end with achieving a certain level of capital gains on foreign currency surplus (about which we recently had a public debate), but requires periodic reexaminations of cost and return functions in the economy, and consequently, it requires changes in policy.

What was valid in the economy 10 or 20 years ago cannot possibly apply today. The structure of Israel's debts, their changing absolute and relative level, and new national needs against the background of a different international economic reality demand different measures. It would seem that The Bank of Israel's latest announcement in the matter and the rationale invoked indicate an unwillingness to grapple with key questions and a preference for the relatively easier reserve policy of "the more the merrier."

Business Envoy to Poland and Hungary in June
44230086c Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 21 Apr 89 p 4A

[Article by Avi Gan'or]

[Text] At the beginning of June, a joint Israeli commercial delegation, the first of its type, will go to Hungary and Poland. The delegation will be headed by Dani Gellerman, the chairman of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Dani Profer, the chairman of the Israeli Export Institute.

Participating in the delegation will be industrialists, businessmen, and bankers, including Moshe Zanbar, the chairman of the board of directors of Bank Le'umi, Yehoshu'a Porer, a former director-general of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Yisra'el Asher, the director-general of the Degem Ma'arakhot Company, and Binyamin Jebly, the chairman of the directorate of the Electric Company. The delegation will go to the two states following previous visits made by Hungarian and Polish trade delegations in Israel, and following "Hungary Week," which took place in February at the Tel Aviv Hilton Hotel. An "Israel Week" is expected to take place in June in Budapest.

Israeli exports to Hungary totalled \$3.8 million in 1988, and included mainly agricultural products, chemicals, textiles, agricultural equipment and computer software.

Imports from Hungary in the same year totalled \$23.4 million, and included mainly food products, wood, metal products, electric bulbs and cables. Recently, deals have also been signed to import colored televisions and wines.

Kibbutzim Pursue Grey Market Financing

44230086b Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 25 Apr 89 p 22

[Article by Yehudah Sharoni]

[Text] Signs of credit difficulties in the banking system are beginning to appear in relation to a segment of the kibbutzim as well. In the absence of any alternative, some of them are being compelled to resort to seeking loans on the grey market. The commercial banks are refraining from granting additional credit to some of the kibbutzim for fear that the loans will not be repaid. Credit is only being given to finance export consignments or the importation of equipment for industrial factories. The commercial banks are willing at most to recycle existing credit.

Moreover, an administration for settling kibbutz debts headed by former Bank Controller Galyah Ma'or has still not been established. Nor has a special fund to assist kibbutzim in distress been established as was recommended by the chairman of the board of directors of Bank Le'umi, Moshe Zanbar.

In their hour of need, a segment of the kibbutzim has been compelled to resort to the grey market to seek credit there. Businessmen on the grey market are not enthusiastic about lending to the kibbutzim. Nonetheless, if they decide to lend, they do so by discounting checks or bills. The kibbutz makes available a check as security to the credit provider. The latter deducts 3 percent or more in interest on it monthly, in non-linked shekels. Those discounting the checks are usually businessmen obviously involved in business contacts with the kibbutz system.

As an additional measure to overcome the problem of financing, many kibbutzim that own industrial factories are considering the introduction of private partners. The introduction of partners could create financial depth in case the factory is thrown into difficulties. A number of kibbutzim have even turned to potential investors, and have interested them in investment possibilities.

Kibbutzim Experience Credit Crisis

44230115a Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 17 May 89 p 8

[Article by 'Odi Nahshon, "Credit Crisis in the Kibbutzim - Everyone is Waiting for the Treasury to Complete the Final Text of the Arrangement"]

[Text] Despite the Treasury's promises to complete the final text of the arrangement [for debt forgiveness and re-scheduling] for the kibbutzim following its approval in the [Knesset] Finance Committee, there is still no real progress in the preparation of the arrangement. Many kibbutzim are now reporting a severe credit crisis - the banks are also awaiting the final text. The staff of the

Treasury Budget Branch promised to submit this week the draft, which is in the hands of the branch's legal advisors, but there has not yet been any progress in its preparation.

Galia Ma'or, who is to be the chief of the kibbutzim arrangement administration, began recently to meet with the sides connected with the arrangement, but she made it clear to the heads of the kibbutz movements that she will not begin to act officially until the text has been completed. This text is also supposed to establish the structure of the arrangement administration and its authority.

Meanwhile, the credit crunch of many kibbutzim continues, because the heads of the banks are waiting for the arrangement. The continuing refusal of Bank Mizrahi to join the proposed arrangement makes the relations of the kibbutzim with the banking system difficult. However, senior individuals in the kibbutz movement estimate that after the publication of the banks's balance sheets, the path will be paved for their full adherence to the arrangement, including Bank Mizrahi.

Senior individuals in the kibbutz movements are to meet on Tuesday with the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Bank Le'umi, Moshe Zanbar, in order to discuss the relations of the kibbutzim with the bank. Many kibbutzim report difficulties in financing due to the difficulty in obtaining bank credit.

However, senior individuals in the kibbutz movements said last night that reports of the return of the kibbutzim to the grey market are not true. The kibbutzim reached agreements to re-schedule their debts to interests in the grey market, and these debts are only a miniscule part of their overall liabilities.

Director of Bank Le'umi on New Arrangements

44230115b Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 25 May 89 p 11

[Article by Levi Morav, "Zanbar Settles an Account; The Productive Sector Paid a Price for the Bank Shares Arrangement"]

[Text] The press conference yesterday with the chairman of the board of directors of Bank Le'umi, Moshe Zanbar, had been planned several weeks ago. No one imagined then that the conference with Zanbar would be held the day after the dramatic decision by the Minister of Finance to equalize the voting rights of the bank shares.

Clear-minded, acerbic and sharp as a razor, Zanbar was at his best yesterday. Without mentioning names, he settled accounts with all the individuals connected with the affair. Firstly, the Minister of Finance Peres said yesterday that the aim of his act was to return to the people of Israel that which had been taken from them. Here, Zanbar was at his best. His analysis shattered all

the conventional explanations commonly presented by the Treasury officials, the economists at the Bank of Israel, and the economics professors.

They Paid \$6.5 Billion for Merchandise Worth Only \$2 Billion

Zanbar maintained that when part of the public pays, another part benefits. The Government of Israel did not have to sell the banks today in order to compensate the public. It did that already in October 1983, when it decided to pay \$6.5 billion for merchandise worth only \$2 billion. The government took the difference, amounting to \$4.5 billion, from the public. But it did not take it from all the public. It paid this amount to the owners of the bank shares, and not to the banks themselves. In order to cover the amount, the government raised funds through linked, interest-bearing bonds, and to induce the public to buy these bonds, the government raised the interest. The result is well-known. Those who paid the price were those factors in the entire productive sector, and especially the kibbutzim, the moshavim, Koor, and Solel Boneh, whose stockholders's equity was small in relation to their current operations. The consumption sector benefitted from the bank shares arrangement, while the productive sector paid the price. Nothing was taken from the people of Israel in 1983, so that there is nothing to return to it today.

Zanbar raised an interesting point concerning the bill that would equalize voting rights. In his opinion, according to the signed agreements in force between the government and the owners of the controlling interests in the banks, which have also acquired the force of law, there is no place for additional legislation before 1993, when the agreement expires. Any law, however, justified or correct in the context of the bank shares, would be retroactive legislation, and it is inconceivable that such would be done in an orderly state, which is also under the rule of law.

Endangering the Depositors's Monies

Zanbar then took on Adi 'Amorai, the chairman of M. Y. Assets Incorporated. He attacked 'Amorai's two central assertions sharply. The first: "The equalization of the voting rights will lead to an increase in the price of the shares." The second: "Sell the shares to the highest bidder." According to him, this opinion is fundamentally and terribly flawed. It will result in a threat to the depositors's money, and scores of billions of dollars are concerned. The sale must not be to the highest bidder, but only to a serious buyer, who would be capable of crystallizing a controlling interest around himself. Zanbar warned against the entry of negative factors, who are liable to propose a relatively high price, enter the system, milk it, and get out quickly. In his opinion, there is no equality between the shares, and no such equality can exist in practice. He illustrated this by saying that if a serious buyer would come and try to acquire a bundle of 26 percent, it should be assumed that he would ask that

the government and the Bank of Israel would guarantee him, contractually or legislatively, that no other factor would be allowed to attain significant shareholdings, which would be liable to challenge his control over the bank. In order to ensure a broad distribution of the shares, there is no need of all things to equalize voting rights, Zanbar said, and brought as an example the Chase Manhattan Bank of the Rockefeller family. He said that Rockefeller himself had revealed to him that the family holds only 2 percent of the bank's shares, and that is sufficient for it to control the bank almost completely.

Semiconductor Factory Coming to Be'er Sheva' 44230133

[Editorial Report] Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew on 1 June page 2 presents an interview with Be'er Sheva' mayor Yitzhaq Reger. In the interview Reger claims that former Israeli businessman Rafi Kline seems committed to investing in a high-tech semiconductor plant in Be'er Sheva'.

Reger explains that such a factory could help to exploit the hidden potential of Be'er Sheva'. The city has a university, he explains, which produces engineers, as well as a technical college. "We also have plenty of room and inexpensive housing," Reger continues. He adds that such a plant would also aid in dealing with the unemployment problem. Be'er Sheva' currently has about 3000 persons out of work.

Reger explains that the factory is slated to employ 1000 to 1200 persons. The initial investment would be about NIS 170 million (New Israeli Sheqels). Such financing can only be facilitated, Reger claims, with government assistance. He adds that Minister of Trade and Industry Sharon knows this and is behind the project.

Tzim To Expand Operations

44230086d Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ Weekly Economics
Supp. in Hebrew 29 Apr 89 pp 16-17

[Article by Gil'ad Bloom]

[Text] Tzim has ordered four container ships worth a total of \$140 million, and will soon order another three container ships costing about \$35 million per ship, based on the cost of the four ships on order. This deal will be financed independently by the Tzim company and its credit lines, without any aid. Despite the large expenditure entailed by the acquisition of these ships, Tzim's long-term obligations did not increase. On the contrary, in 1988, the company paid all of the interest charges which it owed, which amounted to \$33 million. In addition, it reduced its lines of credit by \$61 million.

Tzim's management decided to order these ships, each of which is capable of carrying 2,600 containers compared to the 2,000-container capacity of Tzim's current largest ships, because of expected growth in its activity in

coming years, and the need to become more efficient, the same factors that caused a turn-around in Tzim's financial performance following large losses in 1983 and 1984.

Tzim lost almost \$100 million in 1983 and 1984, and many predicted that it would cease being an independent shipping company and go bankrupt. In the same period, many international shipping companies went bankrupt due to a profound crisis in the shipping branch caused by the world economic slowdown and the large surplus of ships. News of the buckling of large shipping companies, such as the U.S. Lines of the United States, and Japan's "Senko," only strengthened this prognosis.

Actually, Tzim managed to move from loss to profit already in 1985. Mati Morganstern, who was appointed director-general of the company at the height of the crisis in November 1984, was forced to cope with a column of debts amounting to \$600 million, an ungainly administrative structure, and a company suffering from the difficult problem of a manpower surplus and low production figures.

All of these problems were handled, one after the other. Morganstern put together a new management comprising Tzim employees, who in turn appointed two teams to make the company more efficient and re-organize its activities. Administrative powers were decentralized and transferred to regional administrative centers, and intensive negotiations were begun with workers over a series of efficiency measures whose objective was to reduce manpower strength without damaging production.

Since the start of 1985, Tzim has succeeded in reducing its manpower strength by about 800 workers, including 200 sailors and 600 Israel-based company employees. It halved its number of representative abroad, who currently total only 58 compared to 120 representatives 5 years ago.

Despite all of these reductions, the company's revenues grew by an average of about 10 percent annually. Thus, for example, the company's revenues grew by 13 percent in 1987 to \$796 million, and by 10 percent in 1988 to \$875 million, and it is estimated that this year's revenues will total close to \$1 billion.

Together with these savings and efficiency measures, Tzim also devoted considerable attention to matters pertaining to service lines.

Tzim is among the 10 largest shipping companies in the world, and was recently ranked as sixth in the world on this list. It has the widest geographical deployment of any shipping company, and it is the most flexible shipping company regarding cargo-handling capabilities. Currently, Tzim operates 21 permanent service lines everyday of the year, and its ships visit 250 ports on all five continents. In the course of implementing the recovery program of the company, a portion of the service

lines found to be unprofitable were shortened or suspended. However, despite these cutbacks, Tzim has managed to maintain its senior position in this area. This deployment confers on it a tremendous advantage, inasmuch as it can offer its clients cargo-handling services to and from any port, and is not limited to transporting cargo of a specific type, such as containers or bulk cargo, as are other shipping companies which specialize in the transport of one type of cargo. Tzim was established to transport any cargo to and from Israel. Therefore, it possesses ships which transport all types of cargo, including bulk cargo, fuel, non-containerized cargo, and containers themselves of course. Despite the suspension of a number of unprofitable lines during the implementation of the recovery program, a large segment of maritime transporters currently turn to Tzim to handle their cargoes, because Tzim still has the widest deployment of the shipping companies. In addition, it is also the most flexible company regarding the transport of different types of cargo. It is no coincidence that Tzim adopted the motto, "Any cargo to every port at any time."

This policy led to the consolidation of Tzim's status in recent years, the result being that 58 percent of the company's revenues are currently derived from international trade, and only 42 percent are derived from trade with Israel.

Tzim's management has decided that it must diversify its activities to maintain Tzim's economic strength and preclude dependency on a specific branch which might be thrown into a crisis, thus causing a deep depression as happened in 1983-84. Therefore, it decided to deepen the company's penetration of the air and land cargo-handling branches. These activity branches complement Tzim's maritime cargo-handling operations, and can insure the company against dependence on a single source of income. Tzim has already begun to activate complementary handling activities. For example, it is a partner in an aviation company in New York, and in a land transport company in Britain. It also owns consignment and customs brokerage companies in Israel. In 7-10 years, Tzim hopes to complement its continental deployment by means of an integrated sea-land-air network; it will be able to see to it that any cargo will arrive from any departure point in the world to any destination chosen by the sender, without the latter having to handle transport, customs brokerage or any other subject.

1988 Balance - Profit of \$36 Million

Tzim finished 1988 with profits of \$36 million, double the \$17.8-million profit obtained in 1987, making it the fourth consecutive year in which Tzim ended the operational year with a profit.

The company's operational profit of \$89.7 million would have been even higher had it not been for the erosion in the exchange rate of the dollar, which increased Tzim's expenditures in dollar terms without a concurrent increase in revenues.

The company's revenues increased by 10 percent in 1988 to total \$875.3 million, compared to \$796.2 million in 1987. It is already clear that Tzim's revenues this year will surpass the \$900-million mark, and could reach \$1 billion.

Since 1985, Tzim has repaid debts and paid interest to banks totalling close to \$0.5 billion using its independent means. In 1988 alone, Tzim paid \$33 million in interest on its debts, and defrayed credit lines totalling \$61 million. The company also obtained an arrangement providing for the spread of its \$136 million in obligations to banks in Israel over a 3-year period to improve its capital structure.

In the company's last balance, the market value of the company's ships grew. The gap between their price on the balance sheet and their real value is currently a positive sum of \$33 million. The total value of Tzim's fleet of ships was \$345 million at the end of 1988.

Possible Implications of Levinger Case Considered *44230119a Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 May 89 p 7*

[H. Gur article on Levinger's court case, "Opening Shots"]

[Text] You don't have to be a prophet to predict that Rabbi Levinger's trial is destined to become, wait and see, a political trial that will soon send tremors through Israel. The opening session took place yesterday at the Regional Court in Jerusalem on Salah ad-Din Street, before Judge 'Ezra' Hadya, and will resume on July 13th. However, the beginning was enough to foretell that its continuation and end will be marked by stormy debates and will put the Israeli judicial system to the acid test. This time the defender is Rabbi Moshe Levinger himself, and he is accused of killing in Arab in Hebron.

When I arrived there in the morning I found Ya'aqov Heniman, currently of Susya, one of the underground members who had served a prison term for his participation in plans to blow up the mosques on Temple Mount, in the small hall. Next to him sat Yitzhaq Novick of 'Ofra, who had been convicted for participation in the attacks on Mayors Karim Khalaf of Ramallah and Ibrahim al-Tawil of al-Birah. Also present was Ury Ari'el, secretary general of the West Bank and Gaza Council, women with covered heads, and bearded men, the accused's close friends.

A short discussion began between the judge and Prosecutor 'Eren Shindar about the accused request to postpone the trial. The decision was to hear the accused himself make the request. Rabbi Levinger, who was somewhat late, requested that members of his family, who had accompanied him, be allowed to enter. His wife and one of his sons, together with Beny Katzover and Rabbi Me'ir Heiten came in, followed by underground leader Yehuda Etzion and Daniela Weiss, as well as

Efrayim Segal who, together with Yossi Harnoy of 'Alon Moreh, was found guilty in the killing of the girl Aysha al-Bahash. Harnoy is still in jail and the former was released after a few years.

The accused rabbi stated: "I view this trial very seriously. This entire trial is a miscarriage of justice. It is a terrible atrocity. The State of Israel is putting me on trial, instead of Sari Nusaybah and Faysal Husayni. This is advocacy of Ishma'el, rather than of the people of Israel... An advocacy that is appalled by a Jew but forgiving to Arabs... Such a great injustice..."

The judge politely tried to persuade the rabbi to voice his factual arguments for postponing the trial. The accused claimed that he had received the indictment only on May 14th and had not had time to appoint a lawyer and to appeal to the State Attorney to cancel the trial or, at the least, to postpone it. He shouted: "They presented 1,500 pages only for those fabrications! Madness! For the false charge that I had killed a man. If only I had killed!" The room was silent.

The prosecutor stood up and suggested that "The Court make its statement." The judge softly asked Levinger to state the length of the postponement he wished. The rabbi demanded that the State Attorney be permitted to consider the issue. He raised his voice: "There are eight important paragraphs here, each one of which separately would suffice to void the trial. According to the Agranat Commission findings, the State Attorney should consult the justice minister." The prosecutor continued to the point: "We agree to postpone by 2-3 weeks." The judge asked him if he did not want to consult a lawyer; Levinger announced that as soon as he had received a reply from the State Attorney, he will call the court and inform it on the date suitable to him. He turned to the prosecutor and yelled: "All those evil people, those Arab killers run around free and are not brought to trial! Don't push me! Don't bring my trial forward!" The prosecutor answered darkly: "It is beneath my dignity to reply to this." The judge appeared to understand Levinger's feelings: "Let him speak, I allow him to talk... That's how he feels... It pains him."

The judge postponed the trial until 13 July. A decision will be expected on the case from the State Attorney. In the meantime, he added, the accused will appoint an attorney for himself. He looked at Moshe Levinger and called him to task severely about his appearance and his remarks about the office of the prosecutor. The standing rabbi immediately answered: "I heard you. I will do all that is my duty as a rabbi to do."

Those were the opening shots in a criminal case that promises to be the most political trial since the Six Day War. The rabbi described the murder charge as a fabrication and right away he added, "I wished I had killed." The gist of the defense can be written on a stamp. Rabbi Moshe Levinger. Number 1. The crowned leader of an entire tribe that will stick together, will demonstrate, will

protest, will yell, and will view this trial as the focus of a political campaign against a "government of treason and surrender and its catastrophic plans which will necessarily bring about the establishment of a PLO state in the heart of Greater Israel."

On July 13th the trial will resume, since it is not reasonable to assume that the State Attorney, in consultation with the justice minister, will cancel it. In July, in the middle of the hot summer, hatred will come to a peak against the background of smoke from fires set "presumably for nationalistic purposes," of continued bloodshed, and of retaliatory actions carried out by "Jews who have despaired of the capability of the defense forces to protect them... and the time has come to teach them a lesson!" Me'a Sha'arim, frustration, rage, and division. And the State of Israel, as an enlightened state of law and order, will have to withstand all that and resolutely and firmly rule what is allowed and what not, and who has a right to shoot and when. It will have to enforce law and authority. Judging by the beginning of the trial I think that there will be and that Israel is facing tough "happy times" times ahead (sarcastic expression in Hebrew). 'Arafat, the olive branch bearer, is calling for intensified killing, while good Jews are calling for an eye for an eye. Presumably, cabinet ministers will claim that all the victims we will suffer from now on will be the result of Shamir's peace initiative. Others will demand the head of the chief of staff. HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement] is calling for general jihad in the name of Islam's sword and for an Islamic Palestinian state, under the slogan: "O Jews, remember the battle of Khayber, Muhammad's army will return." Israel will need a lot of wisdom, strength, and good nerves to "go through the summer in peace."

Without drawing any parallel, it is interesting to note that Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, the revered HAMAS leader in the Gaza Strip, and 250 of his men were arrested on the eve of Rabbi Levinger's trial. As if the poisonous conflict with the Arab national movement was not enough, now Elohim and Allah both are called upon to support the two religions in the war between father Abraham's descendants.

Levinger Comments on His Trial

44230112 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
23 May 89 p 8

[Article by Ron Levi]

[Text] Rabbi Moshe Levinger's entrance into the courtroom where his trial opened in the Jerusalem District Court was about a half-hour late. Levinger is accused of killing a shoe merchant in Hebron in 1988.

The rabbi, who was not represented by a lawyer, attacked the prosecution and the government. He stood before the judge, waved his hands, and said, "This is the prosecution for Ishmael, not the prosecution for Israel. Your Honor will excuse me, but this trial is basically unjust.

They are trying the settlers' leader, and not the Arabs. They presented against me 1,500 pages of material for the trial. Everything was for the sake of the word justice, as if I had killed a person. If only I had killed, but I didn't kill him."

Levinger continued to attack the prosecution: "I received the indictment only 8 days ago, and the first hearing was already set, in contradiction to the law. At least 2 weeks must pass from the day I receive the indictment until the trial opens. This must be investigated."

Judge 'Ezra Hadaya, who accepted with understanding Levinger's lateness ("It's difficult to leave Hebron in the morning. One must first finish praying.") accepted Levinger's request to delay the opening of the trial.

Levinger continued to preach: "None of the leaders of the Arab revolt, the intifadah [uprising]—Sari Nusaybah, Faysal al-Husayni, and Hanna Sinyurah—are being put on trial. They go about freely, and I am being put on trial with the greatest despatch."

At that moment, the prosecutor, attorney 'Eran Shendar, spoke to the judge: "I would expect that Your Honor would explain to the accused that the place for this kind of argument is not in court." Judge Hadaya put an end to the political speech: "You said enough of what you want to say and what is necessary. Let's relate to the dry legal matter."

Levinger continued: "My request for delaying the proceedings contains eight paragraphs of great importance, any one of which is sufficient to cancel the trial. The Legal Advisor must confer with the Minister of Justice and the government. There is no one in the State of Israel to whom the court is as dear as it is to me, but the Legal Advisor must examine my request in a business-like manner and in a relaxed manner."

The prosecutor requested that the file be put on the docket for the reading of the indictment and the hearing of testimony, without connection to the request to postpone the proceedings. "I agree to a postponement of 2 to 3 weeks," he said. Levinger burst out, "Your Honor, do you think it possible to conduct proceedings calmly when those evildoers are not put on trial?" Judge Hadaya shouted at him, "Enough, be seated. As you said, we will conduct the proceedings in a relaxed manner. I can't listen to your arguments without getting upset."

The judge advised Levinger that an attorney be appointed for him, who would conduct the defense better. Levinger refused: "I don't need a lawyer. That I am now being advised that a lawyer be appointed, before the Legal Advisor has decided, interferes with the clarification of the matter. If we get a negative reply from the Legal Advisor," Levinger said surprisingly, "I promise that within 24 hours I'll contact the judge and notify him of the Legal Advisor's decision."

The prosecutor was alarmed: "It is unacceptable that the accused would contact the court. I suggest that instead of waiting for telephone calls from the accused, we finally set a date for the trial. An attorney must be appointed for him in order for the proceedings to be conducted in a business-like manner."

Levinger burst out again towards the prosecutor: "Don't be so eager to try me." Attorney Shendar fumed: "I would like to comment to the accused on his expressions towards the prosecution, which is carrying out its professional duty. It is beneath my honor to be drawn into replying to the accused, and the court must comment to him."

Judge Hadaya said to the prosecutor, "Why are you so serious? He's under pressure, he's suffering, so let him say what he wants and that's it." Levinger continued, but the moment came when the judge halted him and postponed the proceedings until 13 July. In his decision, he noted that he expected the decision of the Legal Advisor concerning the postponement of the proceedings, and that Levinger would get himself an attorney.

When Levinger rose to leave the courtroom, the Judge said to him, "If we continue with this trial, remember that what you said here has no connection with the court." "Your Honor, I heard you," replied the rabbi, "I'll do what my duty requires of me."

The judge began the proceedings even though Levinger had not yet arrived. Then a policeman announced that Levinger was present, but that members of his family wanted to enter with him, and that the courtroom was full. The settlers in the first row gave up their places. Levinger entered with the members of his family - Dani'ela Weiss, of Gush Emunim, Beny Qatzover, and one of the rabbis from the settlements. In the courtroom three of the leaders of the Jewish Underground—Yehuda 'Etzion, Bo'az Henman, and Yitzhaq Noviq—were also present.

At the end of the proceedings, the settlers shook the rabbi's hand and criticized the prosecution. Qatzover: "The prosecution has a considerable share in the development of the intifada and the inability of the army to contain it." Weiss said, "The trial of Rabbi Levinger is a twisted thing from the beginning, and should have been solved through a clarification with the Legal Advisor to the Government."

Levinger read parts of his letter to the Legal Advisor to the journalists that waited outside, adding, "The prosecution knows that I'm innocent, and that I did not have the privilege of killing that Arab, so they made a false accusation. The great speed with which they want the trial to be conducted, without taking into consideration the reply of the Legal Advisor, proves their intentions."

When Levinger left the court, he received his pistol from the guards at the gate. In front of the cameramen he went through the motions of drawing it, saying, "It's good, it's good." In the afternoon, Levinger appealed to the Minister of Justice and asked him not to give in to pressures, and to put the leaders of the intifada on trial and to postpone the legal proceedings against him.

Police Statistics Refute Mayor's Accusations Against Arabs

44230119b Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 May 89 p 3

[Text] Police statistics on crimes committed by Arabs refute the statement made by Ramat Gan Mayor Tzvi Bar to the effect that 80 percent of the crimes committed in the Tel Aviv area are carried out by Arabs.

These are the figures concerning Arab criminal activities according to 1988 police statistics: Total number of criminals active within the Green Line—59,866, out of which 39,598 were Jews, 16,373 belonged to minorities living within the Green Line, and 3,895 were felons from the territories.

Shmu'el (Mooly) Dor, member of the Ramat Gan Municipal Council for the Alignment, yesterday sent a letter to the mayor in reaction to the latter's statement that Arabs should not be employed on the soil of the State of Israel because of their involvement in criminal activities.

"I read your views against employing Israeli Arabs and allowing them into town in the newspaper, as well as your unfounded collective accusation that they are our worst enemies and that 80 percent of the murders, rapes, and vicious attacks are perpetrated by Arabs. I want to ask you to retract your racist pronouncements, of the kind that until today we heard only from Kahane, whose party was banned from the Knesset.

"The inhabitants of Ramat Gan, members of youth organizations, and all the city students, who have been waging an education campaign against Kahane's employment, were stunned to find out that we had a Kahane follower for a mayor, who, by his racist suggestions is undoing years of effort to educate the children of Ramat Gan in a spirit of democracy, tolerance, equal civil rights, respect for the law, and understanding between Jews and Arabs. Your statements run counter to your proposal for an Israeli constitution, which you signed and on behalf of which you purport to work. I want to remind you that Chapter 7B of the proposed constitution states that 'There will be no discrimination between people on grounds of race, sex, nationality, community, country of origin, beliefs, personal or social status, and political affiliation, or on any grounds whatsoever.' Should you not retract your statements, I will request all the factions within the Municipal Council to

join in a vote of no confidence and in demanding your resignation as mayor, a post that must serve as a model and an example to the students and inhabitants of Ramat Gan."

Dor asked the CRM (Citizen's Rights Movement) faction, led by Dr Dinah Goren, to immediately leave the coalition and to join Alignment in the no confidence vote against the mayor, should the latter not retract his statements.

At a closed meeting of Knesset members and several Likud ministers, members of the former Liberal Party, Knesset Member Uri'el Lynn, chairman of the Legislative, Legal and Judiciary Commission, said that in the wake of a deliberate policy, Israeli police has turned the country into a paradise for criminals from the territories. "For years the police has known that the criminal 'output' of felons from the territories within the Green Line is three to eight times larger than their proportion of the population. The intensity of their criminal activities changes in relation to area, whereby Tel Aviv area constitutes the focus of attraction for them. In that area, in 1988, Arabs committed up to 50 percent of the murders, 65 percent of sexual crimes, 20 percent of rapes, and 15 percent of the property crimes recorded."

Problems Continue To Plague Health Care System

44230090 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
21 Apr 89 pp 8-9

[Interview with Health Minister Ya'aqov Tzur by Ronit Morganstern; place and date not given]

[Text] We are facing a year of great changes in the health system, including legislative developments in public health care areas....If this does not happen, I foresee breakdown and decline....The public health care system, which moves from crisis to crisis, is causing people to violate the law....I admit that I see no possibility of surmounting the problem of financing transplants abroad through the government—Health Minister Ya'aqov Tzur, after 100 days of grace.

When Ya'aqov Tzur entered the Health Ministry about 4 months ago, at the height of the crisis in the health system, he stated that he was approaching his new post "with awe and reverence," and that he knew that he did not have 100 days of grace. One hundred days have since passed. The health system (until a few days ago at least...) is relatively free of the consecutive crises which characterized it last year. However, its problems are still unresolved, and Tzur has to deal with them just as his predecessor did.

Across from the Congresses Building, on the lawn in the exhibition parks, Tzur reveals his familiarity with material which he has diligently studied. He is even so bold as to strike out on his own with new ideas which the Labor Alignment is slowly digesting, albeit with indecisive nods

of agreement. Calm, as it were, spread out unoblingly on the lawn, Tzur is preoccupied with what is being done inside the hall, where a penetrating self-examination of his party, the Labor Party, has been underway for several hours in discussions being held by the party's center.

Ya'aqov Tzur grants his first interview as health minister to 'AL HAMISHMAR.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Since you assumed the post of health minister, there has been relative quiet in the health system, although its problems persist. How do you explain this?

[Tzur] That fact per se is important, and is not coincidental. There are several reasons for it. First, the Finance Ministry is currently open to ongoing discussions with employees' organizations in the system regarding worker demands and the needs of the system.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Are you alluding to a personnel change at the Finance Ministry?

[Tzur] Absolutely. The expression "nyet" is presently not in circulation in discussions between the Health Ministry and the Finance Ministry, and between the Finance Ministry and the employees' organizations. Beyond that, I feel that there is growing recognition among employees—including physicians, nurses, and management and administration personnel—that a period of stability is needed. Otherwise the entire public health system will be in danger. During these past several months we have held discussions, mainly with physicians, but also with nurses and administrative and management personnel, on two subjects:

1. A comparison between them and comparable workers in the Qupat Holim [Sick Fund] system; it is very distressing that there are no uniform rules for compensating hospital personnel in both systems. This causes damage and unrest. To a certain degree, we have yielded for the purposes of a comparison.

2. Concurrently, we are in the midst of, and nearing the end of a discussion about putting a second shift into operation at the hospitals.

[AL HAMISHMAR] What is really happening with the plan to shorten waiting lines? For a year we have been hearing about the conclusion of agreements, but nothing is moving in this respect.

[Tzur] The system is complicated. We have actually reached an agreement with the physicians. Now we have to reach an agreement with the nurses and administrative and management personnel on activating a second shift.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Meanwhile, administrative and management employees are not willing to work during the first shift because of gaps between them and Qupat Holim employees.

[Tzur] No. We are in the thick of discussions with them. There is no problem of gaps regarding the nurses. I do not want to say that everything is settled. The explanation for this quiet is the aforementioned series of discussions. I hope that we will be able, within several weeks, to activate a second shift at the hospitals to provide services to citizens, which is our main objective. Public health care services have been affected considerably and are experiencing a profound crisis. I hope that the start-up of a second shift will respond to many of the problems.

[AL HAMISHMAR] We are talking about a project of limited scope and duration. What will come after it?

[Tzur] The project will last a year. The great wisdom in such a project is that we can exploit the year to implement changes arising from the conclusions of the commission of inquiry, which are expected in several months. We in the government will need to determine which conclusions to adopt, and we will need to initiate changes. In my opinion, we are facing a year of great changes in the health system, including legislative developments in the areas of public health care, without which I foresee the collapse and decline of the system.

Defining the Rights of the Insured

[AL HAMISHMAR] Do you think that the system is beginning to recover, or are pictures of suffering patients and hunger strikes by nurses liable to reappear soon?

[Tzur] I would not wish a return to such conditions on anybody, including myself as health minister. I reiterated to health care personnel my hope to end that situation in which the only change in the health system's model of conduct is a change of ministers.

[AL HAMISHMAR] As one who at one time opposed the establishment of a commission of inquiry, what importance do you attach to its conclusions? To what extent will you be bound by it? The director-general of Qupat Holim, for example, warned that he does not view himself bound because of the absence of a senior representative of Qupat Holim on the commission.

[Tzur] It must be remembered that this commission of inquiry was established amid the crisis into which public health care was thrown and amid the government's inability to determine the required policy. Indeed, I was among those who opposed the establishment of a commission of inquiry because I thought that the government should not transfer social policy matters connected to a social world view to "ostensibly" objective judges for their judgement. However, the government within the government made it impossible for the government

to make a decision. It should be recalled that the committee was established under the Commission of Inquiry Law. It is not intended to investigate the past, but to provide a recommended model for public health care. I am not obliged in advance to accept all of its conclusions. However, it is a mistake to think that this commission has no significance. The Agronot Commission of Inquiry, the Beiski Commission of Inquiry and the 'Etziony Commission of Inquiry were created largely according to the legal and governmental tradition in Israel.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Will the formation of a policy by the commission of inquiry actually facilitate your determination of the changes needed in the health system?

[Tzur] It will to a certain extent, inasmuch as it will lend strength to a direction. However, I repeat that I am not obliged to accept all of its conclusions. I imagine that the government will also not accept all of its conclusions in advance. I regret that there is no senior representative of Qupat Holim on the commission. However the composition of the commission is determined at the discretion of the president of the Supreme Court. Central figures from different areas of the health and health economy system and a judge serve on it. The conclusions of the commission of inquiry will doubtlessly be a crossroads, which will oblige the government to determine a policy and far-reaching reform in the area of public health care.

[AL HAMISHMAR] You have initiated ideas for reform without waiting for the conclusion of the commission of inquiry.

[Tzur] I view four points as constituting the central issues with which we must be concerned regarding reform:

a) Financing of the public health system, an area which must be provided for in legislation.

b) Defining the rights of the insured—the basket of services to which citizens are entitled, and the maximum time that it is permitted to tell them to wait for services.

c) Determining a national model for Israel's health system.

d) Determining methods for compensating employees; I favor disengaging them from the general wage scale, and determining their wages in connection with the output of employees in the different sectors.

Any reform must deal with these four components. Of course, different suggestions exist regarding each component. Any reform must deal with these components through legislation and agreement, while taking into account that the central method in Israel is the Qupat Holim method.

[AL HAMISHMAR] They have been discussing a basket of services for years.

[Tzur] Let us take point "a" mentioned above, as an example. This is the strangest thing in the social system. It also has historical reasons. Health care service is the second largest social expenditure. The national expenditure for health is about 4 billion shekels. This is an enormous social budget. Most of it comes from the public. It is implausible that this system does not have rules pertaining to how it is financed. In education, for example, a student is entitled to 10 years of study. If one multiplies this by the number of hours, one knows what the central treasury can finance and what is permitted to demand from the parents. The health care system cannot be approached in the complete absence of financing rules. I say—enough. The period of improvisations is over. This is also the case regarding the basket of services. It is said that it is the citizen's right to receive all of his needs from Qupat Holim and the hospital services. However, the truth is that Qupat Holim is the only insurance system in which it can be said: There is a line, come back next year. A person is entitled to know what his rights are. Therefore, I see in these four aforementioned points the course by which to stabilize the public health care system with some model, which will enable it to move forward and to develop. The European states, which all have public health care, are being tried by similar and other questions. There too, different reforms are underway.

Not an Enemy of Private Health Care

[AL HAMISHMAR] You are depicted as a minister who is less inflexible regarding the treat-everyone-the-same nature of the health system. Are you also willing to accept the idea of payments made by the sick when medical service is given, in addition to medical insurance payments?

[Tzur] It must be remembered that 50 percent of the budget of Qupat Holim is from the parallel tax. The parallel tax is a tax, and the big mistake of the Histadrut is that it did not want to treat it as a social tax, such that it would be distributed among the health insurance funds according to the type of population which it insures. Thus, it would give more to insurers of the elderly, large families, and those living on the periphery. At present, the parallel tax does not behave as a social tax, and the Qupat Holim Haklalit [General Sick Fund] suffers from this. It is a tax for everything. It comes only from employers. Another 15 percent of the Qupat Holim budget is financed by the government through different ways, and about 30 percent is provided by the uniform tax. In Israel, 7.5 percent of the GNP is spent on health, of which 28 percent is from the parallel tax, 24 percent is from the state budget directly and about another 15 percent is from the uniform tax. I do not believe that there can be a significant increase in the portion paid by the state, as long as there is no growth in the economy. I know that the health system needs another 200 million

shekels. I think that the participation of the citizen is also needed to finance a portion of this amount when services are provided. I prefer this over the current situation in which the citizen does not receive service and pays under the table, and in which we put up with black market medicine. This is all happening at present in the name of values. Because of adherence to these values, the system is not providing responses, and we are ignoring the fact that the abnormal has become the norm.

I know that the public health care system must be saved. It can be saved, because there is enough of an infrastructure in Israel. We are the second country in the world regarding the number of physicians per 1,000 persons, and we are facing a surplus of hospital beds and equipment. True, greater resources are needed to compensate physicians, but the system is not working, and it is impossible to exist quietly with this. I reiterated this to the secretary-general of the Histadrut. If 1-2 years are needed to request the participation of those who can pay, it is better to do this than to stand by and watch what is happening to the public health care system, which is not providing a response, moving from crisis to crisis, causing people to violate the law, and causing people to resort to private medicine, for which they sell their cars and houses to pay for open heart surgery, or pay a physician under the table.

[AL HAMISHMAR] However, if a citizen is compelled to pay for public health care services, he will be less hesitant about turning to private health care, for which he will pay somewhat more, but will receive services and much better conditions.

[Tzur] I do not perceive the payment issue as a very central question surrounding the salvation of the system. I said that if another 200 million shekels are needed this year for public health care, it would be better to absorb this from the citizens—from those who are able—than to allow this situation to continue as is.

I am not an enemy of private health care. We are living in a free state. I must ensure that there will be public health care. However, private health care is developing, because there are people who have the resources to use it, and they want to obtain the best service. As long as they have their own resources, it is their right to use them. The difficulty is that private medicine in Israel is developing significantly beyond the needs of the upper class, because people will not concede their health. If they do not find answers in the public system, they will seek them in the private system, which is what concerns me. The solution is to consolidate public health care. I am convinced that if we are able to achieve reforms regarding the matters which I indicated, determine new rules within the system, and change its organizational structure—what I called a national model—I think that we will be able to establish a more effective, attractive system which will be able to provide responses. However, there will always be the same percentage needing the private system.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Regarding transplants abroad, is it possible to end the humiliating contribution campaigns and to allocate public funds for transplants?

Currently, there is insurance. It will not provide a solution in the near future because many requiring transplants are already sick and unable to obtain insurance. Therefore, I admit that we do not have an answer, which is first of all financial. We are attempting to make it easier through various ways and are checking into an affiliation with one or two transplant centers in the world to assure that the price will be cheaper in the overall agreement. I admit that I do not see any possibility of overcoming the problem of financing transplants abroad through the government.

The Period of Improvisations Is Over

[AL HAMISHMAR] Let me return to the subject of the parallel tax. Why is a change in its index being delayed?

[Tzur] On Sunday, the first meeting of the ministerial committee regarding the parallel tax will take place.

[AL HAMISHMAR] You issued a formula which actually parallels that of Qupat Holim Haklalit?

[Tzur] I recommend much more than Qupat Holim Haklalit. I recommend that the age of the insured be taken into account. We will distinguish four to five groups—children, youths, adults, and the elderly—according to the amount spent on each age group annually. Second, we will take into account the number of persons per family, because a family with five children requires more medical services than a family with two children. The third criterion will be distance from the center of the country. This model calls for viewing the parallel tax as the main health tax in Israel, which finances more than 50 percent of the budget of the health funds.

[AL HAMISHMAR] The small health funds argue that changing the index will affect them adversely, precisely because the parallel tax finances a large portion of their budget. You are a Haklalit health minister, and they are accusing you of taking a position which favors Qupat Holim Haklalit.

[Tzur] The question is not who will be affected adversely, but how to finance the health system. The era of improvisations is over. The parallel tax is over 1.5 billion shekels, and is the lion's share of the financing for the health system from the central treasury, even if it comes from the employers. These funds must be allocated according to the needs of the insured. The elderly and large families have greater medical needs. Is this not logical? I reject the political accusations.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Is Qupat Holim a governmental element, or is it perhaps a political element, as perceived by the Likud Party for example?

[Tzur] What is a governmental element? One must refrain from slogans. If you examine the budget you will see how Qupat Holim is financed. It is financed by the parallel tax, the state budget, the uniform tax and by the services which it sells to other health funds. I also have many things to say to Qupat Holim, because I do not separate between the Qupat Holim system and the government system. I think that Qupat Holim—mainly its hospital system—must be freed from organizational rigidity. I see competition between the health funds in the area of community first aid. This is a most healthy phenomenon that will assuredly induce Qupat Holim Haklalit to improve its services. The hospital system, 35 percent of which is under Qupat Holim, must become free from organizational rigidity. We must also determine a national or regional model, or a model of hospitals in a region, without any question as to what belongs to me, what belongs to the state, and what is private. From the standpoint of determining a model, it is necessary to view all of the hospitals as one system and in terms of their work versus that of the community clinics. I maintain that as long as Qupat Holim does not pass through this phase, it will have difficulties and be unable to provide complete responses to the health system in Israel.

The health system must be financed objectively by clear rules according to law. Also, it is unfortunate for the Histadrut that the Qupat Holim budget is sometimes part of wage agreement discussions. There is no reason why this should happen. Qupat Holim must be part of a joint hospital system model. I have no doubt that this will be one of the matters decided by the commission of inquiry, which will have to be legislated. I also think that all public hospitals must undergo a large organizational change from a system of administrative management by the Qupat Holim Center, or by the government via the Health Ministry, to a more economic management based on business considerations, in which there is incentive for initiative and achievement which compensates employees according to the economic achievements of the hospitals.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Who will act as a control to make sure that business considerations will not push aside medical considerations?

[Tzur] For this there is the Health Ministry or the Qupat Holim Center. However, we need to undergo a revolution in the method of management. The Qupat Holim hospitals must become Histadrut companies and the governmental hospitals must become governmental companies with boards of directors and rules of operation. In this way, they could manage themselves not as a budgeted system, but as an economic system of a hospital existing on revenues from the health insurance funds and the activities which it initiates. It is impossible to sanctify what was, because remaining in the existing situation would not only bring it down, it would also cause the disintegration of the public health care system. Many things which we thought were permanent, strong,

and eternal collapsed. This period has me worried. In Israeli society, there is a destructive impulse toward anything characterized by indifferent solidarity. This is definitely a question of the survival of public health care. Woe to the state of Israel if its public health care system collapses. It is enough to see the great United States where the outlay for health is 11 percent compared to 7.5 percent in Israel, and to know of the accessibility of the underprivileged to American health care. Therefore, I see change as a condition for saving the system, and I am attempting to make this perception sink into Histadrut members and Health Ministry personnel, because such change is preventative.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Given that the current finance minister is Shim'on Peres, is it not an opportune time to implement such changes?

[Tzur] The fact that Shim'on Peres is finance minister certainly enhances the possibility of changing the public health care system without undermining its foundations.

[AL HAMISHMAR] As we approach the 21st century, Israel still has such problems as dysentery and polio and has nearly done away with malaria....

[Tzur] Israel is very backward regarding sewerage, the main factor in the environmental problems which you indicated.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Do you intend to cooperate with the Environmental Quality Ministry?

[Tzur] Absolutely....

[AL HAMISHMAR] But you would not contribute the public health branch to it for example?

[Tzur] The question is who is responsible for public health. In my opinion, the Health Ministry is responsible. We are certainly cooperating with the Environmental Quality Ministry.

To Go Forth With a Message of Change

[AL HAMISHMAR] You are a settlement man and its representative in the government. Do you think that the government has done enough to assist the kibbutzim and moshavim? It seems to me that this was one of the considerations in your joining the government.

[Tzur] We came after the decision of the finance committee, which ended a long, exhausting argument which damaged the settlements economically, and in terms of the social price paid by the kibbutzim and moshavim in this period of the crisis. It must be taken into account that we too needed time to recognize and understand the intensity of the crisis and its entry into a spin because of inflationary processes. However, all of us would have doubtlessly not been compelled to pay the economic and social price had we been able to obtain this response 2

years ago. This week's decision no doubt makes it possible to move along, inasmuch as a large portion of the burden, obligation, and responsibility is presently imposed on the kibbutzim themselves. Of course, we wanted to obtain more. However, we reached an agreement which links three elements—the government, the banks, and the kibbutzim. The recovery program provides not only for sums, but also for the operational methods of the three aforementioned systems. This will truly enable the development of a model in each kibbutz so that each kibbutz can strengthen itself economically. The main burden is currently on the kibbutzim to adopt and adhere to this model.

[AL HAMISHMAR] How do you explain the decline in the status of the kibbutz movement?

First, an enormous decline occurred in Israeli society stemming from personal acquisitiveness and personal prosperity in Gush Dan and its environs. Israeli society is changing. It is enough to see that the center has grown while border areas have diminished. The kibbutz movement is currently coping based on this situation in Israeli society, which does not view kibbutz society as a symbol as much now as in the past. The fact that kibbutz society is standing in the midst of the economic crisis is definitely affecting its feelings of self-confidence and esprit de corps. As part of Israeli society, we are coping painfully and problematically with the subject of survival and how to presently transmit the message to our children and young people. We will experience significant changes in the kibbutz as well in coming years. However, I do not doubt that kibbutz society will find its way. We are talking about hundreds of settlements, an enormous productive system, tens of thousands of members and four generations who selected this way despite the difficulties. I am convinced that we will find a way.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Do you think that Israeli society is tired of values, as expressed in our failure to absorb new immigrants?

[Tzur] One of the things which has really confounded me in recent months is the indifference of society and the government to the possibility of bringing thousands of Jews from the USSR. Sometimes it seems to me that we are not willing to pay the price for them to come, assure employment for them at any price, share what we have created here, and lower the standard of living in order to absorb new immigrants. This is certainly a sign that Israeli society is weary of everything except that which pertains to "me" in a continuing period of security pressures, and so on.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Are you anxious about the results of the Histadrut elections?

[Tzur] Definitely. I am concerned, because the Labor Party has been hit hard in the last two election campaigns. This is attributable not to one cause, but definitely to a trend. I hope a lesson will be derived from past

elections in the discussions of the center. It is necessary to go in two directions, with one addition: We must go forth with a message of change—that we want to change, and that we do not want to sanctify everything. True, a general Histadrut is desired, in which there is a professional, administration, settlement and services union, but I admit that I am disappointed with the changes being put on the table. Meanwhile, there are many superficial questions of how representatives will be elected and few questions of substance.

There is no value in the existence of an employees' administration—even if it brings relief—if it does not present a different model of relations between the worker and his work place. Currently the employees' administration cannot substitute for the state in the development of border areas. The only reason for its existence would be to present another social model. It should be said that if Qupat Holim succeeds in coming years, it would be in the Histadrut's interest to induce the state to determine a national health system model, and not to sanctify the organization. We are sanctifying organizations and not goals. I think that the secretary-general of the Histadrut has an opportunity to present a model of significant change without fear, for there is nothing to lose. Regarding Histadrut elections, the struggle will mostly be precisely against those who would not want to come out to vote. In addition, good, young people will have to be put up, true representatives in the workers councils. It will also have to be recognized that the days are over in which anyone on whom they decide sweeps the masses.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Is Qaysar your man?

[Tzur] Qaysar is the man for all of us. I am well disposed toward the election of Yisra'el Qaysar. I am sure that he will manage to express the significance of employee representation and the distress caused by the difficulties. I think that there is lagging regarding reform.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Are you disappointed with the separation of MAPAM [United Workers Party]? Will this damage the Labor Party in elections for the Histadrut?

[Tzur] It did not surprise me, and I hope that an election campaign which does not damage "Labor" will be conducted. I thought that MAPAM's first separation in Knesset elections was a mistake, because our problem is to create a line of separation between us and the Likud, not between ourselves. However, I currently do not view this as the focal question, even regarding Histadrut elections. I doubt whether MAPAM caused the movement of votes from the Likud to someone from the Labor parties, which is the main question in the final analysis.

Reservist Who Refused Service in Territories Interviewed

44230109b Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
29 May 89 p 21

[Interview by Rami Rothholtz: "Once I Decided, There Was No Turning Back"]

[Text] It was reported yesterday that the head of the manpower branch, Maj. General Matan Vilna'i, had decided to stop sending orders for service in the territories to those who refused such service. According to the report, this step was intended to stop the impression that the system becomes clogged by isolated individuals like Rami Hasun.

Rami Hasun was released Friday from Prison 6 for the fourth time, this time after serving 56 days. The previous four times he had been sentenced to 28 days, each sentence having been served in its entirety. Altogether Hasun has been in prison for 140 days since the beginning of the intifadah.

Hasun left prison with an additional service order in hand for Sunday (yesterday—R.R.). He received the order for additional reserve duty in the middle of his period in prison. Yesterday, after publication of the notice, Hasun presented himself for an interview with his brigade commander. They tried to reach some kind of accommodation with him. Hasun was not interested in accommodation for Hasun. He is interested in seeing the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) get out of there. [Rothholtz] You arrived yesterday with the order; what happened? [Hasun] I went into the interview with the brigade commander, a nice guy; the purpose was to find a compromise. [Rothholtz] Did he suggest it? [Hasun] Yes. I said: You don't have to find a compromise for Rami Hasun, the army simply shouldn't be there. I reminded him that I am not refusing service in the territories. I am prepared to serve in the territories: in the Jordan Valley, in the Golan Heights. I refuse to participate in suppressing the intifadah. [Rothholtz] Do you attribute the brigade commander's attempt at reaching a compromise to procedures that have started coming out of the Manpower Branch with regard to those who refuse service? [Hasun] I had heard something, but I didn't know exactly what it was about since there was also denial. Yesterday I was psychologically prepared to be judged by court martial. I knew there was a prospect of that happening. [Rothholtz] What do you mean by "court martial"? [Hasun] Three years inside. [Rothholtz] Would you have done it? [Hasun] The severity of the punishment is not a factor. I will not lift my weapon against civilians. [Rothholtz] What happens when you arrive at base after being released from prison and before you go in again? For instance, how does the battalion policeman greet you? [Hasun] With a lot of sympathy. [Rothholtz] Do they recognize you? [Hasun] Of course, there are also those who identify with me. But don't be misled. I arrive at base with the order in hand and butterflies in my stomach. I know that I am going to sit

in prison and I don't want to. [Rothholz] Do they stop you on the way and say: 'Listen, Hasun, give it up?' [Hasun] At the trial, they say it. [Rothholz] Who judges you? [Hasun] Twice I was judged by the deputy brigade commander and twice by the chief of staff. [Rothholz] Was anything personal said in any of these trials? [Hasun] The last two times there were harsh words between me and the judge. [Rothholz] What was said? [Hasun] He said the usual things: you are breaking the consensus, you are goldbricking, you are a draft dodger. I told him: The day will come when they will judge the judges. [Rothholz] What were the results of your interview with the brigade commander yesterday? [Hasun] They postponed my order for two days. [Rothholz] On their initiative? [Hasun] No, I asked for it. I was released Friday and I wanted to sleep another night at home. [Rothholz] Do you already know where they are sending you? [Hasun] To the Valley. From my point of view, as long as I have no contact with the civilian population, there is no problem. [Rothholz] From the conversation thus far it seems to me that until the end of the week you could go back to Prison 6 despite the decision at the Manpower Branch. [Hasun] That is possible. [Rothholz] Don't you feel like you are really on an after hours pass? [Hasun] It is exactly that, and a kind of humor is developing around it. The quartermaster says to me: Go way, you're not getting your kit bag, put it aside here. After all, you're going to be back in two days. [Rothholz] It was reported that the Manpower Branch decided to go easy on those who refuse service so as not to create the impression that the system becomes blocked by individual cases, and they cited your case as an example. Do you know of anyone who has refused service whom the IDF has not drafted for reserve duty? [Hasun] I know of a whole lot who refused and were not sentenced; I also know of some who refused and were let go until their unit's next reserve period. Not everyone gets a prison order right on the day of their discharge. They got stuck on me and on Angelo (Angelo Aydan, a man who has refused service in the territories and has been imprisoned 8 times—R.R.). Angelo, actually, is coming for a visit. [Rothholz] Why do they get stuck like that? [Hasun] What business is it of mine! [Rothholz] They are turning you into a symbol. [Hasun] That is the method. They try several different ways to destroy the phenomenon of refusal:

A. They don't call up those they know will refuse so as not to make the phenomenon more widespread.

B. They get stuck on some and try to break them in public. What are they going to do when the two they chose to break publicly don't break? [Rothholz] How many more times will you go to prison? [Hasun] What they do at the Manpower Branch makes no difference, the phenomenon is growing. The intifadah will make it grow. You know what effect the Giv'ati soldiers verdict will have on it? It turns out now that the Minister of Defense gives patently illegal orders on the floor of the Knesset; no high-ranking officer hands down the sentence; in Petah Tiqwa they are building prisons. Without

a doubt, the numbers of those who refuse will grow, as will the numbers of draft dodgers. [Rothholz] It isn't clear to me how long a man can sit in prison without breaking. [Hasun] What do you mean by 'breaking'? [Rothholz] You get up and say: 'I'll give them their reserve tour and let them go to hell. [Hasun] That won't happen. But there could be another kind of breaking. You sit and sit, cut off from military smells and seeing what's happening on the outside; you go into a kind of shell that is very hard to get out of. [Rothholz] I understand that you suffered heavy financial loss. [Hasun] Irreversible. I had a business and savings. Now I have no business and no savings. [Rothholz] Has the system learned any kind of lesson from your stubbornness? [Hasun] Look, it will never be easy for them to swallow refusal to serve. You are really telling the officers: What you do all year 24 hours a day, I am not going to do one month a year. Everyone would find it hard to hear that about his daily routine.

POLITIKA Discusses Future IDF Strategy
44230109a Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 11 May 89 p4

[Text] The last issue of the periodical POLITIKA, which just recently came out, attempts to deal with the difficult question of national security and stimulate discussion of the IDF's (Israel Defense Forces) path toward what it calls "the future battlefield."

This issue, somewhat unusual in its content for a generally political newspaper, is an attempt to point out the defects in the direction the army is taking as it moves toward the twenty-first century and calls forcefully for a serious and courageous study of the subject of national security.

Even though the issue was distributed during a difficult time for the army, which was then mired in a mission for which it was not designed, the editors of POLITIKA managed to raise themselves up above ground level and outline the direction that they feel the IDF should follow. Thirteen investigators, senior officers, reporters and a soldier from the rank and file, analyze Israel's present security concept by surveying all aspects: national resources, threats, manpower.

The issue sounds a call for change in IDF doctrine, today based on offense, to an essentially defensive posture.

General Moshe Bar-Kokhba, the senior general within the IDF's General Staff, charged with drawing conclusions from past campaigns, has a tough article on the IDF's approach to the subject. In his opinion the IDF has not drawn the proper conclusions from two important wars like Yom Kippur and Lebanon, and has paid for it in its campaigns.

The editorial staff of POLITIKA was preceded in an attempt to stimulate public discussion of this issue by a subcommittee of the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, which dealt with the subject in the last Knesset. At that time the commission, headed by Dan Meridor, heard most of the generals in the IDF, academics and heads of the security industry, and produced a series of conclusions and recommendations for changing the national security concept as well as a recommendation for directions in equipping and development. The Meridor commission was not successful in stirring up discussion, and the security establishment held no serious discussion of its conclusions.

An Important Document

The issue of POLITIKA devoted to this topic provides another opportunity for the involved public, for academia and for state leaders to address the issue and to repair defects, with one aim in particular: that the next war, if one should be forced upon us, not start out like the Yom Kippur War and not conclude like the Lebanon War.

This POLITIKA issue is an important document which the IDF should provide to every officer in its ranks from company commander on up. The problem with the IDF in this connection, however, is that regular duties, which never end, have "emergency items push aside the merely important," and day to day matters leave no time for thinking and analysis. IDF officers, for objective reasons, have little time to read this sort of material. The average commander, from the rank of brigade commander on up, in general has to devote about two hours a day reading the mail, the newspapers, intelligence reports, special studies, etc.

There is insufficient education and encouragement within the IDF today for writing and reading on security questions. That became clear to me mainly from my regular reading of the various IDF publications on matters of philosophy and military thought. In general it is the same officers, recognized within the IDF as good officers, who structure their orders to deal with this matter. In addition to the IDF officer corps, it seems that the articles in POLITIKA and the alarm that they sound are directed in at least equal measure to the political echelon in charge of the IDF and the parliamentary echelon that oversees the army.

The politicians are also called upon to raise themselves up above ground level to gain some perspective.

JORDAN

Post 1987 Imports, Exports Detailed

44040440b Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
16 May 89 p 3

[Article: "Large Increase in Jordan's Exports of Chemicals and Raw Materials"]

[Text] Jordanian exports during the first 11 months of last year were valued at 281.960 million dinars compared with 214.86 million dinars for the same period of 1987. This is an increase of 67.874 million dinars.

According to official statistics released by Jordan Central Bank, Jordan exported in the first 11 months of last year foodstuffs and livestock valued at 26.674 million dinars compared with 31.715 million dinars in the same period a year earlier.

A breakdown indicates that Jordan exported livestock valued at 543,000 dinars, eggs and dairy products valued at 5.44 million dinars, wheat flour valued at 832,000 dinars, vegetables worth 12.77 million dinars, fruits and nuts valued at 4.06 million dinars, and fodder worth 1.408 million dinars.

Jordan also exported during the first 11 months of last year tobacco and potables worth 1.408 million dinars, including cigarettes valued at 1.303 million dinars.

Exported non-edible raw materials, excluding fuels, shot up by 51.47 million dinars to 125.882 million dinars from 74.412 million dinars in the same period a year earlier. Of that amount, phosphates accounted for 68.104 million dinars and fertilizers for 55.017 million dinars.

Jordanian exports of fossil fuels, lubricants, and similar products were valued at 338,000 dinars compared with 136,000 dinars in the same period of the previous year. Exports of animal and vegetable oils and fats were valued at 302,000 dinars of which olive oil accounted for 274,000 dinars.

Chemical exports during the first 11 months of 1988 amounted to 82.2 million dinars, or an increase of 20.304 million dinars from 61.716 million a year earlier. They included paints valued at 997,000 dinars, medicinals worth 16.023 million dinars, soaps and cleaners worth 2.247 million dinars, and fertilizers valued at 45.331 million dinars.

Exports of indexed manufactured goods amounted to 30.725 million dinars that included wood products valued at 708,000 dinars, paper and cardboard worth 4.163 million dinars, spinning and weaving products valued at 11.73 million dinars, and cement worth 2.682 million dinars.

Other exports included transport equipment and tools valued at 2.738 million dinars. Exports of assorted manufactured items had a value of 11.863 million dinars compared with 8.623 million dinars for the same statistical period of 1987. The latter category includes ready-to-wear valued at 2.873 million dinars and plastics worth 3.187 million dinars.

Education Minister Calls on Students To Pay For Riot Damage

44040440a Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
11 May 89 p 3

[Article: "Dr. Al-Nusur Calls on Students to Help Cover Costs of Repairing Educational Properties Damaged in Recent Incidents"]

[Text] Minister of education Dr 'Abd Allah Al-Nusur sent education directors throughout the provinces and governorates a memo in which he called for translating

noble student sentiment into positive behavior for the construction of the country.

Dr al-Nusur said in his memo that our sons, the students, must each contribute a minimum of 10 fils to help repair the damage done during recent events.

The memo read: As you know, certain properties of the ministry of education throughout the dear fatherland were burned or damaged during the recent regrettable events due to lack of understanding of the true nature of this kind of behavior and its negative impact, especially on public property, by wasting the people's money. Those with mature outlooks no doubt understand the grave nature of recent events which amounted to nothing more than self-destruction.

Our educational philosophy emphasizes the development of self-expression, constructive criticism, and debate of the daily or seasonal travails of the individual, groups, or the people as a whole. It is hoped that this would take place in a civilized setting and through legitimate channels via prudent communications leading to close and responsible cooperation between citizens and state agencies. Mutual trust, devoid of methods regrettably manifested in the recent painful events, should underlie that cooperation.

Our educational institutions are the first to jealously safeguard the sacred educational trust and protect the noble act of citizenship. They prosper under His Majesty's directives to the government, and their conceptual content is as noble as our people. They are keen to rise to the responsibility of translating these royal directives in a true and aware fashion into positive educational propensities. The ministry must be diligent in deepening the roots of these propensities and anchoring them into student consciousness in order for them to bear fine fruit when the students, who are the men of awareness to whom responsibility will fall in the future, interact with recurring developments in their societies and the fatherland and react in an objective and enlightened fashion to events and challenges, hopefully responsibly and astutely but not in the emotional and impulsive manner that characterized recent events. These events were the black spots mentioned by our constructive monarch in his address to the nation.

Enlightened reaction to developments should, by any logic and under no circumstances, do harm to the property of the people who are this dear fatherland's vein, pulsating with giving, or undermine its reputation steeped in enlightened and astute behavior based on the morality and noble principles that govern this land blessed with wise leadership.

Perhaps recent happenings were expressive of a number of indicators that should be meticulously considered and studied and objectively analyzed by educational agencies for the lessons they provide. We, the educators, believe that the behavior of individuals is in fact the end result

of the educational system. Traditional educational disciplines consider such behavior cause to re-evaluate the components and concepts of the educational system. We are currently in the process of implementing the resolutions of the National Conference for Educational Development.

We believe that the damaged properties belong to the people and [were paid for] through their efforts and benevolent giving. Our educational institutions should diligently instill this concept into the students. Even more, they should so develop the psyches of our sons the students that their response to developments would take the form of enlightened, coordinated, and responsible behavior.

In view of that, we must call upon our sons the students to contribute no less than 10 fils each to partially help cover the cost of repairing the damage inflicted during the recent happenings.

These contributions should not be construed as an assessment. Although nominal, they would be a clear symbol and indication of belief in the concept that state property belongs to the people and that safeguarding public property is a national duty. Contributions would also symbolize the determination to translate noble sentiment into positive action for the construction of this fatherland.

I hope that these contributions will be collected in a fiscally responsible manner and that each directorate deposit its collections to the ministry's escrow account in a lump sum.

Phosphate Industry Yearly Report Published

44040440c Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
13 May 89 p 3

[Article: "Phosphate Production at Al-Shayyidiyah to Exceed 12 Million Tons Within 10 Years. Phosphoric Acid Industry to be Created with a Daily Capacity of 2,300 Tons"]

[Text] Jordan Phosphate Mining Company, working under a careful plan to be implemented yearly, has completed preparations for an ambitious operating schedule extending to the year 2,000.

The company's annual report said the plan was flexible and adjustable to the needs and vagaries of the market. In the main, the company produces materials and products targeted at world markets and is therefore subject to their variables and pressures.

Company programs and plans are therefore characterized with studied caution based on careful analysis of world market trends and of the competition as well as the economics and technical and financial requirements of development in general, and commercial profitability in particular.

The company communicated its future direction in its economic and technical feasibility study of the first stage of the al-Shayyidiyah mining project, which detailed the company's future economic activity for several years to come.

The company plans to continue mining the present sites at al-Wadi al-Abyad and al-Hasa until operations there are no longer commercially feasible. Production at the two sites will begin to decline in the next two years and will continue to do so for a period of 9 to 12 years when all commercially viable raw materials would have been extracted.

This means that with the advent of the next century, the company will concentrate on production at al-Shayyidiyah site which came on stream in 1988 and will have a capacity of 3.2 million tons of dry phosphates by 1992, gradually increasing to 11.2 million tons by the year 2,000 and to about 15 million tons by 2,005. Meanwhile, production at other sites is expected to drop to a mere million tons by the year 2,000.

The company plans to increase future exports of manufactured phosphate products through the implementation of two projects.

The industrial complex at 'Aqaba is to be developed to its maximum nominal capacity and therefore its needs of feedstock will increase from one million to 1.4 million tons of dry phosphate.

The second project involves the creation of fertilizer and phosphoric acid industries capable of absorbing another 3 million tons or so for domestic manufacturing.

The company's strategy calls for increasing domestic production to no less than four million tons annually by the year 1995 and is currently consulting with several authorities on the implementation of its programs which include the creation of a compound fertilizer industry parallel alongside of the 'Aqaba industrial complex. Its main objective would be to feed on a considerable portion of the complex's product in addition to a few hundred thousand tons of dry phosphates.

Plans also include the creation at the al-Shayyidiyah site of a phosphoric acid industry with a daily capacity of about 2,300 tons.

The government has already approved the establishment of a free trade zone at the site of these industries in order to encourage investment by non-Jordanians.

The company is currently considering developing its marketing potential and identifying new markets for raw materials and end-products in order to widen the base of customers for Jordanian phosphates and fertilizers. Markets being targeted are the Soviet Union, Australia, New

Zealand, Japan, and Thailand. The company's marketing strategy is to target markets where it has comparative advantage in order to maximize profit.

Company plans for 1989 include an increase in exports to about 6 million tons at minimum. Another million tons will be used domestically as feedstock for the industrial complex at 'Aqaba. The company's plans therefore require the production of between 7.2 million and 7.5 million tons in 1989 of which half a million will come from al-Shayyidiyah and the remaining 6.7 to 70 million tons from other sites.

The company is also preparing to modernize the industrial complex at 'Aqaba and increase its annual capacity from the current 600,000-640,000 tons to more than 830,000 tons of fertilizer or an equivalent amount of concentrated phosphoric acid. Modernizing the complex is expected to take between 18 and 24 months from the time it is begun. Tendering is expected to be completed and the work begun before September, 1989.

KUWAIT

Editorial Discusses Economic Crisis Sources, Solutions

44040426 Kuwait *AL-WATAN* in Arabic 22 Apr 89 p 28

[Article by "A Patriotic Economist": "Solutions of the Economic Crisis and the Missing Link"]

[Text] There is much talk these days in Kuwait about the economic crisis through which the country is passing and the nature of the best solution for it. Many are contributing their opinions. The Planning Council discusses, the Chamber of Commerce discusses, and the banks offer memorandums. Many individuals, too, here and there are tempted and discuss the matter. Who knows, perhaps they may find the awaited solution. They are all like people looking for a missing link.

We have already been told that the economic crisis can be traced to three causes:

1. The Iraq-Iran war,
2. The decline in oil production and prices, and
3. The crisis of the [economic] climate.

The war has now ended. Oil has regained its vigor. As for the crisis of the climate, it has left us two connected burdens. These can be summarized in the sharp drop in the prices of assets and programs for the settlement of hard debt obligations. This naturally results from the incorrect methods and practices that were followed in treating the disaster of the climate.

Before looking for the best solution to remedy the crisis, we must look for some authority that is convinced of the errors that occurred in the treatment of this crisis, an authority about which one may be optimistic regarding its overcoming these problems and being able to implement solutions in a positive way. There is no doubt that

the current economic administration does not have these elements. Rather, it has failed in treating the problems that have resulted from the crisis, problems that have increased because of adherence to incorrect practices. The problem has become more complicated, and the solutions have now become more costly. Thus, one must always begin by trying to restore lost confidence in the economic system. This will be feasible only through confidence in the custodians of the system. Otherwise, all solutions will be obstructed and become more complicated; or we shall return to the vicious circle in the search for the missing link.

Last week's replacement of the finance minister in West Germany was a prelude to a change in the income tax system on investment income. The change in administrators was a preliminary to modification of the tax system.

The sharp decline of asset prices and the subsequent complication of the system of hard debt obligations does not need Moses' magic staff to split a path through the sea. The fact of the matter is that more than 4 years ago it was proposed to the economic administration, without response, that the remedy lay in detaching hard debt obligations from the banking system at a reasonable cost. Our banking institutions would then be able to perform the role for which they were created—financial services. These institutions would not, as is now the case, be turned into institutions for investigation and inspection. Certainly, banks will become more capable of competing in the service of customers domestically and internationally if the indebtedness program is detached from them and transferred to an independent agency to which the government contributes and in which the banks participate in a supervisory capacity.

This measure will have two important factors. First, most of the assets of debtors are bank assets. Detaching the indebtedness will undoubtedly improve the prices of these assets. This will have positive effects on debtors' ability to meet their obligations to a greater extent.

Second, treatment by the debt agency will have greater adaptability in dealing with debtors, either through scheduling repayment of the debt, its rate, or even its manner.

You doubtlessly perceive that in this article we are dealing with one of the most important aspects that impede economic activity within the country.

LEBANON

Arab League Resolutions, Future Described
44040400 London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 5 May 89 p 18

[Text] Tunis—At noon on Friday 28 April, implementation of a cease-fire in Lebanon began based on a resolution made by the Council of Foreign Ministers of Arab

States, which held an emergency 2-day session on Wednesday and Thursday to examine the report of the Arab Committee of Six, and to deal with the recommendations made by the committee after three months of negotiations and discussions with all parties to the Lebanese crisis. Although this resolution was violated repeatedly by more than one party, observers emphasized that the Arab League had finally succeeded in bringing the Lebanese crisis into its purview in the hope that Arabization of the conflict will cure Lebanon's malady. Observers also stressed that the Arabs have succeeded in providing the minimum for a Lebanese reconciliation.

Naturally, the Lebanese perceive the resolution of the Arab foreign ministers council from two conflicting viewpoints, because matters are complicated, and cannot be viewed from one side. There are those who maintain that the truth itself has two sides: One is represented by a group which determines what the truth shall be, and the other is represented by a group which is not of the same opinion as the first group. However, this time, both Lebanese governments have perceived the truth from a single viewpoint and have agreed—timidly and with their respective blessings—to the decisions of the league.

Let us first peruse the content of these decisions before entering into how they are viewed by the Lebanese parties which either support, oppose, or reject them.

The resolution of the Arab Foreign Ministers Council includes the following:

- A cease-fire in Lebanon, starting at noon on Friday 28 April.
- Lifting of the land, naval, and air blockade, and the opening of the crossings between east and west Beirut for a period of 3 months.
- Formation of a group of Arab observers to supervise the cease-fire, under the command of the secretary-general of the Arab League.
- The appointment of a military commander for this group, who is a national of the state of the chairman of the Committee of Six, i.e., Kuwait.
- The Arab League Council will request from the UN Security Council the implementation of its Resolution No. 425, which pertains to the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from lands which it occupied in Lebanon.
- The Arab League Council calls on all Lebanese parties to assist the group of Arab observers and the Committee of Six by facilitating their actions, inasmuch as such actions are in the interest of security and peace in Lebanon.
- There are other articles which include an expression of thanks extended by the league to the Committee of Six, and which determine the costs of the observers committee, the length of their presence in Lebanon, etc.

Shortly after the issuance of the resolution, the Lebanese became divided into two groups:

- A group which believe that the decisions harm Lebanon's right, thwart hopes and determination, and do not place responsibility for the war on a specific group.
- A group which believes that the Arabs cannot give Lebanon more than what they gave it.

The group which considers itself wronged used many arguments, including that the Arab League was not specific when it spoke about the "parties to the conflict."

In addition, it did not mention any names when it discussed withdrawals, nor did it respect the decisions of the government of General Michel 'Awn to reclaim public utilities and illegal harbors for the state realm.

This group maintains that the demands of Gen Michel 'Awn are not personal demands. Rather, their objective is to restore the freedom of the country and its sovereignty over its territory, people, and utilities. No one can accuse Gen 'Awn of being an agent, nor is that the desire of ordinary Muslims and Christians. Their desire is for complete freedom in its full, comprehensive, national sense. That is to say, without a free country, there can be no free citizens.

The group defending Gen Michel 'Awn maintains that the Lebanese war is actually the result of international circumstances, and the frustration of hopes on a regional level, because of which Lebanon was disposed to being broken up and divided with the connivance and consent of the major states, especially the U.S. 'Awn's defenders also maintain that he had wanted to hold negotiations on the Middle East crisis, in which Lebanon would be the price paid by one group to the other group.

The group supporting the Arab decisions maintains that the Arabs are not against Lebanon and the Lebanese. However, this time, the Arabs are more frank than previously, having made their decisions without flattery, diffidence, or hot and cold emotions.

This group maintain that the Arab committee gathered the following facts regarding Lebanon:

1. The committee realized that the Lebanese are actually suffering from internal division. There is no matter or reform on which all Lebanese agree in a like manner without exception.

2. The committee realized, through democratic means, that the Lebanese Muslims are not demanding Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon by force and in the way advocated by Gen Michel 'Awn.

3. The committee realized that even within Lebanese Christian ranks, there are Christians who do not want what Gen 'Awn wants with respect to a Syrian withdrawal, war and liberation, and the like. For example, former Lebanese President Sulayman Franjiyah, who can currently be considered the most influential Maronite leader in Lebanon, does not hold the same position as Gen 'Awn on reform or withdrawals.

There is also the position of the Maronite Patriarchate, which signed, with 23 Christian deputies, a very important document, which condemns liberation by the canon, and calls for dialogue as the means to achieve peace, be it dialogue between the Lebanese themselves, or between the Lebanese and the Syrians.

The Arab committee cannot ignore all of these positions in order to support the demands of Michel 'Awn, although it is well aware that the general's demands are not outside the law.

4: The Arab committee ascertained, and was informed through all diplomatic and political means, that Washington does not support the "war of liberation" in which 'Awn has decided to engage. If Washington opposes this matter, there is no wisdom in clashing with it.

5: The Arab committee ascertained that France, the Soviet Union and Britain do not support the demands of the general unreservedly, but view dialogue as the means by which peace can be attained in Lebanon, after it has been proven that violence does not solve the problem of Lebanon or the Lebanese.

The group supporting the Arab decisions maintains that the Arab League was not apt to do what the world did not want, especially what all Lebanese did not want. Hence, the decisions of the Arab League appeared clear, exacting, and unbiased toward one group as opposed to another.

If the Lebanese crisis must be resolved, the Lebanese must realize, henceforth, that the solution to their crisis is subject to a solution to the greater conflict, the Middle East conflict. It is odd that official Lebanese are informed of such talk—be it from the American Administration, France, or even from Egypt and the moderate Arabs—but they do act accordingly.

It remains for us to ask: What is over the horizon for Lebanon?

Brigadier General Raymun Iddih states that the crisis of Lebanon is connected altogether to an Israeli withdrawal from the south, and that no one thinks that the Lebanese can enjoy their independence and the restoration of their sovereignty as long as one Israeli soldier is on their land.

This remark by Brig Gen Iddih means that a Syrian withdrawal is subject to an Israeli withdrawal, and will not occur before Israel realizes where the Middle East peace table is leading it.

By carefully noting Maj Gen Iddih's statements, as well as those made by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz (chairman of the current session of the Arab League), by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah, the committee's chairman and Chedli Klibi, the secretary-general of the Arab League, the following reading of Lebanon's future can be derived:

1. A 3-month cease-fire is expected, during which the Lebanese will catch their breath and rebuild what can be rebuilt.

2. The way will be paved for electing a new president of the republic; no one will oppose Gen 'Awn, nor will Syria reject him.

3. The next president will manage the Lebanese crisis, which will revert to what it was before the battle of 14 March, until the Middle East peace table imposes its weight, and an international choice is made regarding our region. Thus, a decision will be made for Lebanon, which Lebanon might not desire.

4. The state of no war, no peace, no liberation, no reconstruction and no hope will continue for three, or perhaps more, years. For all of these reasons, the resolutions of the Arab League yesterday were called the minimum for a Lebanese reconciliation.

LIBYA

Jallud Discusses Summit, Implications

45040381b Tunis HAQA'IQ in Arabic 26 May 89 p 6

[Interview with Major 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, by Najib Lakkanji: "Countries of Arab North Africa Should Have Consulted About the Summit"; date and place not given]

[Text] Major 'Abd-al-Salam Ahmad Jallud visited Tunisia last week and met with Tunisian officials, foremost among them President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. During the discussions, the Arab summit and pan-Maghribi relations were brought up. These are the subjects that we raised with the major in this special interview.

[HAQA'IQ] What are the goals of your short visit to Tunisia?

[Jallud] The goal of this visit is to follow up on the unity program that was drawn up between the two countries and approved during the visit of Brother Mu'ammarr [al-Qadhafi] to the fraternal country of Tunisia. The goal is to find a practical formula to move the project and program forward and to complete this unity project as the president conceived of it and in a way that expresses the aspiration of the two peoples.

[HAQA'IQ] Did you talk with Tunisian officials about the Arab summit?

[Jallud] Naturally we talked about the subject. We really feel sorry that this summit was called by a member in the Arab North African Union. This is the first negative sign, because mutual consultation ought to have taken place between the five nations. This is point one. The second point is that we in the Jamahiriya believe that all we have to do is carry out what was decided in the Algiers summit and that there are no new factors or unforeseen circumstance to make us meet. One can see that the meeting will be a response to more calls for abdicating our historic right to Palestine. I believe we must review our past position, because the Zionist enemy has not and will not respond to concessions.

Even the international conference—we in Libya reject it. We think that all it will do is extract more concessions, as if what we have given were not enough. We are against these attitudes.

[HAQA'IQ] There are rumored to be disagreements between the countries of the Arab North African Union on the subject of relations with Egypt. Is this true?

[Jallud] Of course, there are countries in the Arab North African Union that have restored relations with Egypt, just like other Arab countries. Ever since the Amman summit, we have believed that the reasons for which Egypt's membership was suspended still exist—the existence of a Zionist embassy in Cairo and recognition of the enemy. Egypt's concession changed the Arab-Zionist conflict from a struggle for existence into a struggle over borders. Egypt abandoned a historic right. For these reasons, we hold that the problem still exists and that our policies since '48 have been wrong. Really, we do not think it is Egypt that has returned to the Arab nation. Rather, the Arabs are the ones who have gone to Egypt by way of Camp David.

Benghazi People's Committee Secretary Meets With Religious Leaders

45040381a Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID
in Arabic 22 Apr 89 p 8

[Text] The secretary of the People's Committee for Mass Mobilization and Revolutionary Guidance in the municipality of Benghazi met the night before last with the imams and preachers of the municipality's mosques.

The meeting was attended by the members of the People's Committee for Mass Mobilization and Revolutionary Guidance and the secretary of the People's Committee of the municipality of Benghazi.

At the beginning of the meeting, the secretary of the People's Committee for Mass Mobilization welcomed those present and spoke about a number of problems related to Islam and Muslims and certain administrative matters related to the imams.

Afterwards, the secretary of the municipal People's Committee spoke about a number of subjects of concern to the meeting. He affirmed in his speech that the Great September Revolution showed special concern for Islam and Muslims, based on the fact that the Noble Koran is the law of society in the Great Jamahiriyah. He enumerated in his speech effective positions to help Islam and Muslims throughout the world. He stated that the People's Committee of the municipality of Benghazi was using all its resources to overcome the difficulties that sometimes confront imams and preachers of the municipality's mosques. This included the preparation of a new organizational plan for the preaching department in the People's Committee for Mass Mobilization and Revolutionary Guidance. The plan aims at establishing programs related to preaching, mosque maintenance, and the completion of still unfinished mosques.

A number of imams and preachers also spoke at the meeting. They put forward a number of suggestions contributing to the advancement of the preaching department in the municipality of Benghazi.

At the conclusion of the meeting, those in attendance sent a telegram to the brother leader. At the beginning of the telegram, they offered best wishes to the brother leader upon the arrival of the blessed month of Ramadan. They stressed in their telegram that they would move forward to spread the true Islamic religion and cast out all superficial impostors, subservient hirelings, and people who hold on to worn-out yellow papers. They would work to realize the unity of the Arab nation, spread justice, and create a society that would take its place under the sun and upon the earth with pride and strength, in order to fulfill its role of liberating the peoples of the earth from oppression, injustice, and exploitation.

In their telegram to the brother leader, the imams and preachers of the mosques of Benghazi municipality affirmed their constant readiness to combat all forms of trickery, factionalism, and deviation, and that they would make the mosques of God houses of security, tranquillity, love, loyalty, dedication, a daily call for increased production, and a kindling of the spirit of the revolution among coming generations.

OMAN

Economic Feasibility Study of Two Copper Regions Reported

44040403a Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 5 Apr 89 p 2

[Article by 'Abdallah Hamad al-Maskari: "Two Copper Sites Evaluated for Economic Worth"]

[Excerpts] Chrome is one of the most important strategic metals in the world and it receives a great deal of attention from the sultanate. The metal is currently found in two areas of Oman.

The first is in Shinas in the Rajmi valley. We undertook a detailed study in certain areas and found chrome ore at several sites. Numerous other sites were discovered while mapping the northern section of Rajmi—a project that began 15 Jan 89.

The second chrome site is near Muscat and encompasses the regions of al-Rustaq, Sama'il, Nakhl, and Samad. Discoveries in those regions have already been evaluated, according to Salim Ibn-'Umar Ibn-'Abdallah, director of metallurgy at the ministry of petroleum and mining.

He said that the minister of petroleum and mining Sa'id Ahmad al-Shanfari recently signed an agreement to prospect for chrome along an area of 215 kilometers in two regions: Rajmi/ Qazah and al-Farfarah/al-Halti situated between Luwayyah and Saham. There are indications that chrome is present in the two regions since previous geological surveys have made discoveries there. In addition to exploration, studies are being conducted on the economic value of seven sites being explored in the same region.

He said that the environment in the region would indicate the presence of chrome because it is similar to that of Rajmi valley and of the region near Samad/Sama'il.

He added that the project has been underway for two years and that studies are being made of more than 300 sites. The number of sites has increased due to recent discoveries made during the geological mapping of the states of Shanas and Dank.

As to the availability of other minerals, the director of metallurgy said that the sultanate's metals include copper, currently being mined at three mines in Sahanas: al-Asil, 'Arja', and Bayda'. There are also coal, manganese, and other industrial raw materials directly utilized by domestic industries. Examples are marble, gypsum, chalk, and laterite which is 40 percent iron ore. The latter is currently being utilized in cement factories and other industries in the country.

The most important of these minerals are copper and chrome. A feasibility study is now underway on sites at al-Rakkah and Hayl al-Safil in the state of Yanqul to evaluate the economic worth of copper there. Should it prove viable, it will prolong the life of the current project at Sahar.

In addition to other copper deposits in the plains of al-Batinah, we have had them evaluated. We will soon begin a comprehensive project to prospect in this region. We are currently digging to choose certain sites to test the results of detailed geophysical, geochemical, and geological surveys. [passage omitted]

Improvement of Water Supply System Discussed

44000553b Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN*
in English 11 May 89 p 7

[Text] The Ministry of Electricity and Water is to undertake vital improvements in Muscat's water supply system and a consultancy firm has been commissioned to design facilities.

Additional storage tanks and pumping stations are being considered at Ghabarah along with laboratory facilities for water fluoridation and quality control.

Several kilometres of transmission pipelines are to be laid or strengthened along the city's eastern and western sectors.

The consultancy work has been awarded to an Omani firm, Ayyub Oghanna Associates, which will be carrying out its work in association with Engineering-Science Inc [ES] of Pasadena, USA.

An agreement was signed in Muscat on Wednesday last week by Minister of Electricity and Water, Khalfan Ibn-Nasir al-Wuhaybi, ES senior vice-president Christopher Thomson and Ayyub Oghanna of Ayub Oghanna Associates.

The existing reinforced concrete water reservoir at Ghabarah has a capacity of 54,000 cubic metres. Mr Oghanna told the press the need for additional capacity for providing storage equal to approximately one day's production of desalination water plus water for blending would be examined.

Mr Oghanna said the consultancy work would cover the construction of a 22-km long and 1,000mm-diameter pipeline along the western sector while the need for strengthening transmission along 12.5 kms of the eastern sector from Ghabarah to Wadi 'Udayy would be studied.

Means of Developing Fisheries Industry Outlined

44040403b Muscat *UMAN in Arabic* 5 Apr 89 p 9, 12

[Article: "Building Infrastructure to Utilize and Develop Marine Resources"]

[Text] The sultanate of Oman enjoys a 1,700-kilometer-long coast teeming with marine and fish resources that support a large sector of citizens. Fishing is one of the major occupations in the country.

This resource needs to be methodically exploited in order to become a strong pillar of the national economy and a main source of food. The wise government of His Majesty the Sultan, since the inception of the blessed renaissance led by His Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id, has made a special effort to build a solid foundation for sound management, define methods of developing the

marine wealth with which the sultanate has been blessed, and exploit it in an ideal fashion that conserves it while deriving the utmost benefit from it.

Plans and programs have been devised to develop the marine and fisheries sector. Several programs, short range and long range, have been implemented under these plans with the specific objectives of supporting and assisting professional fishermen in order to encourage and protect the profession and induce entry into it.

The state, under these plans, has built the fundamental framework for developing and exploiting marine resources. It gives professional fishermen access to modern fishing equipment through financial support by the Fishermen's Fund and through soft loans by the Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries for the purchase of boats. The state also provides freezers, fisheries complexes, piers, icemakers, fish markets, and marine workshops to repair and service fishing equipment free of charge.

Aware of the increasing need to support the fisheries sector and to develop marine resources in the best possible manner, the ministry has restructured the general directorate for fisheries to include specialized departments that work in absolute harmony to service and develop marine fishing. The government has furthermore directed that the ideal utilization of marine resources should be conditional on conservation.

A center for marine sciences and fisheries was built at al-Bustan as a scientific monument specializing in the study of this resource and its biological, oceanographic, and environmental components. Its research will be directed to define means and set parameters for utilizing the resource. This scientific monument has become one of the fundamental research institutes for the conservation of our national wealth.

Following is a review of recent accomplishments in this field:

Infrastructure to Develop Marine Resources

1. Warehousing Freezers: a. Muscat/Ghala. The project occupies 40,852 square meters and cost a total of 302,763 Omani riyals. It comprises a 400 square meter fish freezer with refrigerated anteroom. The warehouse has a capacity of 400 tons. b. Nizwa: Has an area of 3,850 square meters and cost 212,201 Omani riyals. It comprises a 125-ton refrigerated warehouse, an icemaker with a capacity of 10 tons, and a 40-ton refrigerated ice storage facility. c. Sawqirah: The project, which cost 240,996 Omani riyals, stands on 13,292 square meters and comprises a 25-ton facility for fresh fish storage, an icemaker with a capacity of 5 tons, an ice storage facility with a capacity of 25 tons, and a marine workshop to service fishermen's equipment. d. Hasik: The project stands on an area of 15,000 square meters and has a total cost of 254,941 Omani riyals. It comprises a fresh fish

storeroom with a capacity of 25 tons, a 5-ton icemaker, a 25-ton ice storage room, and a marine workshop to service fishermen's equipment. e. Sharbatat. The project cost 232,976 Omani riyals and stands on an area of 5,659 square meters and includes a fresh fish storeroom with a 25-ton capacity, a 5-ton icemaker, a 25-ton ice warehouse, and a marine workshop to maintain fishermen's equipment.

2. Fisheries Complexes: Fish complexes have been built all along the Omani coast in order to help preserve the fish and keep it from spoiling, thus assuring fishermen a fair price and saving them the effort of transporting fish to distant markets. Complexes can be found at al-Ashkhirah, al-Dukum, al-Shuwaymiyah, Sahar, Sadah, Khuriya Muriya, and Rakhyut.

Each of the complexes contains a 100-ton freezer storage for newly caught fish, an ice-maker with a daily capacity of 10 tons, 25-ton storage for crushed ice, and a main electric generator as well as three auxiliary ones. Each complex offers family residences and a marine workshop. Total cost is 3.6 million Omani riyals.

Three centers for light refrigeration have also been erected at Sawqirah, Sharbatat, and Hasik.

The ministry originally planned to operate the complexes but, in order to stimulate the private sector, it entrusted Omani national firms and institutions with operating them in the service of fishermen and the public in general.

The current fishing season has been fairly active. Fishermen and other citizens, well-served by these complexes, were able to increase fishing activity and consequently their material reward.

3. Fish Marketing Centers: The ministry, keen to make fish available in all parts of the sultanate and especially remote interior locations, has established fish marketing centers in Manah, Danak, 'Abri, Azki, al-Rustaq, Sama'il, Abra', Adam, al-Mudaybi, Wadi al-Tayin, Hima, Nakhal, al-Qabil, Bahla, and al-Hamra'. It cost some 298,850 Omani riyals to build the centers. Each comprises two cold storerooms in addition to a sales floor and a preparation area. Each center is run by an Omani citizen in return for nominal monthly rent of 30 Omani riyals. The complexes helped make fish available to areas of the interior at reasonable prices.

4. Piers: The state's keen interest in the fishing sector is manifested in the construction of piers that greatly ease the task of professional fishermen by helping them protect their equipment and quickly unload their catch. Piers offer the following advantages:

a. They facilitate docking. Fishermen no longer have to leave large ships offshore and take several trips to unload their catch via small boats. Piers save them travel and unloading time and help protect their catch

against spoilage b. They keep boats and engines from banging against the rocks thereby prolonging their nominal life spans c. Piers give fishermen an incentive to upgrade to larger, better-equipped boats. d. They make it easier for fishermen to sail larger vessels, thus boosting production and providing a surplus catch to be exported after satisfying domestic needs, resulting in a larger contribution to the national economy

The following piers were completed in 1988:

Masirah: Built at a total cost of about 1,996,289 Omani riyals, the pier consists of a 780-meter-long breakwater of large rocks connected by a 22-meter concrete bridge to a "beautified sea walk" that is 165 meters long and 3.5 meters wide. The pier also comprises a 28- by 11-meter floating iron pontoon, a 70-square-meter concrete shelter, water and electric lines, lighting poles across the length of the pier, navigational lights in the area, and fuel stops for fishing boats.

Mirbat: Cost a total of 514,914,160 Omani riyals and consists of a 250-meter-long breakwater of solid rock. It uses 10 tons of concrete pilings for fishing boats to tie to, a 50- by 12-meter pier for the docking of large wooden boats, and a 130-meter long incline for the launching of boats. Of the paved area, 2,500 square meters are used for automobile parking and for the handling of fish and fishing equipment. The pier also has a 75-meter long shelter for fishermen as well as navigational equipment such as water and electric lines and lighting poles.

Khuriya Muriya: Consists of a 110-meter-long breakwater and a paved roadway for the length of the pier. The pier is 22 by 8 meters and has a stepped-up area for mooring small boats.

It is worth noting that a study has been done on the construction of two ports to accommodate larger ships and traditional fishing boats at al-Dukm and al-Ashkhirah.

Shelters for Fishermen: These are removable units that consist of a roof made of rust-resistant asbestos roofing supported on iron poles. The floors are tiled. The shelters have areas to keep fishing equipment and are properly constructed to protect fishermen against heat and the elements as they go about repairing their nets and maintaining their equipment.

The shelters cost some 56,954 Omani riyals and are to be found at al-Bustan, Darsit, Saddab, Qaryat, Liwa', al-Khaburah, al-Suwayq, al-Ashkhirah, Ra's al-Hid, Mahawt, Mirbat, and Masirah.

The most important recent accomplishment is the establishment of marine workshops that provide fishermen with technical services and facilities and repair their engines for free, charging only for the cost of spare parts. Some 4,000 engines undergo repairs annually. Nine such

marine workshops were established at a cost of 860,843 Omani riyals and have been so distributed as to service all the coastal areas in the sultanate.

The Fishermen's Fund

The care of the Omani fisherman is not limited to free maintenance of equipment at marine workshops spread all along the Omani coast or to training and education in modern fishing techniques, or to the supply of such infrastructure as piers, refrigerated warehouses, and protective shelters as previously mentioned.

In addition to all the things it has offered the fisherman, the state is taking special care of traditional fishermen. Fishermen no longer use traditional fishing boats, equipment, and techniques. The fishermen's fund has put modern fishing boats and equipment within reach, thus helping fishermen increase productivity and consequently improve income and standard of living. Equipment distributed to fishermen is subsidized by more than 4 million Omani riyals.

Fund Objectives: a. to raise the social, economic, and professional standard of Omani fishermen throughout the sultanate b. to make a plentiful supply of fish available to domestic markets and export the surplus c. to encourage fishing operations and boost fish production d. to make modern equipment available to fishermen at low cost

Fund Services: The fund makes boats, marine engines, and other fishing equipment available to fisherman throughout the sultanate on the basis of the following guidelines: a. commitment to the principle of assisting the fisherman in kind b. A fisherman pays only one third of the cost of boat, engine, or other equipment and is forgiven the remaining two thirds. c. Repayment is by installment over 2 years that begin after a 2-month grace period from the day equipment is received.

Fishermen have so far made some 12,400 applications to the fund which has already distributed 10,875 marine engines and 5,844 boats in return for about 4,319,000 Omani riyals in subsidies.

SUDAN

Foreign Minister Discusses Relations With Neighbors

45040349 Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 10 May 89 pp 10-11

[Interview With Sudanese Foreign Minister Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn by Usamah 'Ajjaj: "No Fabricated Crisis Exists Between Egypt and Sudan; Garang's Concessions and Peace Intentions in South; No Fear for Democracy; Sudan's Army Is Not Coup-Oriented; Joining Arab Groupings Is Next Phase After Putting House in Order"; date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] To begin, can we know what are the latest developments in Sudan's pivotal issue, namely the establishment of peace in the south, especially since disagreement on the peace agreement [concluded] between the Unionist Party and John Garang was behind the recent crisis that culminated with forming the united national front government which has proclaimed its adherence to the course of peace?

[Al-Husayn] It is actually as you have said. In its first meeting, the united national front government committed itself to the peace agreement concluded between the Unionist Party and John Garang last November. This means that we have ended what we may call the official acceptance phase, especially since all of Sudan's parties, political and intellectual tendencies, popular organizations, and unions are participants in the government. At the same meeting, an operations chamber was formed under my chairmanship to contact the [southern] movement and to present [to it] the documents containing the phased program [drawn up] by the political figures participating in the government, the cabinet decision embracing this program, the resolutions of the ministerial peace committee, an original copy of the initiative's provisions, a copy of the cabinet decision establishing the ministerial committee and its jurisdiction, and the prime minister's address to the Constituent Assembly explaining the government's commitments to the phased program. This has actually been done through a delegation of the ministerial peace committee. [passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] Can one imagine that Garang has been eager to escalate the military confrontation with the Sudanese Army when the government has taken all the goodwill steps toward the peace issue? Through your negotiations with it, what does Garang's movement specifically want?

[Al-Sayyid] Some people confuse an agreement to end the conflict with the peace initiative. What has been agreed upon is a peace initiative of a purely procedural nature—an initiative on the path to be followed to the round table, meaning the constitutional conference. In the conference, the discussion will be clear and frank on what the movement wants and what Garang wants. In the wake of Garang's approval of the peace initiative in light of the latest developments, a national committee formed of the unions and all the political parties will establish the issues to be presented to the constitutional conference. Only there will all the issues be discussed and will every party's or union's vision of Sudan's future, of its form of government, of Sudan's development, and of all the pending issues or issues depending on the convocation of this conference be presented. We hope that this conference will be held as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] It seems that you have certain reasons that motivate you to underline the movement's credibility and its adherence to the peace agreement concluded in Addis Ababa last November.

[Al-Husayn] Yes. John Garang's movement is fully sincere in its commitment. It suffices that to achieve an agreement, Garang has made some concessions. In all past dialogues, Garang insisted on abolishing the September laws and the Sudanese constitution promulgated in 1959 and amended in 1964. He has ceded these two points and has agreed to suspending the issuance of new laws containing Shari'a restrictions. He has ceded the demand for abolishing the constitution, provided that the government undertake not to issue new laws until a [new] constitution is established.

Kenya and Chad Conflicts

[AKHIR SA'AH] Do you think that Sudan, while seeking with all its efforts to establish peace in its southern part, can afford to embark on conflicts with its neighbors, meaning Kenya and Chad?

[Al-Husayn] When we deal with every phase [separately], we find that Sudan is not responsible for the consequences of this conflict.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Sudan accuses Kenya, for example, in official documents of smuggling weapons to Garang's faction in [as published] Israel?

[Al-Husayn] We are now seeking a peace phase. It is not in the public interest to discuss such obstacles because, basically, such a discussion is not in the interest of peace. Can you imagine the start of a peace phase with the exchange of accusations?

[AKHIR SA'AH] But the charges have been made by Sudan's minister of information?

[Al-Husayn] I will not comment on this issue. We are in a peace phase. If some circles are trying to raise these issues in this phase, we do not wish it. The important thing is that there is basically a border problem with Kenya. This problem concerns a triangle on the borders which, according to all the internationally acknowledged maps kept by all international institutions, belongs to Sudan. Kenya has altered the border maps between the two countries, has included this triangle in its territories, and has distributed the new maps to tourist agencies and other establishments. In this regard, Sudan is not the cause of the problem.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What about Chad, which accuses Khartoum of involvement in the recent coup attempt that was led by Hassane Qampus, an ex-chief of staff, and about Khartoum's giving political asylum to the coup leaders? The crisis has reached the point of clashes in some border areas.

[Al-Husayn] All that is reiterated about Sudan's involvement in the recent coup in Chad is untrue. Sudan has eight neighbors. There are no natural barriers. Any natural catastrophe or political unrest pushes citizens to come from neighboring countries to Sudan. There are

tribes who straddle the common borders, half the tribe living in Chad and the other half in Sudan. When unrest develops in Chad, they rush into Sudan. This is normal. As for those who came in and requested political asylum, Sudan cannot, in accordance with the international traditions or the law, expel or oust them. The political asylum law is fully explicit. Therefore, Sudan has not sought to provoke problems with its neighbors. On the contrary, Sudan has taken a firm stand on the Chad issue. In the past, it refused to allow any forces to cross its borders into Chad. It has supported Chad and has permitted Chadian citizens wishing to return to their country to do so through Sudan. But when a coup occurs and citizens rush into Sudanese territories and become refugees, Sudan cannot be considered the cause behind these problems or the party seeking such problems. [passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] How can the recent fabricated crisis between Egypt and Sudan be overcome?

[Al-Husayn] We believe that the safety valve in the course of the Egyptian-Sudanese relations is a good understanding of Sudan and of its party and political structure. If the nature of the Sudanese people were understood, there would be no fabricated crisis. We, as Sudanese people, do not feel that there really is a crisis in the relations.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Has the issue of the Libyan plane which landed recently in Egypt during your talks in Cairo been discussed?

[Al-Husayn] I have no connection with this issue and I have not heard of it. My visit to Cairo came on the occasion of the presence of the ministerial peace committee's members in Cairo. It was an opportunity for me to be with them and to explain the dimensions of the situation in South Sudan and the bilateral relations to the Egyptian officials. [passage omitted]

[AKHIR SA'AH] Let us return to Sudan's internal situation. Do you think that the National Islamic Front's rejection of the peace initiative for the south will be an obstacle in the face of completing and implementing the agreement?

[Al-Husayn] The front will be absolutely no obstacle to establishing peace in the south because 99.9 percent of the Sudanese people, now represented in the united national front government, supports peace. Supporters of the front recently staged a demonstration which the authorities did not oppose because, ultimately, this demonstration had no influence on the ordinary citizen.

[AKHIR SA'AH] But what is surprising is that despite formation of the new government, labor and unionist unrest has not ended.

[Al-Husayn] This is one of the manifestations of democracy in Sudan, which allows everybody free expression. Generally, the government will devote full attention to this issue, especially since all the professional and labor unions have become partners in the government and since they are represented in the united national front government.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Don't you think that the continuing economic crisis and the shortage of foodstuffs may motivate the Sudanese to renounce the democratic experiment which has not really contributed to solving these problems?

[Al-Husayn] The Sudanese people have not renounced democracy. They realize that the democratic period from 1986 to the present has not made a noticeable accomplishment at the economic level because the main malady is the war and the instability. The current regime inherited from the previous administration a legacy burdened with destruction and debts, in addition to the catastrophes of the recent floods. We are confident that the country's economic and social stability are tied to political stability. The new government will offer clear plans for exerting efforts to reform the country's economy which is characterized as a productive economy that lacks nothing other than political stability and that suffers from some deficiency in infrastructures, such as energy, transportation, and supplies. Generally, one of the Sudanese people's special characteristics is that they realize that the government's current priority is to end the war. If they were a different people, they would have come out supporting and cheering the first person to stage a military coup.

Sudanese Army's Position

[AKHIR SA'AH] On occasion of the talk about coups, there is fear that a military coup may be the alternative projected for Sudan's continuing current crises (especially if the military establishment moves from the position of presenting memoranda expressing its opinion on the internal affairs to the position of seeking actual control of the government).

[Al-Husayn] The Sudanese Armed Forces are something unique in Sudan's history. They have always stood with the people against any dictatorship. The April 1985 events confirm this. The Armed Forces sided with the masses, the people, and the uprising, thus turning into a supportive force. When it was agreed that there would be a 2-year transitional period during which the Army would be in charge, the Army declined the agreement and set the period at just 1 year. The Army did actually then turn the authority over to the people and free democratic elections were held. In the recent events, the Democratic Union Party's presence in the opposition, the party's leadership of the public opinion, and its reflection of the Sudanese people's true tendency for peace were tantamount to a safety valve which prevented

any adventurer from embarking on his adventure. Generally, the Sudanese Army is not coup-oriented by nature, even though there are adventurers in all the world's armies. The memorandum which the Army presented to the prime minister was not a coup and was not intended to imply that a coup would be staged. It was a true reflection of the hardship experienced by the Sudanese people.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Will Sudan linger in joining the current Arab groupings which have become a characteristic of the common Arab action?

[Al-Husayn] We acknowledge that this age is the age of regional groupings. The creation of three Arab groupings within the Arab League's framework is proof of the Arab nation's vitality. Creation of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] has been a successful experiment which played an attested role in the Iraq-Iran war, in ending the bloodshed and in containing it so that it may not spread to other countries. The GCC's positive accomplishments have been behind the thought given to the Arab and Maghreb groupings. We in Sudan support such groupings. But we must put the Sudanese house in order from within, must achieve our national unity, must entrench security, and must end the war. We, as Sudanese and as unionists in particular, advocate real unity, not pivotal unity. The urgent issue now is to put the house in order. This is why action within the GCC moves within the framework of development and consolidation. We seek peace. Generally, we say that we must be influential in any grouping we join. We must not try to join any grouping while we are trying to settle our internal disputes. We are a nation formed of numerous elements and our problems are well known.

Foreign Minister Discusses Militias, African Relations

45040358a London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
22 May 89 pp 22-23, 25

[Interview With Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn by Ibrahim Salim in Cairo: Egypt Does Not Accept Continuation of Agreement With Which Sudan Is Not Satisfied; Preventive Detention Law Will Not Be Used Against Opposition But Against Currency Dealers; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Southern Problem

[AL-DUSTUR] Regarding the Arab countries, do you think that they sufficiently understand the dimensions of the southern problem? What is the aid that Sudan needs from its brothers while it is waging the peace battle now?

[Husayn] There is no doubt that this role falls on our shoulders. We must clarify to our brothers all dimensions of the issue and must present to them all its causes, cards, and documents. Our Arab brothers must also seek

this familiarization and take the initiative to understand the war and peace battles being waged in the South because they affect them both negatively and positively. The same applies to our African brothers because what happens in the South influences their inherited internal conditions directly and influences the Afro-Arab relations in particular. What we need at this time is whatever bolsters our position on peace and leads to entrenching and cementing this position politically, economically, and at the information level.

[AL-DUSTUR] Do you think that bolstering the peace steps is in conflict with strengthening the Armed Forces and attracting the military aid they need from the brothers and the friends, in light of the shortage these forces are suffering?

[Husayn] The truth is that the military forces have shouldered recently a military and moral burden that exceeds their capabilities, especially in the South. Therefore, meeting their needs is something that concerns all, considering that they are the shield protecting Sudan in the face of those lurking for Sudan's sovereignty and for the unity of its people and soil. Sudan's enemies are enemies of the Afro-Arab region and identity to which we belong and enemies of the indivisible Afro-Arab security. This is a fact which must be made known to all. This is why Sudan's military strength constitutes strength for the Arabs and the Africans and its weakness constitutes a weakness for them and an infiltration of their front by the imperialist forces, the foreign monopolies and world Zionism and by their international and regional supports in the area. [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] How true is what is being circulated about a Sudanese initiative to mediate between the Ethiopians and Eritreans and to get them together around a negotiation table to establish peace?

[Husayn] Let us look at the reflection of Sudan's peace course on the ongoing war in Eritrea. There is no doubt that the climate is now better. Ending the prolonged bloody war in Eritrea is everybody's objective. Sudan's fundamental role and conviction is that it is necessary to get the participants around the dialogue table and to look for a starting point on the peace path because we believe that there is no victor and no defeated and that the two countries' security, safety and national unity are an indivisible whole. [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] We are now in mid-May, meaning that only 10 months remain until the election of the Constituent Assembly's second session. Do you think that this time is enough to achieve peace?

[Husayn] Yes, it is very sufficient. The Addis Ababa agreement has been mutually accepted and a cease-fire has been established. What remains is to hold the constitutional conference. I believe that there is a strong popular desire represented in nearly 70 parties and

unions, as well as the armed forces, that support and back up the peace steps. This in itself is a strong guarantee for peace and for obstructing any endeavor to set back its course.

Relations With Neighboring Countries

[AL-DUSTUR] Chad has launched a campaign accusing Sudan of being behind the abortive coup to which Hissein Habre's regime was exposed. Where is the truth?

[Husayn] How can Sudan, which is seeking peace and good-neighbor relations and which is preoccupied with its urgent internal and external problems, turn its thoughts and its planning and consume its time and effort in such matters that constitute open intervention in another country's affairs! Sudan has repeatedly tried to shield itself from the ramifications of the [inter-] Chadian conflicts on its territories, considering that they undermine its sovereignty. Regrettably, the conflicts turned into acts of armed looting by the [Chadian] tribes in Darfur. We will not permit these false accusations to pass and to harm Sudan.

[AL-DUSTUR] Has the problem of the presence of Ibn 'Umar's Chadian Forces in Darfur ended?

[Husayn] Yes. Iraq has played a role in bringing reconciliation between President Hissein Habre and Ibn 'Umar to a successful conclusion. Ibn 'Umar is now a minister in the cabinet.

[AL-DUSTUR] Where does the conflict between Sudan and Kenya lie? Is it because Kenya, in cooperation with Israel, supports Garang, as the minister of defense has said, or is it because Kenya has stripped away Elimi region from Sudan?

[Husayn] In my capacity as chairman of the Ministerial Peace Committee, I will not touch on the popular movement's relationship with Kenya, especially since I had been scheduled to visit Kenya within the framework of the peace process and since they have declined. Generally, it is not by choice that our borders with eight countries are open. Official maps of our borders and of the neighbors' borders deposited with the OAU and the United Nations confirm our right to the Sudanese region of Elimi which is reported to contain oil in its land. But after receiving propaganda pamphlets, distributed by Kenya to tourist companies, containing false maps that transfer Elimi to within Kenya's borders, our embassy in Kenya held a press conference to clarify the dimensions of the issue. But Kenya deported them [embassy staff]. The problem developed between us as a result of this.

Army Memorandum

[AL-DUSTUR] Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has reformulated the relationship between the Armed Forces and the government. What are the features of this formula?

[Husayn] Within the framework of expanding the vessels of political participation in the government in order to bring in the unionist and political forces that are not included in the current government's parliamentary balances, we had to take the Armed Forces into account, considering that they are a genuine national faction. This is why al-Sadiq al-Mahdi proposed expanding the Higher Defense Council so as to explore the Armed Forces' views on the government's tendencies and policies, in order that the council may include a number of the ministers concerned for the purpose of consultation and in order that data, information and facts may be presented within this framework. This [expansion] requires a new law. There is no contradiction in this formula. As to the contradiction depicted by some press articles in connection with the Armed Forces memorandum to the State Council chairman, this memorandum amounted to no more than support and backing for and alignment with the people's demands and it was not an ultimatum, a threat, or an intervention in government.

[AL-DUSTUR] Is the government thinking of altering or correcting a number of positions and decisions which Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the Islamic Front leader, made when he held the position of attorney general and foreign minister, especially the preventive detention law, the dismissal of some diplomats, and the recognition of the Afghan Mujahidun government?

[Husayn] The preventive detention law will be enforced only against currency dealers and against those who horde and smuggle the people's food. It will not be used against the opposition or to repress liberties. We are now reviewing the list of [dismissed] diplomats to correct the mistakes unjustifiably made against some of them. The same goes for the Afghan Mujahidun government, which lacks the mainstays of a government while the Kabul Government continues to exercise its legitimate powers.

Armed Militias

[AL-DUSTUR] Is there common conviction among the political factions participating in the government on abolishing the military militias of some parties?

[Husayn] To date, it hasn't been really proven to us decisively that there are armed militias under the command of any specific political circle. The talk about such militias is completely appropriate insofar as the West Sudan tribes are concerned. Each of these tribes, whether in Kordofan or Darfur, has—as a result of the security troubles, of the armed looting, and of the absence of capable security agencies—armed some of its men to defend itself or, at times, to raid other tribes. This is the real armed presence. As for organized militias operating under the command and leadership of a certain political circle, I can say that they do not exist.

[AL-DUSTUR] Is consideration being given to reexamining the proliferation of weapons among the tribes, especially since Sudan is approaching the peace phase?

[Husayn] This process [of proliferation] is always subject to the security forces' presence. The more concerted the security forces' efforts, the more possible it is to uproot these negative phenomena. We are seeking peace now. With termination of the armed struggle in the South, we can disarm these tribes and eliminate the reason for the presence of the arms.

[AL-DUSTUR] What degree of success has the international operation to aid the victims of war and starvation in South Sudan achieved?

[Husayn] For the aid issue, there is a higher ministerial committee which is headed by the prime minister and in which I am a member. But it is my belief that the operation has not been conducted in a good and satisfactory manner. This operation has actually accomplished 80 percent of its task by transporting nearly 120,000 tons of food and aid supplies to the South before the onset of the rainy season.

[AL-DUSTUR] Are there fears that the aid shipments will go to Garang and that they will be exploited to win tribes over by being used as a weapon to starve the citizens in the South?

[Husayn] Aid is distributed in areas controlled by Garang and areas controlled by the government. The United Nations supervises the aid through a special envoy who represents it in this matter. UN supervision is definitely present. The donors themselves will not accept supervision by any other party.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is the IMF's position now, especially since your relationship with it has been tense?

[Husayn] There is now a government moving on the right path. Our debts are inherited debts amounting to \$12 billion or \$13 billion. They are not that big when compared with the debts of other countries.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is your role in solving this problem?

[Husayn] Stability is the most significant element Sudan lacks to make its progress. The first crossing point on this path lies in ending this bloody war in the south.

[AL-DUSTUR] What are the guarantees that this government will continue, especially in light of the experience of the coalition with the Ummah Party and the Islamic Front?

[Husayn] Sudan, with its parties, unions, and forces, is the government's support and the guarantee of its survival. Moreover, the peace agreement is one of the best guarantees of the current government's survival. We are now moving on this path and we are extremely optimistic that we will catch up with the stability, progress, and national unity opportunities that we have missed.

[AL-DUSTUR] When will al-Sadiq al-Mahdi visit Cairo?

[Husayn] There are matters which I do not wish to discuss in the media. But you may expect in the near future initiatives and developments that call for great optimism.

Government Reports Differ on Darfur Violence
45040358b London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
29 May 89 pp 17-19

[Article by al-Safi Musa: "Darfur Pays Price of Libya's and Chad's Intervention"]

[Excerpts] Khartoum—[Passage omitted] Observers believe that tribal coalitions and, consequently, the "tribal state" to which Chad has become accustomed by virtue of the Libyan interventions will be, if they have not already been, transmitted to Darfur Province to turn this province into an arena for the presence of a pro-Libya circle which Libya will use in its conflict with Chad. The observers also believe that the reason for the deteriorating and worsening security conditions in Darfur Province is the presence of foreign strategies embraced by ruling Sudanese parties so that they may pay for old bills by overlooking the developments and the presence of armed foreign elements in the province. These parties had repeatedly denied the presence of armed foreign elements in the province until irrefutable evidence materialized and forced them to acknowledge this presence in Darfur Province. Speaking about this presence, a province official said in an interview with AL-DUSTUR more than 2 years ago that it had become like a gunpowder keg waiting to be ignited. This warning by that official was the cause for his dismissal from his leadership position. The warning even had its ramifications for the entire region because the administrative crew which had experience with the region and with the nature of its problems was transferred to other regions. [passage omitted]

The current developments confirm that the strategy that had been plotted externally to be implemented by local circles has entered a delicate phase, considering that most parts of the province have flared up and have even seen, according to the news reports, the movement of large numbers of armed elements from Kordofan Province, which is adjacent to Darfur, to aid their kinsmen because of the tribal conflict and the foreign presence.

The intensifying developments in Darfur Province compelled al-Tijani al-Sisi, the provincial governor, to call the government in Khartoum by phone and ask for urgent help. The conditions, according to the governor, had gone beyond the scope of local control. This is what motivated the government to dispatch on the 19th of this month a ministerial delegation headed by Mubarak al-Fadil, the minister of interior, to find out the dimensions of the developments. The delegation, which included a number of high-ranking Armed Forces and

security forces commanders, stayed 3 days during which it observed developments and gathered details. On the 22d of this month, the Council of Ministers issued a statement in which it said that there are "some facts" which the delegation deemed necessary to clarify to the public opinion, namely that the area's tribes had lived in harmony and peace for a long time, that the provocations between the tribes started because of pasture and water, that Chad has exploited this tension to serve its own purposes, that it has begun to nurture the conflict materially and morally, and that the Chadian war has had a negative impact on security in Darfur.

The statement pointed out that the recent incidents occurred in the towns of Zalingei and (Wikas) where tribal groups supported by Chadian groups attacked a number of al-Fur villages. The victims from both sides amounted to 453 killed and 123 wounded. Seven policemen were also martyred.

The statement stressed that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi will visit the province this month. However, all the signs show that he will not be able to make the visit, especially since he paid the province last fall a visit which he was compelled to cut short for, it was said, security reasons.

Within the context of the Darfur developments, Dr Faruq Ahmad Adam, member of the Democratic Unionist Party Political Bureau and member of the Constituent Assembly representing Darfur Province, has made statements saying that the clashes in Darfur are due to tribal reasons. But political circles have interfered in the conflict and have supported it militarily and at the partisan level with the help of foreign circles who have compatible interests in evicting some of Darfur's tribes so as to resettle their citizens with the purpose of serving certain political and election objectives. Dr Adam noted that what is happening in Darfur is a scheme in which foreign and local circles participate. He criticized the statement of the ministerial committee headed by the minister of interior and said that the figures cited in the statement are not correct, noting that the losses resulting from the recent Darfur incidents amount to 1,000 killed, 500 wounded, tens of thousands displaced and tens of villages burnt. Dr Adam also said that party militias from Kordofan Province intervened in Darfur's tribal conflict. AL-MAYDAN, a Sudanese newspaper, also reported that elements from the Islamic Front assassinated an administrator in (Shortay). It has also been circulated that the front issued a leaflet declaring the bloodshed in Fur lawful on the grounds that Garang forces train the Fur [tribes] in Jabal Marrah. A group from the front also attacked and burned the residence of Ahmad Ibrahim Durayj, the former governor of Darfur Province. [passage omitted]

Parliamentary Deputy 'Abdullah Ahmad Adam has said that military concentrations supported by Libya are now present in Wadi Salih area of Darfur Province and that

the Chadian opposition played a large part in the Darfur incidents, especially in Nyala area where more than 90,000 refugees from the various Chadian factions exist. [passage omitted]

Government Parties Blame Al-Mahdi for Darfur Violence

45040368a Khartoum AL-RAYAH in Arabic
21 May 89 p 2

[Article by Muhammad Taha Muhammad Ahmad: "Garden' Parties Continue Their Attack on Ummah Party Because of Militias"]

[Text] In the preceding article, we said that the Ummah Party's coalition partners in the United National Front government are tightening the siege of this party and want to defeat it again, after having driven it to form the United National Front government, which has adopted the program of the Unionists and has given a share in power to the political parties friendly to the Unionists, such as the Communists and the bloc of African parties.

The Ummah Party has not succeeded in restoring trust between it and the Democratic Unionist Party, between it and the Communists, or between it and the bloc of African parties. It has been completely unable to win any of these parties over to its alignment, even though this alignment has produced a return to the government of the two Sayyids.

Lacking trust in al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the "parties of 'Ali al-Mirghani's garden" have refused to disband their alliance. The Communists have not forgotten that the Ummah Party left the National Grouping without excuse and allied itself with the Islamic Front. The Unionists have not forgotten that they were expelled from power after the increases in prices of essential commodities. They were fired from ministries and from regional governments, even though they wanted to broaden the government, not leave it.

The "garden" parties do not consider their current presence in the government to be a favor from al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. They consider it to be a result of their efforts and struggles and of their power to influence the events of politics.

Today, the "garden" parties are besieging al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to work for the dissolution of the militias that he is accused of having formed and armed.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's problem lies in the fact his party has been penetrated. Thus, a prominent leader like Dr Adam Madbo, a member of the Ummah Party General Secretariat, is shooting at the leader of his party the same arrows that others are shooting—the same arrows as the "garden" parties.

Dr Madbo said to AL-AYYAM (Tuesday, 16 May 1989), "Some politicians are attempting to arm certain Sudanese border tribes, thereby threatening the security and stability of the Darfur Region. The arming of these tribes raises doubts among other tribes in Darfur and may force them to contact other quarters in order to obtain weapons to protect their lives and property." Dr Madbo warned that the Chadian conflict might spread into a Sudanese-Chadian conflict or a Sudanese-Sudanese conflict. This would lead some tribes to seek aid from the Chadian Government or Garang's forces. He called on the government and officials to make certain that the relevant agencies were adhering to implementation of the announced policy.

If the Unionists, Communists, and Ba'thists accuse al-Sadiq al-Mahdi of fanning the flames of tribal conflict in Darfur and of arming militias subject to him, their proof for the charge lies in Dr Madbo's statements—Madbo being a prominent leader in al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's own party. The "garden" parties will say, "A witness from their own kin has testified."

A delegation of Unionists is going to go to Darfur. It will be led by Ahmad Sa'd 'Umar, the grandson of 'Ali Dinar, the sultan of the Fur, and by al-Hardallu, minister of state in the Interior Ministry. At the same time, people from Darfur in the national capital are organizing a large political gathering to discuss the steps required to halt the deterioration of security in Darfur.

Unionist Deputy Faruq Ahmad has already stood before the Constituent Assembly and said that he was challenging the prime minister to visit Darfur. He said that Darfur citizens had previously received the prime minister with stones and that a rock-throwing outburst had broken out in Darfur. The Unionists say that the outburst broke out because the Ummah Party has sold the region in return for party interests and foreign connections.

Even the small parties that al-Sadiq agreed to bring into the National Front government, such as the Sudanese National Party, have raised the banners of revolt and have said that arming the militias is very harmful to their region.

The lead article in the Tuesday, 16 May 1989 edition of the newspaper AL-ADWA' carried the headline, "Minister Threatens To Resign Because of Militias." In the details of the article, the newspaper said that "the militias question in the western Sudan threatens to divide the government. AL-ADWA's sources say that the disagreements will make their way into the government when the Popular Defense Law is submitted to the Council of Ministers. The Democratic Unionist Party opposes the law, and, with some other parties, is presenting reservations about it."

Against this background, reports from western Sudan say that the zone of the militias has expanded in a menacing way that threatens security. Another development in the militias question is a certain minister's threatened resignation in protest over government disregard of this critical matter. The minister, who has entered the ministry for the first time and is his party's only representative, said that if the militias question was allowed to grow in this way, it would threaten national unity, as well as threatening his region, which had recently become a stage for such incidents. In order to prevent the government's becoming divided over the question, a summit meeting is expected between leading personalities of the government; decisive resolutions are expected to be taken on the matter.

It is Muhammad Hammad Kuwwah who is threatening to resign because the militias are threatening his people, the Nuba.

The "garden" parties, both large and small, accuse al-Sadiq al-Mahdi of arming the militias for party reasons, and not to resist Garang. Otherwise, why are his militias being armed in Darfur, when the danger of Garang is far from there?

The party militias are threatening the United National Front government with destruction. The matter is not limited to an opposition led by the "garden" parties. No, there is a foreign dimension. Here is what AL-ADWA' has written (Thursday, 18 May 1989): "The American ambassador has discussed with the government and the opposition the question of the militias, especially in western Sudan."

MB Secretary Views Internal Issues, Shari'ah
45040348 Cairo AL-I'TISAM in Arabic
May 89 pp 22-25

[Interview with Dr al-Habr Yusuf Nur-al-Da'im, General Secretary of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan, by Salah 'Abd-al-Maqsud; in Khartoum, date not given; first six paragraphs are AL-I'TISAM introduction]

[Text] When I visited the Sudan recently, I saw that the Muslim Brotherhood [MB], whose activity is legally prohibited north of the Nile Valley, exists legally in the south of the valley. I found, raised over hundreds of branches in the Sudan, signs that brutal authorities have removed from over 4,800 branches in Egypt.

MB general headquarters teems with visitors from all over the Sudan—young people and old, Arabs and non-Arabs, in love, friendship, and mercy. The Tuesday talk is attended by a large number of people who flock to it from everywhere.

"Muslim Sisterhood" is a sign raised over many houses to which women and girls go to learn their religion and how to succeed in their homes and in serving their communities.

Kindergartens, medical clinics, charitable associations—all these are fields that the MB has entered there and in which the brothers have offered what they can in service to their country and people. In fact, many of the charitable organizations that the MB founded and sustained have now begun to extend the hand of assistance to Muslims in many African countries. Contrast this with many of the Sudanese political parties, which have been preoccupied with partisan struggle, fighting among themselves, and the pursuit of personal gains.

Also noteworthy is the fact that there are many plans and hopes, which the MB entertains and the Sudan needs, that are hampered by lack of funds, for the MB is a sector of a people suffering from poverty and need. Nevertheless, they take part of their sustenance and their children's sustenance to spend for the sake of God.

Current problems on the Sudanese scene are many and complex. We have chosen a few of them on which to investigate the MB view. For this purpose, we met in this interview with His Excellency, Professor Dr al-Habr Nur-al-Da'im, the general secretary of the MB in the Sudan. He was chosen by the MB to succeed Dr Hasan al-Turabi in 1979.

[AL-I'TISAM] Undoubtedly, there are problems that now absorb your interest, whether at the level of the organization's internal structure or at the level of Sudanese society. What are the most important of these problems?

[Nur-al-Da'im] Our interest is directed in two directions. The first is the educational and training direction for ourselves and the members of our organization. This month we started an educational training camp attended by a large number of our working brothers. We use such occasions to fuse the organization together in an intellectual melting pot with a single framework, even though this is as extensive as the Islamic call itself. It is also an opportunity for the leadership to make a give-and-take contact with the base, creating mutual confidence and connection, and exchanging advice and recommendations. The other direction that absorbs our interest is our broad Sudanese society, which is surrounded by many problems and affected by enormous difficulties. You see it now boiling like a kettle on the fire. We are trying with others to exert efforts to overcome some of these difficulties and obstacles.

Naturally, Muslim Brothers have a comprehensive intellectual point of view on the basis of which they try to put forward their ideas for solving problems. They have views and positions that they spread in their sermons, studies, articles, and statements. Perhaps the most recent statement was the one that the organization's political office issued about the Armed Forces' note to the ruling political authority concerning deteriorating conditions in the country, the problem of the South and the worsening security conditions, the economic problem and grinding inflation, the partisan fighting that has led to an

unravelling of the internal front, the lowering of ethical standards, the proliferation of social diseases such as favoritism and bribery, etc.—all these loathsome and widespread sicknesses.

Shari'ah Issue

[AL-I'TISAM] The chairman of the Legislation Committee of the Constituent Assembly stated that the committee had finished reviewing the Shari'ah laws and expected to submit them so that the assembly could make a decision about them. Do you think the government is really serious about steps to apply the Islamic Shari'ah?

[Nur-al-Da'im] If the government were serious about applying the law of God (may He be exalted), we would see it in serious reform measures in the area of educational curricula and methods. If the government were serious about applying the law of God, we would see it clearly in what is presented in the radio, press, and television media. As is well known, God's law is not embodied only in the penal code. People are contending and debating only in this narrow field, which, whatever its importance, represents a truncated view of Islam and the Muslim cause. One need only realize that we have not yet agreed on the sources of legislation and on the fundamental principles of rules. In the absence of the comprehensive, broad view that the MB has continually propagated, in the absence of a fitting model in the area of public activity, and given the disintegration, fragmentation, and conflict that lead to failure and lost effort, as well as the lying, deceit, hypocrisy, and lack of truth with God, oneself, and others, there is no hope of establishing the law of God. God's law demands first of all sincerity of attitude, devotion to God, and freedom from selfish interests and desires. It demands incisive resolve, strong will, generous sacrifice, and pure altruism. These are qualities completely absent from the scene. Everyone, except those upon whom God has mercy, looks only at himself and under his own feet. Their current slogan is, "Myself, myself!" It is a slogan that does not set a country aright. It does not serve a cause. It does not actualize a law. The law of God is too great and sublime to be realized by a worthless person—to use the expression of our martyred brother, Sayyid Qutb, may God make his face to be bright!

Time Bomb

[AL-I'TISAM] The problem of the South and the fall of some cities into rebel hands may perhaps be considered one of the most dangerous land mines on the path of the Sudan. From your point of view, what are the reasons for this problem? How do you envision its solution?

[Nur-al-Da'im] The problem of the South is one of the problems that colonialism planted before leaving the country, knowing that it was a time bomb that would explode some day. Operating by a divide-and-conquer

policy, colonialism divided the people of a single homeland and made the South a closed area to which northerners—people of the same country—were allowed access only with permission and a license. In the process, it stirred up bitter feelings. It suggested to southerners that northerners wanted to make them articles to be bought and sold. For their part, the northerners did not work to remove the rancor from southerners' hearts. Some northerners even made the situation worse and mistreated southerners. They used unacceptable, wounding expressions, thus alienating southerners' hearts. During the fifties, the problem was one of a limited internal rebellion with simple demands. Now, however, the problem has become so complicated that it has more twists than a lizard's tail. It has an international dimension. John Garang now gets assistance in military and technical training and advanced modern weapons from East and West, from the World and African Council of Churches, and from Israel, Cuba, and North Korea. Some people inside the country have come to see him not as a rebel, an outlaw spilling innocent blood, burning villages, plundering wealth, raping women, wreaking havoc through the land, and destroying civilization, but as a national hero, rather than a traitor and hireling. Despite its importance, diplomatic activity by itself will be of no use in solving this problem. It is not enough for us to talk about it and show the outside world that he is a criminal aggressor. There must be deterrent military action to preserve the respect of the country and people's right to live in safety. For such action to succeed, the internal front must be united and stand shoulder to shoulder behind the Sudanese Armed Forces, so that they receive the appropriate moral support. The Armed Forces must be given the weapons to repulse rebel attacks supported from various parts of the world. The rebels no longer want to avert a wrong being done to the South; rather, they want to change the religious face of the country. "They will not cease to fight with you, till they turn you from your religion, if they are able; and whosoever of you turns from his religion, and dies disbelieving—their works have failed in this world and the next; those are the inhabitants of the Fire; therein they shall dwell forever" [Qur'an 2:217].

Form of Government

[AL-I'TISAM] The current conflict between the civilian and military institutions—can it end? Can the Sudan arrive at a compromise formula for government that will prevent the return of dictatorship and yet produce a strong government able to confront accumulated problems?

[Nur-al-Da'im] As is well known, the Sudan has passed through many experiments in government since its independence in 1956. All of them have turned in a vicious circle—democratic government, terminated by military rule, ending in violent popular revolution, followed by a new democratic government. People are now looking for a formula that allows them to avoid military government, with its power and mastery, coerciveness and

despotism, and at the same time avoid democratic government, with its softness, lack of discipline, disorderliness, and inability to make decisions that are carried out or undertake beneficial treatment. I think such a form has no existence in our current state of affairs. It is the Islamic form [of government] for which we yearn—that form which maintains order, so that there is no disorderliness and disturbance, but rather order and firm control, with ready obedience to those in authority, that form which preserves the citizens' right to a free, honorable life, without injustice and oppression, and without wrongdoing or repression by those in power. Undoubtedly, this is an ideal form. It requires of whoever would seek it that he follow the only path to it—by education and indoctrination, training and implementation. "That is God's guidance; He guides by it whom He will of his servants" [Qur'an 6:88]. We conclude our case by saying, "Praise belongs to God, the Lord of all Being" [Qur'an 1:1].

Council Member Praises Socioeconomic Results of Cease-Fire

45040376B Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic
25 May 89 p 8

[Interview with Dr Toby Maduot Parek, Southern Council member, by Najah 'Abd-al-Salam: "Truce Month Has Produced a Situation Citizens Hope Will Last Forever"; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Today's morning interview is with Dr Toby Maduot, Southern Council member and regional minister of health and relief. In it, we deal with the truce period and the positive results it has produced for operations areas, as well as the progress of relief efforts through [Operation] Life Line.

Bright Page

[Maduot] This cease-fire period, coupled with the continuation of the relief program, constitutes a new, bright page, following the tension that has gripped the South because of the war and the deterioration of security, economic, and social conditions. After the government, the movement, and the United Nations agreed on a cease-fire, relief began reaching remote southern areas on a regular basis. Air traffic became regular. It became possible to make direct contact. Reports began to arrive about the condition of citizens there. Many traders and businessmen expressed a desire to return to work and carry on their jobs there. The availability of means of communication and the regularization of transportation caused a resurgence of life in many areas, such as Gogrial, Tonj, and Bahr al-Ghazal. Many refugees returned to their areas and resumed their normal life.

What After 'Life Line'?

[AL-AYYAM] What about the distribution of relief to the various areas of the South after the completion of Operation Life Line?

[Maduot] In each area, special committees will be formed, under the supervision of the responsible governor and a representative of the United Nations, to program distribution and prevent shortages and imbalances in distribution.

[AL-AYYAM] Looking ahead, Dr Maduot said that they are worried about the rainy season and the obstacles it will cause—cutting means of communication and isolating areas such as North Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes Province, Upper Nile, Equatoria, Kapoeta, and Torit. Even worse, in the opinion of the regional health minister, the coming of the rainy season will create alarm among citizens. They will have misgivings about whether relief supplies will be able to reach their areas. This will lead them to consider migrating to escape possible famine in the rainy season. This makes it necessary to indoctrinate citizens and reassure them. At the same time, an effort must be made to provide the food and medicine they need, before the critical period comes.

What After the End of the Truce?

[Maduot] The real desire of every citizen is for the fire of this war to die out forever. During this brief period, citizens have enjoyed stability and quiet. Food, medical care, and clean drinking water have been available. People coming from Juba and Malakal talk about the improvement of living, social, and health conditions in those areas. We are now trying to establish projects and plans to save the health situation in the South in cooperation with the central government and international organizations. These plans embrace the major cities and remote villages. We are using this opportunity to obtain information for all areas about the health situation and all the obstacles that face citizens' lives in the fields of herding, farming, and stock-raising, and to learn their food supply needs. A comprehensive program has been laid out in cooperation with the Central Ministry of Health to determine the needs of southern hospitals. Agreement has been reached with a number of international organizations to provide the medicines, vaccines, and ambulances needed to confront emergencies.

Migrants

[AL-AYYAM] Concerning the condition of migrants to the north, who number about 2 million, Dr Maduot said that these migrants, who are concentrated in the capital, the central region, and the West, are in extreme need of immediate programs in the areas of food, medical treatment, and education. They need job training projects. He added that the Southern Council has prepared an integrated program. A committee has been formed to discuss all these issues. Among its members, it includes the minister of social welfare and the regional minister of education. This committee has established plans and projects for housing in Kosti, Kordofan, Darfur, Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile. "We are also thinking about establishing cooperatives for these migrants in the areas where they are presently located."

At the conclusion of this interview, Dr Toby Maduot, the regional minister of health and relief, urged everyone to work to strengthen the foundations of peace, so that stability and growth will return, not only to the southern region, but to Sudanese society as a whole, after the effects of war have extended to all its parts and shaken its stability.

DUP Leader on Factionalism, Controversial Positions

45040375 Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic
21 May 89 p 5

[Interview with al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin al-Hindi, DUP general secretary, by Idris Hasan: "I Am Not a Rebel Against the Party; No Disagreement Between Me and Muhammad 'Uthman [al-Mirghani]"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [AL-AYYAM] People have said that you are a rebel against the existing political situation. They say that you do not want to contribute to it and that you are trying to put obstacles in its course, both as regards the general political framework and within the political institution to which you belong.

[Al-Hindi] I am not a rebel against the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP], for a simple reason: The DUP, with its history and its natural large size, is far removed from the disfigurements of sickness and swelling. With its luminous patriotic history, which has never been sullied by a blemish, and with its experienced and genuine thinking, which has not been affected by all the charges and rumors or stained by imported and intrusive opinions and ideas—that is the DUP in which we place our hopes. It is the party that we desire, but that has not yet been realized.

We are all trying now to unify the DUP's being in regard to point of departure and goals, so that we can reshape its being on its broad base—a base that possesses organization, indoctrination, and mobilization. The statements now being issued in my name and in the name of others here and there are nothing but cries to rally that broad base and to awaken the popular will that believes in the Unionists' principles and goals. The road leading to realization of those goals has surpassed the institution itself. It is now taking place through conferences and discussions that the base is organizing. In some cases, these are apart from the framework of the institution, since the base desires to find the effective, strong organization that will achieve its hopes and aspirations in the future that it seeks. When that takes place, the party will have come to represent a real existence on the national scene, an existence in immediate contact with the problems of Sudanese reality. This is the reality toward which we strive. We are looking for it, so that we can make the party an entity that interacts with national issues and the problems of the masses.

Party Exists and Does Not Exist

[AL-AYYAM] Does this mean that, according to what you say, the DUP does not exist and that what you see others do not see?

[Al-Hindi] Institutional organization is a vital, pressing necessity for every entity, so that it can grow and develop. But in an institution like the DUP, which embraces many sectors and numerous social divisions with divergent thinking and attitudes, each of these divisions will inevitably have its own concept and its own method for awakening the organization from the base to the summit in the way it deems best and by the method that suits it. This does not necessarily mean that there is disagreement about the essence of the organization issue. There is only a difference in visions, resulting from the kind of make-up to which I have referred. It is a disagreement that does not involve essential principles, goals, or ends. What is required is technical coordination so that organization will exist in a political establishment like the DUP—one that in general includes the forces of the middle in the country.

Naturally, many difficulties confront the reaching of this goal. These can be overcome only through direct meetings with the popular grass roots and entering into exhaustive discussions with them—which may take a long or short time. In this way, the base will become convinced about the proposals the leaders are making about the desired organization. This is what we are now doing.

Effective Participation Does Not Exist

Perhaps someone has asked whether the DUP now is in complete existence and participates effectively in the existing situation on the political scene. I would say—and I say it with all clarity, frankness, and objectivity—no. This is because the DUP was the last of those that returned to the political scene after April, following an absence lasting more than 16 years. I say this because the party's meetings with its masses have not yet been completed—to say nothing of the fact that most of the present political universe is filled with many mass bases that occupy an wide area. These have their own new contributions to political activity, contributions that differ from traditional models. These groups were born and developed in the period between 1969 and 1985 and equal more than 70 percent of the country's population. Naturally, this is a vast, great volume. One must meet with it, and the ideas and viewpoints of its adherents must be listened to, so that these groups can make an informed and conscious contribution to the required organization. Furthermore, these bases have their own problems and aspirations—for example, the great increase in numbers of students, professionals, and government employees. [passage omitted]

Why Unionists Did Not Hold Their Convention

[AL-AYYAM] Did the fact that the DUP's general convention did not take place prevent the party organization from assuming its desired shape? What difficulties prevented the general convention from meeting?

[Al-Hindi] I believe that any sincere national activity is inevitably confronted by many difficulties. In a large, vast country like the Sudan there are many transportation and communications difficulties, requiring that large material resources be available to link party committees in different regions to general headquarters. This is something that has not yet been sufficiently provided for. Also, the lack of a party presence throughout the years of the previous regime has caused activity to be confronted with great difficulties and to take place in an agonizing atmosphere because of normal and abnormal factors. In addition, lots of problems and issues of everyday life have not been solved, as we all know. These have added a great burden to people's daily lives. Naturally, this has reduced their ability to be active and has hindered the efforts they have been able to make.

Therefore, party conferences are of two kinds: conferences for quantity and conferences for quality. The attempt to unite quantity and quality was what led to not holding the general convention. This is because the convention we are calling for is a convention that we want to flow really from the popular bases. Thus, these bases will be connected to party decisions and positions, not merely from a commitment of politeness, but from real participation linked to the consciousness of every individual of the party. Every individual will therefore defend these programs and plans with sincerity and do all he can to make them succeed. This is what I meant by a quality convention. Quantity conventions, on the other hand, are ones where people are packed in, but where the ruling elite alone lays down the party's programs and resolutions. We certainly do not want our convention to be of this kind. If it is, we shall have wasted time and money.

Unionists' Unity Like a Kernel; Split, It Won't Sprout

[AL-AYYAM] Because of your positions, you are accused of trying to cause division between Unionist factions. What do you say?

[Al-Hindi] I originated the famous saying, "The Unionists' unity is like a kernel; if it is split, it won't sprout." This charge is not true. It merely expresses the wishes of biased individuals whose inclinations and purposes have led them to such allegations that are unsupported by logic and do not rest on fact. Of all people, I am the one most concerned about the DUP's unity. In all honesty, I can affirm that there is no disagreement between DUP party leader Mr Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani and myself. He is distinguished by a clear vision of the party. In this we agree. Neither of us has any personal objectives or ambitions.

For my part, I wonder what motives could make me try to cause such a division. My real position is clear; there is no confusion or obscurity in it. It is so clear that no two people could differ about it. It is like the sunlight; only a blind man would deny it. I believe the charge is the work of people who do not know. They are people whom we are always inviting to meet, so as not to differ with them about anything related to the welfare of the party and the country; but they have always preferred to sit on the sidelines or on the fence. Such people have caused much of the hardship the country is experiencing and many of the dangers that target it—dangers that have begun to penetrate from its extremities to its heart, as if they were traversing a void in which there was no barrier.

When we talk about this and about those who constitute dangers to the progress of the country, we ask people to arm themselves with caution and beware of heedlessness. These dangers can be overcome only by uniting patriotic ranks in a single, united national front—and the DUP is part of this entity. If it weakens, it will cause weakness in the entire building. We therefore believe with full conviction that our unity is part of comprehensive national unity, without which it is impossible to solve government problems, economic problems, and problems of war, security, and stability.

Masiriyah Leaders, SCP Clarify Status of Tribe's Militia

45040370 Khartoum AL-MAYDAN in Arabic
24 May 89 p 2

[Interview with Masiriyah leaders, by unnamed interviewer for Voice of the West: "Masiriyah Leaders Say They Have 'Travelling Patrols' of Between 50 and 1,000 Men, Not Militias"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are AL-MAYDAN introduction]

[Text] The Sudanese Communist Party [SCP] has clear and announced positions on all national issues. Nevertheless, well-known quarters attempt to distort the facts, aiming at isolating and encircling the party. This is an unattainable dream. All the noise of the May regime's media failed to realize it, and the media of the [National] Islamic Front and its allies will join them.

One of the issues affected by this intentional distortion is the party's position on tribal conflicts. The party has been accused of hostility to the Masiriyah tribe. Because this charge has fooled many members of the tribe, we made an effort to meet its leaders and talk with them. The discussion lasted many hours. Today we are publishing the first part of it.

[Voice of the West] We have been seeking this meeting ever since our preparation for the conference on tribal clashes in October 1985. Major General Birmah Nasir, then a member of the Military Council, and the Dinka chief participated in the conference. The Masiriyah did not participate. We again contacted the head of the Union of Sons of the Masiriyah, Dr 'Ali Za'id, to

participate in another conference, but he did not attend. We made several appointments with Mr 'Abd-al-Rasul al-Nur, minister of state in the Ministry of Industry, but they never took place. At the discussion, "Where Is the Movement of the People of the West Heading?" we met Mr al-Harikah 'Izz-al-Din, a leader of the Blue Masiriyah, and we continued trying until we succeeded in arranging this meeting.

My intention in this introduction has been to clarify the position, since we have received information saying that we, as a party and newspaper, are intentionally hostile to the Masiriyah. This is untrue. We were the first political force to support the Union of Sons of the Masiriyah after its formation and to support its bold stands against the national administration during the sixties. To this day, we support their just claims.

[Sabahi] We welcome you and are following what you are doing. We have been expecting to be contacted for a long time. This is the first time there has been official contact with us as a union of the Masiriyah. We have met and decided to accept. We are sensitive about dealing with the SCP, because it has sided with the rebellion and does not want to hear our opinion. It has an announced position toward us as Masiriyah. It considers us to be merely Ummah Party militias engaged in killing citizens.

As an example of these positions, there is the conference that the Union of University Professors organized. A number of leftist professors spoke at it, attacking our tribe. Edward Lino also participated. AL-MAYDAN publishes the reports of the Abyei group and pays no attention to our reports—in fact, it refuses to publish any denial by us. This, despite the historic connection linking the SCP with our region. The party has long had a role in implanting consciousness in the region, so that Babanusah came to be a beacon of consciousness in the western Sudan—Numayri called it "the Moscow of the West."

As confirmation that we are not racists, Engineer Hashim Muhammad Ahmad, currently head of the Engineers' Union, held the position of cultural secretary of the Union of the Masiriyah, when he was working in Babanusah, even though he is not a member of the tribe.

In July 1971, dozens of members of the Masiriyah were arrested, but they did not retreat from their principles, in spite of prisons.

Frankly, the SCP had a clear vision, which made it attractive to the young people of the tribe. But its recent positions siding with the rebellion down the line have diminished its influence and even made many tribe members leave membership in it.

[Muhanna] This meeting is a healthy phenomenon—one of the democratic phenomena that our people must preserve. We have disagreements with the SCP and AL-MAYDAN newspaper. Even though we have our

recognized organizations (the union, the League of Western Region Intellectuals, and the League of al-Muglad and Environs), the newspaper publishes reports concerning us without consulting us.

The SCP has leaned to one side in the tribal conflict. Instead of calling for reconciliation, it has come to advocate fighting against us.

[Voice of the West] Following this introduction and clarification, we enter into a discussion aimed at bringing your view to light. Our positions will also become clear in the course of it. We begin with the fundamental question: Does the Masiriyah tribe have militias?

[Sabahi] What do you mean by militias?

[Voice of the West] An organized group that bears arms and uses them to implement tribal, party, or religious objectives.

[Sabahi] Militias, in this sense, do not exist in the Masiriyah region.

[Voice of the West] Then what are the "travelling patrols" [marahil]?

[Sabahi] Marahil, which is the plural of murhal, means "the road or route toward the Bahr al-'Arab [River]." Since the tribe is pastoral, it has travelling patrols. In December, they go toward the river. Since it is a dangerous region, all of us come together to search out the presence of rebels. In the past, we used to call it the "scouts," since they would search for a watering place and pasture. Now, however, they look for the location of the rebels. You can call them by whatever name you wish.

[Voice of the West] How many individuals are in each group?

[Sabahi] It depends on circumstances. They move groups between 50 and 1,000. Since we have to drink from the Bahr al-'Arab, we will attack anyone who stands in our way toward the water.

[Muhanna] This, of course, is because of the rebellion. Before the rebellion, the region was historically the scene of coexistence, as is well known.

[Voice of the West] But there are the notorious incidents that occurred during the sixties, such as the burning out of the Dinka in Babanusah.

[Sabahi] We used to live together with the Abyei Dinka and got to know them. Indeed, their chief, Majok Deng, won the seat of council chairman, against our chief, Babu Nimr, with the votes of the Masiriyah. Although the English tempted the Dinka chief to join Bahr al-Ghazal, he refused.

All the successive governments of the Sudan understood our problem as one of conflict over grazing land and avoided bringing up the question of racism and the rebellion.

Historically, we were not affected by the 1955 rebellion. Our problems with the Dinka began after September 1964, when they killed 23 Masiriyah merchants in Gogrial and carried off 9 women. When we returned to the Bahr al-'Arab in February 1965, they led a surprise attack on the flood plain of the [Bahr] al-'Arab for the length of 80 miles, killing 145 people in a single night.

Are these problems because of grazing land? Our cattle and the cattle of the Dinka do not graze together, because their cattle do not eat dry straw.

After this incident, there was a reaction by the women and children, and they burned out the Dinka in Babanusah.

[Muhanna] It was no ordinary killing. The bodies were mutilated, leaving the Masiriyah very embittered.

[Voice of the West] How was a solution to the problems reached?

[Sabahi] Yearly tribal conferences used to be held under the supervision of the chiefs, and the peace agreement used to satisfy all parties.

However, after the Addis Ababa agreement, the people of Abyei felt that they had been wronged in the distribution of offices in the south, and they began to raise problems again.

In 1972, the second attack on the Masiriyah took place. It resulted in 12 people killed. (I personally traveled to follow up the incident.)

[Voice of the West] There is a charge that says that al-Fatih Bisharah, at Numayri's directive, in one way or another helped support the "traveling parties" in confronting Garang.

[Muhanna] It was a tribe hostile to Numayri down the line. Even his notorious visit to Chevron was received with outcries. So the tribe could not have been helping, especially when Numayri's prisons, right up to the last minute, were packed with members of the Masiriyah.

[Voice of the West] Maj Gen Birmah's statements about arming the tribes raised a wave of reactions. Did Birmah participate in arming you?

[Sabahi] After the al-Qurdud attack, the Transitional Military Council sent Maj Gen Fadlallah Birmah to the area. Outcries greeted him in Kadugli, Babanusah, al-Muglad, demanding weapons or protection. He announced his support for arming the tribes.

[Muhanna] We were harmed by Birmah's talk of arming the tribes, because he did not carry out what he had said. Everyone—especially Garang—believed that he had armed us; so Garang concentrated his attacks against us, considering us to be enemies with lots of weapons.

[Voice of the West] Where did you get weapons?

[Sabahi] From the market and from the rebels.

Communist Party Organ Affirms Support for 'Socialist Democracy'

45040368B Khartoum AL-MAYDAN in Arabic
25 May 89 p 1

[Editorial: "On a Day Like This We Sing to Democracy and Lift Its Banners"]

[Text] On a day like this, 20 years ago, a coup was implemented that took place under the slogans of freedom and defense of the oppressed, but ended in a comprehensive system of subservience and grave injustice against the poor. It was a system whose fundamental character was total suppression of democracy and outrageous bloody repression of political opponents.

The establishment of the May regime was preceded and accompanied by theories justifying the tactics of a coup as a permissible path of liberation from the domination of reactionary classes and for social progress. These theories justified the suppression of democracy in the name of defending the revolution and revolutionary achievements.

We communists paid an enormous price because we did not struggle with sufficient resolve against those theories, refuting them, and eliminating them from within our party and the popular movement. This helped weaken the consciousness of revolutionary forces in confronting the May coup. It contributed to falling into grave errors during the initial period of its rule, especially as regards democracy. We have publicly and sincerely criticized these errors many times during the past 20 years. We have stood resolutely against any manifestation of the coup mentality and against any rationalization of the suppression of democracy.

Long before the popular uprising, we struggled in the front ranks for democracy. After the uprising, we were again in the front ranks, holding to and defending democracy as a system of government and as rights and freedoms for groups and individuals. We affirmed and continue to affirm that we stand completely on the ground of democracy. Under conditions of the domination of capital and quasifeudalism, this means bourgeois liberal democracy.

We communists believe that socialist democracy is higher and richer than bourgeois democracy; however, it does not cancel it, but completes and develops it. We therefore welcome the fact that in Moscow on this day,

25 May 1989, the conference of people's deputies is being held after democratic elections. It is a great event that inaugurates a new age that will remove the tarnish and disfigurement from the face of socialist democracy.

However, as we follow the events of these days, we consider the declaration of a state of emergency in China and the summoning of the Army to confront the demands of worker and student demonstrations to be a negative matter. We also consider as negative the liquidation in Ethiopia of officers and soldiers who demanded democratic reforms.

Democracy is a basic necessity for man and for human activity, both in advanced and backward countries.

Supply Investigator Describes Obstacles to Enforcement

45040376a Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic
21 May 89 p 8

[Interview with Police Brigadier General 'Izz-al-Din Ghandur, director of the Supply Investigation Department, by Shakir 'Uthman: "Supply Investigation Department and Its Limited Abilities To Combat Black Market"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are AL-AYYAM introduction]

[Text] The Supply Investigation Force was supposed to play a large role in controlling commodity movement, regulating markets, and preventing prices' getting out of hand. However, citizens have seen no trace of this role. The black market has remained the dominant and most powerful influence, and with it all official presence has vanished.

What has paralyzed the Supply Investigation Department? What has made its role vanish? How has the black market been able to overpower it? In fact, as the prime minister has more than once admitted, the black market has defeated the entire government. This and other matters were the subject of our conversation with Police Brigadier General 'Izz-al-Din Ghandur, director of the Supply Investigation Department.

[AL-AYYAM] What is the role of the [Ministry of] Supply?

[Ghandur] The Supply Investigation Department, as a special force, was founded recently. Under the order establishing it, it was assigned the task of imposing surveillance over all [government-controlled] supply commodities, such as sugar and soap, and over meat prices. It is to be present in places of production to record the product, its flow, and its distribution channels. In general, one can say that the department monitors commodities that are imported and exported. It reports about them and about adherence to government-set prices. It arrests those who violate these prices and makes them obey the law.

[AL-AYYAM] Has the Supply Investigation Department been able to carry out this role?

[Ghandur] We have tried our best to do something, within the limits of our resources, and in cooperation with the police, state security, and investigation forces. In fact, I can say that within the limits of its available resources—resources that can be described at the very least as modest in equipment and manpower—the Supply Investigation Department has achieved a great deal in the area of monitoring imported and exported commodities and reporting about them. All this has been at the expense of the health and family stability of the department's personnel.

[AL-AYYAM] Yet, despite the achievement you have mentioned, reality says that out-of-control prices are the prevailing rule and that the market dominates. What is the reason? Is it feeble resources, lack of a plan, or both?

[Ghandur] A plan has never been absent. A concept of surveillance rules has been prepared, and the elimination of black market channels is something that is as obvious as can be to us. The problem remains the country's economic abilities and resources, which have cast a direct shadow on the abilities of the Supply Investigation Department. We need to have the force supported with a large number of competent and well-trained personnel. We need more modern means of communication and faster vehicles and cars in order to tighten the surveillance network. But how can we get this, when the treasury, as everybody knows, is empty to the very bottom?

[AL-AYYAM] What is the role of citizens in surveillance? Does the Supply Investigation Department feel that they are cooperating?

[Ghandur] The role of citizens has remained constantly negative. In fact, they deal with the black market as if it were the rule. They do not take the initiative in reporting any pricing violations.

[AL-AYYAM] What punishments are handed down for violators of prices? Are the punishments deterrent and appropriate? Will they stop the phenomenon of out-of-control prices?

[Ghandur] The current punishments are weak and not commensurate with the offense committed. Thus, they do not aid in eliminating the phenomenon. The fines currently in force can be earned in a single hour. The current laws therefore need revision, particularly since they were passed in circumstances different from today's and under economic conditions that we no longer experience. The revised laws need to contain deterrent punishments in order to stop the activity of the black market, which has become a cancer afflicting everyone.

The law alone will not make the black market into a white market. In addition to the law, shortage must be transformed into plenty, since shortage is the pillar of the black market—its legitimate father.

[AL-AYYAM] What about the current bread crisis? What is the department's role in easing high bread prices?

[Ghandur] The department recently issued orders halting the sale of bread from bakeries between 1900 and 0500 hours, in order to prevent bread from going to black-market middlemen. The department has continued to impose surveillance of distribution. An investigation department officer inventories amounts of flour and audits bakeries against the allotments they receive in accordance with established regulations.

[AL-AYYAM] Yet, despite all this role that you have just mentioned as being carried out by the Supply Investigation Department, the crisis exists.

[Ghandur] According to official policy, some bakeries are designated to deal with large institutions and restaurants. On the other hand, the policy obligates neighborhood bakeries to sell bread to citizens. However, the success of this policy requires direct coverage and tight review. To make this a reality, I need 7,000 police just to watch the bakeries. Given current resources, this is utterly impossible. As I said before, one can offset this deficiency through citizen cooperation with us. That is what we currently lack. This weakens our position and strengthens the position of the black market.

South Kordofan Governor Describes Rebel Activities

45040373 Khartoum AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 24 May 89 p 5

[Interview with 'Ali Jamma', commissioner of South Kordofan Province, by Sayf al-Yazal Babikr: "The Rebellion—Has the Advance North Begun?"; in Babanusah, date not given; first three paragraphs are AL-SIYASAH introduction]

[Text] The areas of South Kordofan are passing a critical security turning point. Recently, and in less than 3 years, this has led to incidents of murder that have claimed the lives of hundreds of inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains and of the region. This has been the result of inroads by the rebellion and by rebels into areas in contact with Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, which are considered to be areas of operations.

The rebellion has begun to advance north. This is a fact. It has begun to target peaceful areas in the Nuba Mountains. It has been aided by the fact that the leader of the rebellion in that part of the Sudan is Yusuf Kuwah, a man from the mountains, who knows their paths and roads, how to conduct attacks on them, and how to capture what the inhabitants own.

AL-SIYASAH's reporter visited South Kordofan Province last week and met with Mr 'Ali Jamma', commissioner of the province, in the city of Babanusah. They had a long conversation about the events that the area witnessed on 26 March, when armed rebels attacked entire villages, drove away the inhabitants, and tried to penetrate north, until the Sudanese Armed Forces turned them back, killing some.

[AL-SIYASAH] What is the security situation now? What measures have been taken to prevent rebel infiltration from the south to the west in Kordofan?

[Jamma'] South Kordofan Province is located in an area bordering operations areas in Bahr al-Ghazal Region and Upper Nile. The latter regions have long been the scene of military operations between the rebels and the People's Armed Forces. Thus situated, the region has become subject to attacks of the same kind. They are considered a direct product of the fighting in these two areas. In addition, some Nuba mountaineers who joined John Garang's movement have been trained in the Palfam camps in Ethiopia under the leadership of the rebel Yusuf Kuwah. These groups have caused a number of incidents, including the well-known ones in Umm (Durib) and al-Qurdud, which claimed the lives of a large number of inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains.

After those incidents, the rebel Kuwah and his helpers continued to attack some areas. These operations took place in the mountains and in small villages remote from the Armed Forces and police. The operations continued until a large group of rebels entered the borders of the province on 26 March. The Armed Forces dealt with them, so that they left the region.

I have been told in this regard that the Armed Forces general command issued a report after the end of the operations. It stated that the Armed Forces conducted attacks on 4 April against rebel bands in South Kordofan. The attacks continued until the camps at Fama, Korongo 'Abdallah, and (Tay) were completely destroyed. Forty-eight rebels were killed, and a large number were wounded. The Armed Forces continued their attack and pursued the rebels high into the area's mountains. Three rebels were captured with all their weapons. Thirty-one Kalashnikov rifles were taken, one modified (Garnin) gun, one (Arbji) gun, and 21 (Green) mortars 82. The Armed Forces suffered one casualty and six wounded. The Armed Forces are continuing to pursue the rebel bands to clean them out of the area.

[AL-SIYASAH] The rebellion has targeted particular areas in South Kordofan. What are these areas? To what extent has the rebellion been confined to that area?

[Jamma'] First of all, there is no rebellion in the ordinary sense of the term, as is happening in the southern Sudan. This is a confusion of the facts. South Kordofan Province is composed of three rural council districts. The rebellion has been confined to only one of these, that of

Kaduqli, Umm Dorein, al-Baram, and part of the al-Koalib area are located within it. These are the areas the rebellion has targeted for its activities and where it has continued to exercise all kinds of pressure.

[Jamma'] continuing] These activities have been contained, especially the places that the rebellion has targeted in the al-Koalib mountains and certain areas with large population concentrations and that are considered to be border and agricultural areas. The rebellion has also targeted a chain of mountains located within South Kordofan Province, from the city of Dalam, and including the agricultural projects in the Habila area.

The remaining areas of the province are considered to be normal—e.g., the Talawdi, Kologi, and Rashad areas, as well as the Dilling and Masiriyah areas generally, apart from some pockets in (Akbi). This means that the greater part of the province lies outside the zone of the rebellion.

[AL-SIYASAH] How are the citizens led to the rebellion?

[Jamma'] Either by fear or deception. Because of living conditions, scanty means of subsistence, and lack of many necessities, some citizens in these areas are led to fall in with the first call of this rebellion. This is a kind of deception. The rebels tell them that they will provide them what they do not find there. The second reason is fear of the rebels. The latter threaten to murder citizens' children and rape their wives. So the citizens fall in out of fear for their lives and the lives of their families.

[AL-SIYASAH] Have the area and regional leadership and the Armed Forces made a plan to eliminate the pockets of rebellion targeting South Kordofan? In particular, Yusuf Kuwah's forces remain deployed in areas near the mountains and the province.

[Jamma'] Yes, there is a careful plan to eliminate all pockets of rebellion in all areas belonging to South Kordofan Province, particularly the western region. However, for reasons of military tactics, I cannot talk about this plan now.

3 Axes for Eliminating the Rebellion

[AL-SIYASAH] From information obtained during the last 2 days, after meeting with the commissioner, we have learned that the Sudanese Armed Forces, in cooperation with the regional government, have laid down a three-part plan to eliminate the pockets of rebellion that have recently begun to spread in the South Kordofan region. One aspect of the plan is to close the rebels' infiltration routes into the area. These areas are to be constantly studied, and broad combing operations are to be conducted, including the mountain areas and the areas from which the rebels have come. In addition to this plan, the citizens have played a large role in restoring security to their region. They have participated with the Armed Forces in combing

operations and in dislodging bands, so that they have left the region entirely. This role has elicited the approval of the Armed Forces, which have facilitated these citizen operations.

Also, Mr 'Abd-al-Rasul al-Nur, governor of Kordofan Region, has himself taken an interest in the events. He has visited the area and inspected citizens' conditions, not leaving the area until order was established.

In general, South Kordofan has in the recent period been the scene of unfortunate events to which innocent people have fallen victim. This is because the rebellion began to spread its poisons among citizens in areas remote from governments and various security agencies.

[AL-SIYASAH] Has the security situation in the area influenced living conditions and the stability of citizens in general?

[Jamma'] Of course an effect has occurred, but it has not been extensive. As for the current living situation, the living standard since the last rainy season has been excellent and reasonable in all parts of the province. There is abundant produce from mechanized and traditional agriculture. There was a labor problem, but it was able to be overcome.

As for [government-distributed] food supplies, there is a scarcity, because the amounts earmarked for the province do not arrive. I think this is a general situation that also applies to the other regions generally. The supplies present are sufficient for citizens' needs. There is no scarcity of goods. Most of them are available. The problem lies in their flow from the capital to the regions. Especially factory products—their flow to the regions is weak because of transportation and other problems.

[AL-SIYASAH] Has the South Kordofan administration been concerned about food security and providing the means of a comfortable life to the citizens?

[Jamma'] Our administration is concentrating on food security. This is represented by an interest in agriculture. We are encouraging mechanized agriculture. We are mostly interested in growing sorghum. Efforts are being made for storage after the end of the harvest. There are many storage silos. More planning is needed, so that the maximum benefit can be obtained.

The region is interested in producing cash crops, such as gum, beans, and sesame. These are considered the main crop on which citizens rely. They are grown in very wide areas. All of this is in order to provide the area with the maximum amount of food security.

[AL-SIYASAH] The province is suffering acutely from health problems.

[Jamma'] Yes, there are major health problems facing us. In the city of Kaduqli, the provincial capital, there are only five doctors. We face the coming rainy season without a single specialist. In addition, there is a severe shortage of medicines. This may be due to the general shortage of medicine in the Sudan, but there are administrative obstacles that block the flow of initially inadequate supplies of medicines. We believe that this deteriorating health situation could be better than it is.

The province's budget is considered to be extremely limited. Of the budget earmarked for the province, 80 percent consists of support from the central government, and most of this falls under the heading of salaries.

Self-support exists, but is weak. Revenue sources are influenced by the general situation, and the collection rate is low. Services are therefore low.

[AL-SIYASAH] Is there monitoring of the entry of goods into the province and of their departure for other areas?

[Jamma'] There is monitoring of each commodity reaching the province from the regional government or the capital. Commodities are distributed under the supervision of the competent authorities. There is complete cooperation between regions to regulate the flow of food provisions according to official legal procedure.

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